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THE UNIVERSAL CHURCH AND THE WORLD OF NATIONS

VOLUME VII
The Official
Oxford Conference
Books

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7. THE UNIVERSAL CHURCH AND THE WORLD OF NATIONS
by the Marquess of Lothian, Sir Alfred Zimmern, Dr. O. von der Gablentz, John Foster Dulles, Prof. Max Huber, Pastor W. Menn, the Rev. V. A. Demant, Prof. Otto Piper, Canon C. E. Raven

THE OXFORD CONFERENCE: Official Report
Including the full text of the reports issued by the five sections of the Conference, Oxford, England, 1937. With an introduction by J. H. Oldham

WORLD CHAOS OR WORLD CHRISTIANITY
A popular interpretation of Oxford and Edinburgh, 1937
by Henry Smith Leiper

THE UNIVERSAL CHURCH
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WORLD OF NATIONS

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by

MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN
SIR ALFRED ZIMMERN
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MAX HUBER
JOHN FOSTER DULLES
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WILHELM MENN
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

FEW will question the significance of the issues which engaged the attention of the conference on Church, Community, and State held at Oxford in July, 1937. More important than the conference itself is the continuing process, in which the conference was not more than an incident, of an attempt on the part of the Christian churches collectively — without, up to the present, the official participation of the Church of Rome, but not without the unofficial help of some of its thinkers and scholars [1] — to understand the true nature of the vital conflict between the Christian faith and the secular and pagan tendencies of our time, and to see more clearly the responsibilities of the church in relation to the struggle. What is at stake is the future of Christianity. The Christian foundations of western civilization have in some places been swept away and are everywhere being undermined. The struggle today concerns those common assumptions regarding the meaning of life without which, in some form, no society can cohere. These vast issues are focussed in the relation of the church to the state and to the community, because the non-Christian forces of today are tending more and more to find embodiment in an all-powerful state, committed to a particular philosophy of life and seeking to organize the whole of life in accordance with a particular doctrine of the end of man's existence, and in an all-embracing community life

[1] A volume of papers by Roman Catholic writers dealing with subjects closely akin to the Oxford Conference and stimulated in part by the preparatory work for Oxford will be published shortly under the title *Die Kirche Christi: ihre heilende, gestaltende und ordnende Kraft für den Menschen und seine Welt.*

which claims to be at once the source and the goal of all human activities: a state, that is to say, which aims at being also a church.

To aid in the understanding of these issues the attempt was made in preparation for the conference at Oxford to enlist as many as possible of the ablest minds in different countries in a common effort to think out some of the major questions connected with the theme of the conference. During the three years preceding the conference studies were undertaken wider in their range and more thorough in their methods than any previous effort of a similar kind on the part of the Christian churches. This was made possible by the fact that the Universal Christian Council for Life and Work, under whose auspices the conference was held, possessed a department of research at Geneva with two full-time directors and was also able, in view of the conference, to establish an office in London with two full-time workers and to set up an effective agency for the work of research in America. There was thus provided the means of circulating in mimeographed form (in many instances in three languages) a large number of papers for comment, of carrying on an extensive and continuous correspondence, and of maintaining close personal touch with many leading thinkers and scholars in different countries.

Intensive study over a period of three years was devoted to nine main subjects. The results of this study are embodied in the six volumes to which this general introduction relates and in two others. The plan and contents of each, and most of the papers, were discussed in at least two or three small international conferences or groups. The contributions were circulated in first draft to a number of critics in different countries and comments were received often from as many as thirty or forty persons. Nearly all

the papers were revised, and in some instances entirely rewritten, in the light of these criticisms.

Both the range of the contributions and the fact that the papers have taken their present shape as the result of a wide international interchange of ideas give these books an ecumenical character which marks a new approach to the subjects with which they deal. They thus provide an opportunity such as has hardly existed before for the study in an ecumenical context of some of the grave and pressing problems which today concern the Christian church throughout the world.

The nine subjects to which preparatory study was devoted were the following:

1. The Christian Understanding of Man.
2. The Kingdom of God and History.
3. Christian Faith and the Common Life.
4. The Church and Its Function in Society.
5. Church and Community.
6. Church and State.
7. Church, Community and State in Relation to the Economic Order.
8. Church, Community and State in Relation to Education.
9. The Universal Church and the World of Nations.

The last six of these subjects were considered at the Oxford Conference, and the reports prepared by the sections into which the conference was divided will be found in the official report of the conference entitled *The Oxford Conference, Official Report.* (Willett, Clark & Company).

A volume on *The Church and its Function in Society,* by Dr. W. A. Visser 't Hooft and Dr. J. H. Oldham (Willett, Clark & Company), was published prior to the conference.

Three of the volumes in the present series of six have to

do with the first three subjects in the list already given. These are fundamental issues which underlie the study of all the other subjects. The titles of these volumes are:

The Christian Understanding of Man.
The Kingdom of God and History.
The Christian Faith and the Common Life.

The remaining three volumes in the series are a contribution to the study of three of the main subjects considered by the Oxford Conference. These are:

Church and Community.
Church, Community and State in Relation to Education.
The Universal Church and the World of Nations.

The subject of church and state is treated in a book by Mr. Nils Ehrenström, one of the directors of the research department. This has been written in the light of discussions in several international conferences and groups and of a wide survey of the relevant literature, and has been published under the title *Christian Faith and the Modern State* (Willett, Clark & Company).

The planning and shaping of the volume is to a large extent the work of the directors of the research department, Dr. Hans Schönfeld and Mr. Nils Ehrenström. The editorial work and the preparation of the volumes for the press owes everything to the continuous labor of Miss Olive Wyon, who has also undertaken or revised the numerous translations, and in the final stages to the Rev. Edward S. Shillito, who during the last weeks accepted the responsibility of seeing the books through the press. Valuable help and advice was also given throughout the undertaking by Professor H. P. Van Dusen and Professor John Bennett of America.

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THE DEMONIC INFLUENCE OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY

by

THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN

THE DEMONIC INFLUENCE OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY

I

Few people seem to realize the far-reaching and demonic effects which the almost universal acceptance of national sovereignty as the basis of our present-day world order has both in producing war and in making impossible fidelity to the moral law or to Christian principle both in international and in increasing spheres of national life. It is no exaggeration to say that unless it can be overcome it will be difficult to avoid the catastrophies prophesied in Mr. H. G. Wells' book *The Shape of Things to Come.* It is a commonplace that without "law and order" no organized civilized life for individuals can exist. Without the reign of law man becomes preoccupied with the defence of himself, his family, his home, and his food supply. The might of the club or the gun is able to overrule justice and so make peaceful cooperative life and liberty impossible. It is exactly the same on the larger stage of the world as a whole. Anarchy forces nations to think first and last about themselves, and especially about their own security, exalts might above right, makes war indigenous, and so destroys the possibility of a civilized and Christian society among men.

There never has been a time when war was not constant on the earth. A long peace only endured when great empires like the Roman or the Chinese or Mogul empires established law and order over great areas and vast numbers of the human race. But despotic empires of this kind con-

tained within themselves the seed of their own decay, because they atrophied the independence, the initiative, and the public spirit of their citizens by requiring blind obedience to authority and corrupted their rulers with arbitrary and absolute power. But the shrinkage in time and space through the discoveries of modern science has made the demonic and destructive power of anarchy infinitely more savage and powerful than ever before, and the need to overcome it correspondingly urgent.

II

People often accuse nationalism of being the cause of war. But it is necessary to distinguish between nationality and nationalism. Nationality has been fundamentally a healthy movement. It has encouraged self-respect and the desire for freedom from external oppression, and it has stimulated unity and public spirit as against individual selfishness and parochial narrowness. It is not easy to define with precision the basis of nationality. It is a compound of race, language, culture, religion, and geography. It is a sense of brotherhood and community. It is a recognition of the fact that while civilization may be becoming one in the sense that the whole world is adopting the same modes of daily living and is becoming interested in the same things, it is vital that there should be variety and individuality within it. But if nationality may be described as individuality, nationalism is egotism, the worship of the national self carrying with it fear and hatred of or indifference to other nations. This evil springs likely from the identification of nationality with the sovereign state, when, as we shall see, it becomes subject to all the baleful pressures to selfishness, arrogance, imperialism, fear, suspicion, hatred, and war which inevitably impinge upon those who live under conditions of anarchy.

III

Others accuse capitalism of being the cause of war. This is not the place to discuss the rival merits of the individualist and the socialist ideals. One of the main tasks of this century is clearly to discover some working synthesis between individual initiative and liberty and the collective good of the community as a whole. But it is profoundly untrue to regard capitalism as a main cause of war or socialism as a remedy for war. Capitalism does not produce war inside the state, nor would it produce war inside a world state. Capitalism, indeed, is an international force. Businessmen have few racial or national prejudices when it comes to matters of business. Left to itself the capitalist system would rapidly link the whole world in a single economic structure. Admittedly, capitalism does not distribute wealth evenly or justly. Hence the necessity for social reform to mitigate the effects of competition on the individual and to equalize living conditions through the taxing system. But it is national sovereignty which twists capitalism as it twists nationality into an element of international discord. It is the existence of the sovereign state, which long preceded modern capitalism, which on the one hand produces economic nationalism, with its constant dislocation of international economic life by tariffs, embargoes, quotas, subsidies, and prohibitions, and on the other hand induces business men to try to capitalize patriotism for their own ends and to influence the machinery of the sovereign state to secure privileges and concessions as against their rivals in other states or to establish imperialist control over other countries. Capitalism aggravates the risk of war, but the root cause of war lies in sovereignty and not capitalism.

These evils would not disappear, though they would

change their form, if all nations were to become socialist states tomorrow. The anarchy of national sovereignty would still produce its fatal effects. Few of them would be self-supporting. Those that were self-supporting would be peaceful as the countries with the largest territories are peaceful today. But the prosperity, employment, and rising standard of the rest would depend upon their being able to exchange their own surplus products for the exact things which they needed to import from other countries.

The task of negotiating agreements between seventy sovereign states so that the imports and exports of each would fit in with the needs of all the rest, especially when one considers that such agreements would necessarily involve changes in the occupations and dwelling-place of millions of families, would be extremely difficult. It might well produce as much tension and risk of war as is caused by the interference of the sovereign state in the automatic adjustment of supply and demand through the operation of the price system in a capitalist economy.

The truth is that it is the sovereign state, and neither capitalism nor socialism, which is the principal root of the modern drift towards war, and we are far more likely to arrive at a rational approach to the socialist-individualist controversy when we realize the prodigious effect upon both of international anarchy.

IV

Yet the state in itself is a wholly beneficent, indeed an entirely indispensable, institution. Its primary function is to establish and maintain peace — or as it is sometimes called, law and order. Peace, in the political sense of the word, is a positive thing. It is that organic form of society in which political, economic, and social issues are settled by the enactment of law, applied and interpreted

by the courts, and in which resort to violence or war as a means of settling disputes is prohibited and prevented. Peace, in this sense, does not just happen. It is the creation of a specific political institution. That institution is the state. The state is *the* instrument which enables human beings to end war and begin to lead a civilized life. Never from the beginning of recorded history nor on any part of the earth's surface has there been peace except within a state. The state may be a primitive tribal rulership in Africa or a vast system of republics integrated by the Communist party like Soviet Russia. It may be an advanced democratic republic like the United States, a totalitarian dictatorship like National Socialist Germany, or a placid constitutional monarchy like Sweden. It may be a brutal tyranny or a benevolent republic. It may be managed in the interest of the ruler, or an aristocratic caste, or the bourgeoisie, or the proletariat, or of all the people voting at parliamentary elections. But in every case peace, and what flows from peace, the possibility of justice, freedom, and the increasing welfare of the people, only appears when the state appears. Until the state appears there is only anarchy and violence and private or public war. No other institution has ever been devised as a substitute for the state because the coming into being of the state is the ending of private war and violence, and the substitution for them of the reign of law.

The essence of the state is not contract, it is dedication. The individual cannot contract out of his duties as a citizen. Wherever he goes he is a citizen or a subject of some state. He is bound to obey the law or he goes to jail. He is bound to pay the prescribed taxes or his money is forcibly taken from him. He is bound to help to support the law and the policeman. The state, as Hegel said, is, in a measure, the recognition of the fact that we are members

one of another, parts of a society which is not a mere fortuitous aggregation of unrelated atoms but an organic whole. That is why he regarded it as an almost divine institution, which it is not.

The extent to which justice, liberty, and well-being flow from the state depends upon its form; there are many forms of state, and the kind of society which will exist and whether it subserves the interests of some or of all the people will depend on who in fact controls its executive, legislative, and judicial machinery and the spirit which animates them. They may be a monarch or an aristocracy, the elected majorities in a democratic state or the dictatorial parties of fascist or communist states. But there can be neither justice, nor liberty, nor well-being, as there can be no peace, except where the state, in one of its forms, exists.

The state, however, does not eschew violence. On the contrary, it claims that it alone is entitled to use violence. It could not, indeed, exist without the use of violence. It habitually uses violence. Moreover, the violence it uses is irresistible violence. A great number of the laws it enacts and the changes which it brings about are inevitably objected to by individuals or sections of the community. They are often obeyed by minorities only because they know that disobedience involves fines, imprisonment, or death. Yet if the state did not enforce the law, and do so irresistibly, individuals and groups would inevitably begin to use violence or fraud to defend or promote their own rights or interests, and society itself would dissolve in anarchy. In one sense, therefore, the state is violence, but violence only used in accordance with law and, in a democratic and constitutional state, as a result of an electoral decision by a majority of its citizens.

V

It is because of these tremendous powers, inherent in all states, that the evils of inter-state anarchy are so terrible. For in a conflict of states the whole population of each and all its assets are flung, as a unit, into the struggle. Let us examine first the economic consequences.

The discoveries of natural science and the industrial revolution have placed in the hands of man the possibility of plenty for all. The essence of the process was invention of the machine and new sources of power, the division of labor, the specialization of the task of the individual workman, and by means of capital obtained from private subscribers and through competent management, the assembly of raw materials from all over the earth into the factory and the sale by competent salesmanship, also all over the earth, of the resultant product. The early days of the industrial revolution were marked with immense profits and large losses for capital and with terrible hardships for workers driven or drawn from the land and often herded in towns in wretched dwellings, and working for excessive hours and in noisome factories. Nonetheless, conditions were gradually improved in most countries by factory acts, social insurance against unemployment and sickness and for old age, trades unionism, universal education, and so forth, and it is generally agreed that in western Europe the standard of living of mankind rose no less than fourfold during the nineteenth century.

But if this rise in standards was to continue, free trade, freedom for migration, freedom for the movement of capital, were necessary, as well as a great increase in the regulatory and supervisory activities of government under the general head of social reform. The organization of the economic resources of the world required immense supplies

of capital, a prodigious migration of population, the development of raw materials and markets in all parts of the globe, the uninterrupted exchange of food, raw materials, and manufactured articles, as well as an increasing social conscience to ensure that the fruits of this enterprise were properly shared and laws for the protection of labor were passed and enforced.

During a considerable part of the nineteenth century this free economy existed in greater or less degree. But gradually it has been destroyed through the intervention of the sovereign state. Whether the alleged motive was to protect the standard of living of workers who had machinery at their disposal against the competition of low-paid workers who had little save their hands, and *vice versa,* or to increase the profits of the employer, or to ensure the nearest approximation to self-sufficiency in time of war, or to offset the consequences of the one-way traffic necessary to meet extravagant international indebtedness, especially payments for reparations or war debts, it has been the action of the sovereign state which has profoundly dislocated the pre-war economy by means of tariffs, embargoes, quotas, prohibitions, and finally the destruction of the old international currency based on gold. The sovereign state, thinking of itself, indeed unable by the law of its own self-centered being to think of the world, or of humanity as a whole, took action, supposedly in its own interests, which produced the worst depression ever known, enlarged the total number of unemployed to thirty millions in 1931, completely destroyed the old world balance between supply and demand, ruined millions of farmers in some parts of the world while ruining countless businesses and throwing out of work millions of workers most anxious to consume the farmers' products in other parts. And out of the enormous social tensions so set up has sprung every kind of

domestic disorder which has resulted in the overthrow of democracy in many countries on the ground that nothing but dictatorship was strong enough to keep order, or to make the far-reaching internal changes rendered necessary by these external pressures.

In these circumstances the calm and gradual discussion of social reform, of the problem of reconciling the socialist and the individualist ideals, has become almost impossible. Nation after nation, after plunging into a struggle between ruthless fascist and communist factions, has succumbed to the dictatorship of one or the other, with immense consequences, not only for their domestic life, but on the international front also. Yet the root cause of these disorders has been the anarchy of national sovereignties.

VI

But it is when we turn to consider the consequences of national sovereignty on international political life that we begin to realize the full nature of the evil.

The causes of war in the modern world are manifold: unjust treaties, out-of-date treaties, maltreatment of minorities, or separation of minorities from the parent race, need for markets or raw materials, pressure of population or inadequate soil, racial, linguistic, cultural, or religious differences. But none of these causes of war compares with the consequences of national sovereignty itself. The most obvious effect of the anarchy of national sovereignties is that every international dispute, whatever its origins, is discussed as a conflict between two or more sovereignties, and that there is no authority responsible for considering it or capable of legislating a solution for it, from the standpoint of the well-being of the whole.

But an even more serious consequence of this anarchy is that where discussion does not produce agreement, there

is no remedy but the threat or the use of force — that is, power diplomacy or war. Minor or " justiciable " matters may be referred to arbitration or an international court. But no court can discharge the functions of a legislature, and matters which, inside a state, would be settled by Parliament or the executive on behalf of the whole, can only be determined, in international affairs, by negotiation and diplomacy, or failing voluntary agreement, by violence, between the parties. It is this central fact which produces the inexorable movement towards world war with which history makes us so familiar. Not only are national states inclined to disagree because they look at every problem from their own point of view, but the possibility of their reaching agreement is made far more difficult by the fact that they have to consider every disputed question from the standpoint of their own security in the event of war. The objection to the Anschluss, for instance, was not any desire to prevent Austrian Germans and German Germans uniting, if they wished to, but the fear of its effect on the strategic balance in central Europe. And one of the principal reasons for colonial expansion was the anxiety lest some other country would gain an advantage in power or strategic position, just as perhaps the principal difficulty in the way of colonial rearrangement today is its strategic consequences for the security of the nations concerned.

But the trouble does not end there. Because every serious international question involves the possibility of war, nations, even the most pacific nations, arm themselves, partly to ensure that their rights will be respected, partly to make certain that if war does break out, they will be able to defend themselves. So the competition in armaments sets in, for while no nation-state wants to spend more money than is necessary on armaments, it wants to provide for its own security by having just that margin of superiority which will ensure that, in the event of war, it will win and

not lose. In other words, the security of every nation tends to depend upon the insecurity of its neighbors. And if a nation cannot obtain this security by its own strength alone it will make alliances with others. As this process continues the merits of every international question of importance become overlaid by considerations of strategy and power. Morality is dethroned by prestige and *Machtpolitik*. Secrecy replaces open diplomacy, for, with war in the offing, there are facts and considerations which cannot be disclosed. The *status quo* becomes more and more unalterable, because the organization of security has come to depend upon it. There may be a few minor adjustments made here and there. In a crisis of power a particular nation may prefer the humiliation of retreat to the risk of war. But every such retreat makes retreat on the next occasion more and more difficult, and stimulates the competition in armaments. And, finally, as armaments reach their limits and there are no more alliances to make, the terrible military time-table comes into being. The world, or a major part of it, becomes divided into two great armed camps, each increasingly unable to look at international problems from the standpoint of reason or justice, each armed to the teeth, and with its military preparations so complete that speed in mobilization or in launching an air attack may make the difference between victory and defeat. In such circumstances the decision as to peace and war passes out of the hands of statesmen, for a world war may be precipitated by an accident, a knave or a fool starting an act in some remote part of the world which brings somewhere the vast and interrelated machinery of mobilization into action. This is what produced the war of 1914, for no one deliberately pressed the button for world war. The risks today have been made immeasurably greater by the existence of air power.

While historians will debate to the end of time the dis-

tribution of responsibility for the late World War there can be no doubt that the principal cause was the anarchy of national sovereignties. Europe had had a comparatively quiet century, for the nations were preoccupied with the industrial revolution in a world in which migration and trade was comparatively free, and in its own expansion over Asia and Africa. But gradually national sovereignty began to close the doors of trade, colonial expansion began to be looked at more and more from the standpoint of strategy and power, the rise of the German navy was notice that a new power had entered world politics, and crisis approached as the old absolute empires of Turkey and Austria-Hungary began to totter to their doom under the growing forces of nationality within them. Amid the growing tension which the race in armaments began, every diplomatic issue began to be a trial of strength. Europe became grouped into two great camps, and after one or two preliminary power crises the assassination of Franz Ferdinand precipitated a mobilization which set in motion a military time-table whose inexorable operation no one would stop.

It is exactly the same story since the war. Appalled by the catastrophe, the nations agreed at Paris to create a league of all nations which was to prevent war and adjust international disputes by pacific means. Its members undertook to submit all questions to judicial settlement, arbitration, or investigation by the Council or Assembly of the League. They agreed not to resort to war until they had given the pacific machinery of the league a full chance to work, and to take sanctions against any power which went to war in disregard of its obligations. They agreed to disarm. Later under the Kellogg Pact they renounced altogether the use of war as an instrument of national policy. But national sovereignty has destroyed these sincere hopes. In the first place the United States refused to

join the league because of the onerous obligations in Europe it entailed. National interest prevailed over world organization. In the second place, the league has proved in practice unable to make any substantial revision of the Versailles *status quo* created by the treaty, for the reason that no revision can be made except with the consent of the parties concerned, and these parties think of the issue not only from a self-centered standpoint but from the point of view of the effect of the proposal on their own security. The league without the United States became little more than part of the machinery for maintaining against Germany the unilateral discriminations contained in the Treaty of Versailles, until the National Socialist movement took the task of revision into its own forceful hands. In the third place, as has been proved over the Manchurian and Abyssinian crises, the security offered by the covenant against aggressors has broken down because it is now clear that economic sanctions are ineffective unless they are both universally backed by a readiness to go to war, and by an overwhelming preponderance in the event of war, and that individual nations will only undertake such risks if their own national interests are vitally concerned. So, as the exhaustion caused by the war has disappeared, we see, despite the league, a recommencement of the same kind of events as precipitated the last war. The weak have had to yield to the strong. Rearmament has destroyed the hopes of disarmament. Alliances have reappeared, though sometimes they are disguised in covenant terms. Revision of treaties which might have been easy while the world was exhausted and relatively disarmed has become increasingly impossible as strategic security has begun to replace morality and justice, and *Machtpolitik* has begun to replace open discussion, as the motive of national policy.

VII

It is difficult, therefore, to exaggerate the demonic consequences which flow from unlimited national sovereignty in the modern world. It has been the main root of the economic nationalism which has caused the vast unemployment and capital losses through the cessation of international trade, the dislocation of the world balance between supply and demand, and the overthrow of democracy by dictatorship in country after country. It has been the remorseless enemy of the League of Nations, which is now compelling the world to come back to competitive armaments and alliances and to the military time-table, made ten times more fatal today by air power. It is slowly compelling every nation not only to militarize itself in its external relations but in its internal life also, and is once more dethroning morality and right in favor of force. It is preventing the constitutional solution of the issue between socialism and individualism by turning it into a world-wide struggle between fascism and communism.

It has been estimated by Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler that the last war — the war of national sovereignties — cost 30,000,000 lives and £80,000,000,000. "With that amount," he has said, "we could have built a £500 house with £200 worth of furniture and placed it on five acres of land worth £20 an acre for every family in the United States, Canada, Australia, England, Wales, Ireland, Scotland, France, Belgium, Germany, and Russia. There would have been enough left over to give to every city of 20,000 inhabitants and over in all these countries a £1,000,000 library and a £2,000,000 university. Out of the balance we could have set aside a sum at 5 per cent interest which would have paid for all time a £200 yearly salary for 125,000 teachers and 125,000 nurses. After having done all

this we could still have bought up all France and Belgium and everything they possessed in 1914, every home, factory, church, railway, and street car." That was the price paid for national sovereignty twenty years ago. What will be the price next time?

VIII

A League of Nations is no cure for this state of affairs. It has immense importance as representing mankind's first recognition of the need for world government and for a reign of law among the nations. It creates excellent machinery for international deliberation and the pacific settlement of international disputes, so long as all nations are members and are willing to submit to its procedure. But because it is based upon the complete national sovereignty of its members it begins to be paralyzed as soon as one or more powerful states resign membership or repudiate their obligations under the covenant, for contract is utterly different from common sovereignty. No league of sovereign states can establish peace in the political sense of that word. The reasons for this were exhaustively set forth in the pages of *The Federalist* through which Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay described to their fellow citizens how state sovereignty inexorably broke down the American Confederation of 1781 and why the pooling of sovereignty in a federation actually achieved in 1789, was the only way to peace, order, and the reign of law in America. Europe and the world have had exactly the same experience of the manner in which state sovereignty has broken down the League of Nations since 1920. Because its members are sovereign the league can exercise neither legislative, executive, judicial, nor taxing power. So long as there was general acceptance of the political and economic *status quo* the league system worked. But

gradually national sovereignty undermined it. It was unable to abate in the least economic nationalism, with all its fateful consequences. It could only alter the *status quo* with the voluntary consent of those most immediately concerned, which has not been obtainable. "Collective security" has almost vanished because economic sanctions are of little value unless universally applied, and military sanctions and even effective economic sanctions against a powerful sovereign state involve a risk of war which members are not prepared to assume unless their own vital interests are involved. A league of sovereign states therefore tends to become a system not for the revision of treaties in the interests of justice, but to become an alliance system of those who are interested in the *status quo*. The essential weakness of the league is disclosed in the fact that the allegiance of the citizen is owed to his own state and not to the league, and that when the views of the two conflict it is the decisions of his own state that he must obey.

No system of cooperation can overcome the tremendous power of national sovereignty. There is, indeed, no ultimate remedy for the demonic evils which spring from national sovereignty save the creation of a common sovereignty representing all men and nations by the pooling of that part of state sovereignty which deals with supernational matters, in a world federation — a state which, in its own sphere, will command the allegiance of mankind, will be able to legislate for, judge, and tax everybody, and which will be responsible to everybody while leaving the national state freedom to deal with affairs in the national sphere. When such a body comes into being, then and then only will war end and the perversions and destructions inherent in the competition of national sovereignties be ended on earth. Such a federation need not embrace the whole world from the start. It could commence with

a smaller group of nations which understand the truth and then grow by accretion.

Pacifism is no remedy for war, for it does nothing to substitute for the anarchy of sovereignties, which is the real cause of war, the single sovereignty which alone can end it. Pacifism only encourages the brutal use of violence. Armament is no cure for war, for while it may determine which side wins or whether democracy triumphs over dictatorship or *vice versa,* it also does nothing to end anarchy or to abolish the fears and suspicions, the alliances and military time-table, which end in war.

IX

What is the bearing of Christianity on the demonic evils which thus spring from the worship of national sovereignty? The federation of nations into a single world commonwealth may be the logical remedy, but it is not a practical remedy today. In fact, the creation of a world federation either by force or by agreement might lead to worse evils than those from which we now suffer. It would either be a tyranny so strict and repressive that freedom of thought and initiative and religion would almost certainly be destroyed, or it would be so weak that the differences in race, language, culture, and religion among its peoples would speedily tear it into pieces. All the attempts to create peace by world empire have broken down through the atrophy which universal despotism induced in its subjects and the corruption which arbitrary and absolute power induced in the rulers. That has been true of Egypt, Assyria, the Moguls, the Manchus, and of the Roman Empire.

Yet Christianity clearly cannot acquiesce in the claim of the national state that it has a sovereign claim to the obedience of the citizen whatever its commands may be, that

there is no higher loyalty or law than its own interests, that, in fact, it must be accorded the attributes of God. To the Christian man loyalty is owed to God, whatever his race, or culture, or language may be, and it is this truth recognized and practised which alone can begin to bring unity and law and peace among the conflicting races and the warring sovereignties which now claim the allegiance of mankind. It is love for and understanding of God which alone can create the conditions in which the federation of man will become a possibility and in which war and the demonic consequences of national sovereignty can be ended. For the manifestation of the Spirit among men will lessen the egotism of nationalism, will weaken the hold of despotic political creeds and pagan philosophies, and will substitute brotherly love and trust for envy, hatred, greed, and suspicion in international relations, both political and economic. It will mean a transformed human nature in which men and nations will not only feel their unity but will be able to trust one another because they act on the same just and honorable and unselfish standards. When this Christian transformation of man through love and understanding of the one true God has gone far enough, the nature and purposes of mankind will be so changed that it will be natural, easy, indeed inevitable, to bring into being institutions which will deal with international problems from the standpoint of the well-being of humanity as a whole, and whereby the legislative, executive, and judicial functions of the world federation will be exercised under some kind of democratic control, and in accordance with moral and spiritual law, and without any of the despotic, repressive, illiberal features which would necessarily characterize a world state today. For the Spirit of the Lord will inform its policy and its acts, and " where the Spirit of the Lord is there is liberty."

It is certainly not the duty of the church, as the vehicle through which Spirit reaches man, to advocate the creation of a federation of nations today. But the effective growth of Christianity in the minds and hearts of mankind will inevitably tend to bring such a consummation, with its ending of war and the demonism which springs from anarchy, into being. We have already once in history witnessed the power of Christianity to begin to do this very thing. At the outset Jesus refused to lend himself to the movement among the Jews which sought to break up the Roman Empire, and it was his refusal to surrender to nationalism which enabled the priests to rally the populace to the demand for the release of Barabbas and his own crucifixion. Thus when asked whether his disciples should pay tribute to Caesar, he replied, " Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's." It is not unreasonable to infer that Jesus understood the advantage to humanity of a universal empire which, for all its ruthlessness, gave peace and the reign of a fairly advanced system of law to the then civilized world, apart from India, China, and the Far East, and considered that it was the duty of Christians to transform it by the Spirit they manifested rather than to destroy it. Paul certainly thought so. And Christianity, not Judaism, eventually did conquer Rome, and in doing so tempered its brutality with tolerance and humanity. It did more. As the Empire of Rome began to decay, as Greco-Roman culture became lifeless and wooden, as new cults from the Orient began to undermine the austere faith and morality of the older Roman society, as the empire began to break up under the ceaseless attacks of the uncivilized but vigorous " barbarians " from the north, Christianity itself became the unifying, civilizing, and humanizing power in a new society more extensive than the old. For centuries

savagery was tempered by the consciousness that Christendom was a unity and that the civil power owed obedience to the higher law of God.

But in its struggles the Christian church lost its primitive simplicity. It put on the attributes of Caesar rather than of God, and became concerned with the expediences and compromises of the world. After Constantine the attempt to identify church and state gradually involved the church in political divisions and conflicts. And it was the attempt of the church to maintain the unity of Christendom by turning the papacy into a temporal Caesarism compelling the state to use its police powers to suppress freedom of thought within itself that finally precipitated the Reformation at the time of the Renaissance. So the unity of Christendom disappeared. As the authority of Christianity waned, new cults and creeds, founded on material and not spiritual foundations, began to raise their heads. The national state began to claim the absolute allegiance which was no longer given to the universal church. The discoveries of natural science and the rediscovery of ancient philosophies and cultures began to restore secularism or paganism as the effective faith of the vast majority of the educated classes in the world. But the individual, selfish as he largely is, cannot live unto himself alone. He needs some loyalty for the sake of which he will lay down even his own life. For several centuries the national state has been the main object for which in practice the mass of mankind have been willing to surrender their lives. Hence this anarchy, with all its demonic consequences, in which we live today. And now new political religions, fascism and communism, are claiming a similar dedication for new forms of state.

Nonetheless, though Christianity clearly needs to be revitalized, theology restated, it remains true, as a noted

Oriental scholar has said, that all the real achievements of Western civilization, the respect for human personality, the humanitarian movement, the abolition of slavery, individual freedom, the emancipation of women, the ideal of moral purity, the concept of social reform, the rise of democracy, the assault on war, the idea of the League of Nations, have all derived their greatest support and their greatest driving power from those who have drawn their courage and inspiration and devotion to God and man from the eternal springs of the Bible. Yet Christianity today stands confronted with a task greater than has ever been presented to it. It has to overcome not only the paganism and secularism of our age, but to overcome also the political and economic divisions of which the national state is the most ruthless and powerful, which are tearing human society to pieces, making the practice of Christianity increasingly difficult and driving mankind to the demonism and wars which are inseparable from anarchy. The ecumenical church of Christ will not do this by becoming absorbed in the political and economic programmes and ideals of the time. Neither will it do so by standing apart from the public questions of the age. Christianity produces as acute transformations and controversies in the body politic in which it is lived, as it does in the individual who begins to practise it. The church will accomplish its mission by being faithful to the unchanging spiritual law of God rather than to the experiences of men, and by being the expression of that active and practical love and wisdom of God towards men which, once it is reflected in society, will inevitably produce the kingdom of God among the nations of the earth.

THE ETHICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS OF A WORLD ORDER

by

Sir Alfred Zimmern

THE ETHICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS OF A WORLD ORDER

THE title assigned to this chapter admits of several different meanings. If the discussion on the subject is to be fruitful the first need is to disentangle them. Let us begin with a bare enumeration, leaving comment till later.

(1) *There is a world order now in existence.* It has been established and is being maintained by human effort. What are the ethical factors that are involved in that effort? What exactly is the quality of the goodness which " keeps the world going "?

(2) *There is a world society now in existence but it has not yet been reduced to order.* The continuance of disorder is due to certain moral deficiencies. Can we put our finger on these? And, if so, can they be corrected?

(3) *There is no world society in existence and, in the nature of things, there can never be one.* This is not due to any deficiency in man's moral nature. It is due to his inherited make-up. Man is not made to live in a large-scale society. He is essentially a small-scale creature. Thus the problem is not one of the " ethical " but of the " biological " presuppositions of a world order and the results of such an enquiry must be negative.

(4) *There is no world order and, humanly speaking, there can never be one.* For order is the fruit of right living as disorder is the result of sin. Order in human affairs must therefore always remain an aspiration rather than a practical programme. The " ethical presupposition " for it is the conversion of the human race to a Christian way

of life and adherence to that way of life by the free effort of the individual members of every successive generation; for salvation is not a state that can be attained by mankind once and for all.

Much misunderstanding has been caused by confusion between these four different lines of thought. For our present purpose they may be associated, respectively, with the names of Cobden, Woodrow Wilson, Bergson, and St. Augustine.

We may take as our text for the first thesis the following passage from a speech delivered by Cobden in the House of Commons in the famous debate on the repeal of the Corn Laws, on February 27, 1846:

> We have set an example to the world in all ages. We have given them the representative system. We are now about giving them a still greater example; we are going to set the example of making industry free — to set the example of giving the whole world every advantage of clime and latitude and situation, relying ourselves on the freedom of our industry. Yes, we are going to teach the world that other lesson. Don't think there is anything selfish in this, or anything at all discordant with Christian principles. I can prove that we advocate nothing but what is agreeable to the highest behests of Christianity. To buy in the cheapest market and sell in the dearest. What is the meaning of the maxim? It means that you take the article which you have in the greatest abundance, and with it obtain from others that of which they have the most to spare; so giving to mankind the means of enjoying the fullest abundance of earth's goods, and, in doing so, carrying out to the fullest extent the Christian doctrine of " Doing to all men as ye would they should do unto you."

It is easy to smile or to sneer in retrospect at the philosophy embodied in these confident and self-satisfied phrases. But the fact remains that it was widely accepted in " progressive " circles during the nineteenth century, especially in this country, and though its attendant con-

ditions have passed away it still colors much of present-day thinking on the subject of world order. "There can be no recovery in Europe till politicians in all territories . . . realize that trade is not war but a process of exchange, that in time of peace our neighbours are our customers and that their prosperity is a condition of our own well-being." So ran one of the paragraphs of the International Manifesto of bankers and business men issued in October 1926. The men who signed this, elderly for the most part, had grown up under what they believed to be conditions of world order. For them it was not something to be created in the future but something to be *recovered.* It was the normal condition of mankind in an age in which science had conquered distance — in which a man can travel round the earth in twenty days and a message in less than a minute. These bankers and industrialists assumed that they were carrying on their operations in a "great society," to use the expression coined by Graham Wallas.

Why have their expectations of "recovery" been disappointed? Where is the fallacy in their assumption and in Cobden's argument? It lies in *the identification of economic interdependence with social interdependence.* Cobden, in his candor, reveals this confusion very clearly. He puts together the *economic* motive of "buying in the cheapest market and selling in the dearest" with the *social* motive of "doing to all men as ye would they should do unto you." The businessmen of 1926 were not naïve enough to claim that Free Trade was the fulfilment of the gospel teaching. They did not say that their customers were their neighbors, whom it was their duty to love as themselves. They only said that those whom science had made their neighbors were their natural customers — a very much less Christian sentiment.

In short, the world-wide links established in the nine-

teenth century were the result of a coincidence of separate self-interests, and not of a process of social integration — still less of a deepening sense of Christian brotherhood. Such as they were, they have been largely disrupted by the impact of new forces which, whatever one may think of them, are certainly more deserving of the name of social; for the impulse behind them is generally speaking that of the conscious will of organized social groups. It is therefore not a paradox to say that there is more of order — and even of large-scale order — in the so-called economic nationalism of today than in the economic internationalism of the nineteenth century. What is loosely described as economic nationalism would indeed be more accurately entitled " social particularism ": whilst its contrary is really not " economic internationalism " — for what do business men, as such, care about relations between *nations?* — but economic " universalism " or " cosmopolitanism."

The real question is not why this cosmopolitanism of self-interest has so largely broken down but why it ever came into existence. Why did this rope of sand ever give mankind the illusion of a girdle of order round the world? But this is a historical problem which lies outside the province of this essay.

Before leaving this subject, however, a word must be said about the social effects of the economic interdependence — or, as one ought now to say, the partial economic interdependence — of the modern world. Whether they desire it or not, whether they realize it or not, science has linked together large bodies of human beings in different parts of the world for the performance of common tasks. Posts, railways, steamships, telephones, cables, wireless, and other facilities of the same kind are, in effect, world services: and the maintenance of these services calls for constant and willing cooperation on a world-wide scale — how

constant and how willing the public only perceives when, for one reason or another, the service is temporarily interrupted. In this sense, therefore, there is a world order and it is being kept going by moral qualities — by the cooperative spirit of those who, in the language of the poet,

> With laughter, song and shout
> Turn the great wheel of earth about.

Yet, whilst we recognize what we daily owe to their labors, we must admit that these "workers of the world" are not conscious world-citizens: nor are they consciously expressing the social will of mankind. In so far as there is any sense of world unity underlying their activities it is of a professional character, linking them with fellow workers following the same occupation in other countries. Here, no doubt, there is a possible basis for true social cooperation, if in a limited field. For the present, however, it is enough to remember how easily, at the call of their respective political authorities, this "laughter, song, and shout" can be diverted from world-service on tasks of cooperation to service within a more limited range on tasks of competition and even of conflict. Incomparably the greatest collective effort that the world has ever seen, the largest in scale and the most sustained in character, was the organization of the two contending forces in the Great War, particularly on the part of the western sea-powers, whose control extended over the greater part of the world. It needed the experience of the blockade to demonstrate that it was possible, in the modern age, to tear violently asunder the links that seemed to have bound men indissolubly together and to make use, for this work of disintegration, of these very powers and processes of organization which had hitherto seemed the surest safeguard of world unity and the clearest evidence of the existence of a

world order. An interesting essay might be written on the ethical presuppositions of the allied war effort.

It was with this immense mobilization of political power, exerted for a noneconomic purpose, before his eyes that President Wilson launched his campaign for world order. For him in 1918 it was no longer an economic fact but a political objective. "What we demand in this war," he said in his Fourteen Points speech of January 8, 1918, "is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in. . . . All the peoples of the world are in effect partners in this interest and for our own part we see very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us." In other words, Woodrow Wilson, like Cobden, saw that world order was needed in order to provide for the welfare of the common people, our neighbors near and far. But, unlike Cobden, he realized that, in order to achieve this, *laisser-faire* was not enough. Positive action on the political plane was needed. The Wilsonian League of Nations, which was to "make the world safe for democracy," may therefore be defined as a political framework for economic interdependence.

But in putting forward this idea Wilson, like Cobden, made an assumption. Cobden assumed that an infinite number of individual interests, added together, would create a social interest, a sense of social solidarity. Wilson assumed that there was already in existence, at least among the leading democracies of the West, a sense of social solidarity strong enough to sustain the weight of a political superstructure. The belief in this social solidarity expressing itself through what he called "the organized opinion of mankind" was at the root of Wilson's political creed.

How greatly he depended upon it in formulating the plans of his practical statesmanship comes out very clearly

in the address which he gave on ship-board on his way over to the peace conference, to a group of his intimate collaborators. "The President pointed out," records Dr. Isaiah Bowman, "that this was the first conference in which decisions depended upon the opinion of mankind, not upon the previous determinations and diplomatic schemes of the assembled representatives. With great earnestness he re-emphasized the point that, unless the conference was prepared to follow the opinions of mankind and to express the will of the people rather than that of their leaders at the conference, we should soon be involved in another break-up of the world!" The underlying thought of this passage, which could be paralleled by many others, is quite clear. There had been one break-up of the world order because anti-social forces — the forces of militarism and autocracy — had not been held in check by organized political power. Such a power had not been organized owing to the obstruction of old-fashioned political interests, of European diplomats and representatives as blind and selfish as the machine politicians of the United States. But the peoples of the world, and especially of Europe, he was convinced, were ready and eager for political advance, for the transformation of what was already a world society into a political world order, an organic association of free peoples. "You catch with me," he told Congress in December 1917, "the voices of humanity that are in the air. They grow daily more audible more articulate, more persuasive, and they come from the hearts of men everywhere." "The thought of the plain people here and everywhere throughout the world, the people who enjoy no privilege and have very simple and unsophisticated standards of right and wrong, is the air all governments must henceforward breathe if they would live. It is in the full disclosing light of that thought

that all policies must be conceived and educated in this midday hour of the world's life."

This noble assumption was tested at the peace conference and was shown to be unfounded. The " voices of humanity " were stilled in Great Britain during the general election of December 1918. Perhaps the British premier could have evoked them, had he chosen to make his appeal to the British instinct of fair play. Certainly no leader from abroad, whether President Wilson or another, could have done so. The President was wise enough not to try to appeal to the British people over the heads of their chosen national leaders. He did, however, make such an appeal to the Italians, only to find that Orlando and Sonnino knew their own people better than he did. And when, as the President of the United States, he tried to attune the language of humanity to the ears of his own fellow countrymen the events showed that American sentiments and traditions far outweighed any consideration for the general interests of mankind.

The peace conference and its immediate sequel provided the first " acid test " as to the existence of a sense of social solidarity among the leading people of the world — not to speak of the world as a whole. A second test was the response of the same peoples to the great " economic depression " — an occasion when, if ever, social solidarity should have manifested itself in policies of mutual help and advantage. The third, most familiar of all, has been the weakness of the peoples pledged to the League Covenant and the Kellogg Pact in face of unashamedly antisocial policies on the part of some of the great powers, in the Far East, in Africa and in Europe.

Thus, for the time being at any rate, it seems to be an established fact that the sense of solidarity amongst individual nations and other lesser groups is far more potent

than the appeal to world-wide association The international community that has figured so largely in sermons and perorations cannot assert itself in the field of practical politics because there is no active social consciousness to give it reality. It has once more been relegated to the juridical treatises where it vegetated during the centuries between Grotius and the drafting of the covenant. " The voices of humanity " that rang in the ears of Woodrow Wilson have proved to be the utterances of a very few — those few who, in each country, are consciously thinking and framing policies in terms of the world as a whole. It is voices of a very different tone and temper that " grow daily more audible, more articulate, more persuasive," in public assemblies, in the press, and even, in spite of President Wilson, in the air.

Can we lay our finger on the cause of this disappointment, which seems to many to have relegated the " new order " dreamed of by Woodrow Wilson to the mists of a very distant future? It is certainly not due to moral perversity, to some sudden decline in ethical standards and ways of living, however tempting it may be to the older generation to find comfort in such a hypothesis. The post-war era, though the quality of its life differs in many respects from that of its predecessor, is neither weak nor wicked. Its most conspicuous faults bear the marks not of decadence but of adolescence. It is robust, adventurous, enthusiastic, public-spirited — sometimes to the point of fanaticism. Feats of individual initiative and daring, unimaginable to an earlier age, have become commonplaces to readers of newspapers, whilst in some countries collective loyalty, the readiness to endure hardships and to face sacrifice for a common cause, has been raised, through modern methods of appeal and organization, to a pitch such as, to outward seeming, has never been attained before. A gen-

eration which has seen regular flying services extended over earth and ocean, in which women have rivaled the exploits of men in this domain, in which parachuting has, in some countries, become a sport for the multitude, in which spontaneous acts of heroism in civil life are so common as hardly to occasion surprise, is certainly not open to the charge of " failure of nerve." We must look elsewhere for an explanation of the temporary breakdown of the Wilsonian program of world order.

It is at this point that the Bergsonian argument intervenes. It is a mistake to imagine, we are told, that the ordinary members of the human race can ever become conscious world-citizens. It is not their wickedness nor their weakness but their hereditary make-up which stands in the way. Man is a creature fitted by his nature for life in very small societies, and it is only very exceptional human beings who can emancipate themselves from this heritage. The common run of mankind preserve their small-scale attitudes and inclinations whatever changes may take place in the exterior environment. Civilization may repress these but it cannot extirpate them. " It is a mistake to say: ' Drive out the natural and it will return at a gallop ': for there is no driving it out. It is there all the time." Equally vain is the reliance on a process of evolution in which Herbert Spencer and other sociologists placed their trust before experimental biology revealed the fact that acquired characters are not transmitted. Thus the enlargement of the social area, or what is often called social progress, necessarily involves a disharmony between man and his environment: and the larger the community the greater the disharmony. The notion of world order, therefore, conceals a contradiction. External order means inner disorder, whilst the conditions under which men feel most in order are, to the eye of the political scientist, as

disorderly as eighteenth-century Germany with its innumerable heterogeneous principalities. Thus the Wilsonian effect is foredoomed to failure, for it assumes, in effect, that the ordinary natural man can be brought to share the experience of the " genius " — of the exceptional member of the race, the mystic who, somehow or other, finds satisfaction in an " open society," in " the communion of the elect." But this is to demand the impossible. In actual fact, these two types of society, the closed and the open, are juxtaposed in the world, with no communication between them: for, says Bergson, " they are not of the same essence. The open society embraces, in principle, the whole of humanity. It represents a distant hope, or a dream, for a spiritual *élite*. This hope attains some small measure of fulfilment in every process of social enlargement which, by effecting some more or less profound change in men's habits, enables them to overcome difficulties that had hitherto been insurmountable. But after every such enlargement the circle thus momentarily broken closes in again. Some elements of the new become fixed in the original mold. What was yesterday the aspiration of an individual is today transformed into social pressure. An obligation of the ancient type holds sway over the new society."

M. Bergson is not a political scientist but a philosopher. Moreover, one of his distinguishing marks as a philosopher is his fondness for sharp antithesis and even for a certain element of paradox. Whilst, therefore, accepting his contribution from his own field, which we may take to include biology, we need not acquiesce in the unmixed pessimism of his conclusion. It would indeed be difficult to understand, in the light of his argument, how mankind had ever achieved the very considerable enlargement of the area of social consciousness represented by the civilized state of

today. But the fact remains that, though every child that comes into the world arrives with a Stone Age outfit and inclinations, Holland and Switzerland, France, Germany, and Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States are social entities that have a meaning and evoke an immediate response in the hearts and minds of many millions of ordinary human beings. The way may therefore still be open for an adjustment, and even a harmonization, between the inherited nature of man and the large-scale world in which the discoveries of modern science have projected us. But there is no doubt that the Bergsonian point of view supplies a much needed corrective to Wilsonian idealism. It reminds us — and there are many besides Mr. H. G. Wells who need to be reminded — that world order is to be made for men, not men for world order, and that therefore the proper study of those who belong to what may be conveniently entitled the League of Nations movement is not machinery but man; not man as imagination may picture him, living in a superstate under the control of an *élite* of airmen, but man as he actually is under the conditions of today — and as he is likely, substantially, to remain.

How necessary this reminder is need not be explained to those who are familiar with the literature of internationalism. It has been common form among writers of this school to exalt the notion of external order, under the name of " peace," to the level of a moral, or even a religious, ideal, and then to glorify the instrument by which this peace is to be secured and maintained. Thus the League of Nations, which even to President Wilson was no more than a political instrumentality for effecting a moral purpose, itself became an object of aspiration, round which sentiments of a religious or quasi-religious character were allowed, and even encouraged, to gather.

It would carry us too far to analyze this literature in detail. Much of it, particularly in the English-speaking countries, is little more than an emanation of slipshod sentimentalism, a product of the same kind of laziness as that of the preachers who garnish their sermons with quotations from Jeans and Eddington. Just as the latter-day physicists have been invoked to do the work of the theologians, so Woodrow Wilson and his followers have been relied upon to solve the age-long problem of the relations between the church and the world. All this is now out of date, and has lost its vogue; it would be cruel to recall it. But, leaving sentimentalities aside, it is worth while disentangling three intellectual strains that have come together and joined in confusing the League of Nations movement.

There is first the philosophy of social progress, a survival of eighteenth century Enlightenment, crystallized in the sociological scheme of Auguste Comte. The League of Nations embodies the latest stage of human development; it is the consummation of the long process of increasing world unity to which the industrial revolution so powerfully contributed in the nineteenth century. Round it and its predestined achievements should gather the hopes of all believers in the " Religion of Humanity."

There is, second, the philosophy of political idealism which taught men to regard the state as the embodiment of reason and even of the absolute mind. So regarded, the league had an undivided claim on men's social obligation: in the service of the league, and of the league alone, men would find perfect freedom. This is the Hegelian stream of league sectarianism, surprised as many league devotees would be to know whose accents they were lisping.

Third, there is the philosophy of nationality, which represented Geneva as the center round which should be

crystallized the complex emotions which, under the name of patriotism, had hitherto been associated with the history, the traditions, the countryside, and the homes of individual nations. " Internationalists " were invited to transfer to the wider sphere the sentiment of nationality — and not of nationality alone but of its exaggeration and distortion, political nationalism. Men were asked to " believe in " the League of Nations in the same way as Mazzini and Fichte had called upon Italians and Germans to believe in the moral primacy and sacred mission of their respective countries. No wonder the appeal fell, for the most part, on deaf ears. For, as the Bergsonian argument makes clear, it was easier to turn a Neapolitan into an Italian and a Hanoverian into a German than to carry the process forward to a further stage. The very aspiration of Mazzini has become part and parcel of the Italian national sentiment of today and thus contributes to the social pressure which is resisting a further process of social enlargement. Thus we can understand how it is that the type of leader who in the nineteenth century played the part of a tribune in the opposition finds a natural place today as a dictator at the head of the government.[1]

[1] I do not wish to encumber these pages with quotations to illustrate what has been summarily stated in the foregoing: they are ready to hand in the propagandist literature, to which, in the English-speaking countries, the churches have largely contributed. It would be an interesting, if invidious, task to collect, classify, and, so to speak, trace the curve of such utterances, beginning with the armistice and ending with the adoption of the British rearmament program. They would show the dangers which arise when religious leaders yield to the temptation of believing that Caesar can do their work for them. For present purposes, however, one quotation must suffice, and that, not from an English-speaking but from a French writer, an exponent of what became known, over the space of a few years, in certain French circles, as the *mystique* of the League of Nations. It is taken from the concluding pages of the volume written by Alfred Loisy in refutation of Bergson and entitled: *Are there two Sources of Religion and Morality?* " It is not difficult to show," says Loisy (p. 190), " that the very

Those who have lent themselves to the propagation of the religion of internationalism have been guilty both of confused thinking and of mistaken tactics. They have in fact presented their enemies, so much more astute in the arts of propaganda than themselves, with a fine opportunity for denouncing the errors and falsehood of " internationalism " and for sweeping its devotees ruthlessly out of their path. It mattered little that what was substituted for the international faith was equally false and equally idolatrous: for it enjoyed the decisive advantage of being more congenial. Wearied of stretching their aspirations beyond natural limits, men were open to the appeal of a primitive and unthinking tribalism — the condition from which the Hebrew prophets once carried forward the Jewish people and the Christian teachers the peoples of central and north-

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notion of the League of Nations . . . implies an ideal which is essentially religious and moral. On all sides it is proclaimed that the League of Nations can only be founded on justice. But justice in this connection means something infinitely superior to the general interest and a healthy understanding of the advantages accruing to all from a general agreement. It is the recognition of right — the right which every people, just as every individual, has to its own personality (*d'être à lui-même*) — as of something sacred. That is to say, the recognition of an object which, in so far as it is moral and human, is essentially religious. . . . A humanity which has thus determined to ensure respect for itself in the framework of right and duty marks itself with a divine seal, which is the very ideal of truth, of justice and of goodness, that is to say the religious ideal which it is seeking to realize. That is why it can be boldly asserted that the League of Nations demands a religion of humanity, that it will naturally lead to such a religion, that it will in a sense *be* this religion when the league has become fully conscious of its unity, just as of old the peoples gathered under the Empire of Rome received the religious and ethical consciousness of their unity in Catholic Christianity." In a later passage the writer compares the League of Nations of the future to the heavenly Jerusalem of the Book of the Revelation, adding that it will be in a sense " more celestial, that is to say more truly spiritual and more ideal." For a critical account of the various post-war pseudo-religions see the recent volume by Professor Rougier of Besançon: *Les Mystiques politiques contemporaines et leurs incidences internationales* (Paris, 1935).

ern Europe. This phase also will assuredly pass. It is not to be expected that, in twentieth-century Europe, any people, however romantically inclined, should persevere in the self-conscious pursuit of paganism, in the most old-fashioned sense of that word. But that the pendulum should have swung so far in this direction is due in no small measure to those who, whether they mistook their desires for realities or whether they deliberately lowered their intellectual standards for the sake of immediate returns, associated the League of Nations in men's minds with the divine order or, at the very least, lacked the courage to disabuse the tender consciences of those who found comfort in such a belief.

This brings us to our fourth and last definition — that associated with the name of St. Augustine. We might have selected some other figure from the central line of Christian teaching and tradition; but Augustine's is the name that most naturally springs to the mind in this connection: for he lived in an age when, as today, the problem of world order was a constant preoccupation, when the foundations of what had hitherto been regarded as an impregnable civilization were being tested and found defective. Hence, as Professor Ernest Barker has said,[2] " Order is a great word in St Augustine " — order, be it marked, and not peace. Peace, for Augustine, is " the tranquillity which springs from order." Order, not peace, is the central notion of his thinking.

What did order mean for him? It signified a system of right relations — relations, that is, which are based on righteousness. " Remove righteousness and what are kingdoms but great bands of brigands? " Thus world order, or what in modern phraseology it would be more correct to call cosmic order, is the order which pervades the com-

[2] Introduction to the Temple Classics edition, p. xxiii.

munion of saints. It is the order of the City of God — a city which has both an earthly and a heavenly membership. Order which is of the earth earthly, what we would call political or social order, can be no more than an approximation to this prototype. That does not mean that the political order is doomed, by the fact of human frailty, to be absolutely unrighteous. On the contrary — to quote Professor Barker again — the actual state "has a sort of *justitia* [righteousness] of its own and . . . the citizens of the heavenly city avail themselves of the aid of this *justitia* in the course of their pilgrimage, so that the state is thus, in its way, a coadjutor of the City of God." Political order is thus "a system of right relations reckoning with, and adjusted to, the sinfulness of human nature. It is the best possible, *granted the defect of sin*; but again, just because that defect has to be assumed, it is only a second best. This is the basis of St. Augustine's conception of the state and all the institutions of the state — government, property, slavery."

In making clear the difference between the two realms St. Augustine was, of course, only carrying further the Gospel distinction between "the things of Caesar" and "the things of God." We can express his theory of the state in the language of the Gospel by saying that the duty of the Christian is neither to avert his gaze from Caesar nor to accept his standards, but to understand the difficulties of his task and to master its technique in order to discover how to penetrate it with the Christian spirit. On this view there is always, for those engaged in public life, whether they be monarchs or cabinet ministers or civil servants or diplomats or platform orators or party agents, a Christian way of carrying on their work, however enmeshed it may be in the traditions and practices of an unregenerate world. It is a large part of the Christian's task in such a world to

discover what is the duty appropriate to each professional situation or particular emergency. It is in this way that society, with the whole range of its multifarious activities, can, within the limits of human weakness, acquire Christian habits and standards and become " a coadjutor of the City of God."

This is not the place in which to trace the development of this central Christian doctrine throughout the centuries and to describe its adjustment to the circumstances of particular times and places. Nor can we pause to mark the successive deviations, both to the right and to the left, of the numerous individuals and groups for whose impatient spirits the acceptance of this conception of the second best and the consequent renunciation of all systems of political idealism has seemed an unworthy compromise. Our concern here is not with the relations between Christianity and politics as a whole but with the particular problem, peculiar to our own age, of Christianity and world order. But is not the way to its solution indicated by the words in which Professor Barker sums up the Augustinian doctrine? What we must aim at, in the new interdependent world in which the discoveries of modern science have placed us, is the best possible system of right relations, granted *both* the sinfulness and the inherent biological limitations of human nature.

This surely is the Christian answer both to the ultra-Wilsonian idealists and to the Bergsonian skeptics. We are no more entitled to look forward to a perfect international order than Christians in other ages were justified in expecting to witness a perfect Roman order, or a perfect state of medieval Christendom, or a perfect Reformation through fraternal cooperation between established national churches or between free congregations of believers. All that we can hope for is a second best. And it is a second

best which has to contend not only with sin, which affects political action at every stage of social development, but also with the small-scale nature of man, which renders cooperation, and hence Christian brotherliness, uncongenial to him when pursued on too extended a scale. " Which of you by taking thought can add one cubit to his stature? " We have no right to plan world order on the same lines as order within established and traditional frontiers, on the assumption that human nature may be trusted to adjust itself to our schemes. Still less are we justified in the policy — favored by a certain school of " advanced " thinkers — of coercing human nature into subjection to a large-scale system of this sort without considering whether, to adapt the words of Burke, the virtues that are lovely in the narrower field are capable of being brought into the service and conduct of the larger commonwealth.

The problem of world order is not, as it often seems from the newspaper, the problem of dovetailing into one another a number of states which find themselves juxtaposed in an economically interdependent world. It is, as St. Augustine would have seen, a problem of creating right relations between the citizens of those states. And this is not a matter of political architecture, of constructing courts and councils and assemblies and bodies of officials — though all these may have their uses — but of finding means to mobilize the existing store of virtue and public spirit in such a way as to act as a permanent driving force in world affairs. We know what conscience is in the individual life. We know how, under favorable conditions, it operates in local and national life. We have seen how President Wilson expected to see it operate in world affairs. His expectation was disappointed, because the conditions were unfavorable. The problem was unfamiliar and the ground had not been prepared. But isolated instances in

the past century, of which the anti-slavery movement is the most striking, have shown that what President Wilson called public opinion but what it would be truer to call *social conscience* can, in particular cases, be brought to bear in the field of world affairs. This enlarged social conscience — this and nothing but this — is the " ethical presupposition of world-order."

We are now at last in a position to see the exact outlines of our problem. It is this. *Granted the limitations of human nature,* granted that the ordinary man will never feel towards his neighbor in China or in the South Seas as he feels towards his neighbor in the next street, *are there any issues on which it is reasonable to expect that his social conscience can be relied upon to act as a permanent force in world affairs?*

Before we attempt to answer this question let us analyze the problem still more closely. Our search for the issues on which we may hope that an enlarged social conscience can be brought to pronounce will be simplified if we note certain limiting conditions by which it is necessarily circumscribed.

In the first place the issues must be such as to appeal, if not equally at least in a fair measure, to all the peoples concerned. We must not choose some issue which happens to make a strong appeal to the particular temperament of one people or race, on the assumption that it will evoke a similar response elsewhere. The English people, for example, abhor cruelty. Therefore atrocities committed by a foreign government sometimes (though by no means always — our social conscience in this matter has shown itself to be curiously capricious —) stir us to the point of being willing to make disinterested sacrifices for some neighbor at a distance. But other peoples, no less civilized or chivalrous in temper, are not stirred in the same way

by isolated incidents. There is thus no basis for permanent cooperation on such an issue, though common action on occasion is not therefore to be ruled out. Other peoples in their turn have sometimes looked for our cooperation on matters which have left us indifferent, such, for instance, as the defense of intellectual values as part of the common heritage of civilization. There is no question here of higher and lower, but simply of differences of temperament and outlook which, for present purposes, must be regarded as unalterable.

Secondly, the issues must concern matters with which the general public has been made generally familiar by education and discussion over a considerable period — say, at least a generation. President Wilson's appeal to public opinion failed, if for no other reason, because, so far at least as the English-speaking peoples were concerned, foreign affairs had nowhere as yet become an integral part of the substance of what men considered to be "politics." It is only in the post-war years that they have entered, so to speak, into the common stock to which continuous public attention is directed: and, as we have seen, it has taken some time to divest them of the atmosphere of strangeness — not to say romanticism — in which they were at first enveloped. But one of the principal features of recent years, in Great Britain and the British dominions as in the United States, has been the rapid growth of a steady common-sense interest in the field of world affairs. Men have become more accustomed to viewing the problems of international politics in a dry light or, as the current phrase goes, "realistically." The excitements and mass meetings of the Victorian era seem more and more inappropriate and old-fashioned. Our enthusiasm for Garibaldi and the Bulgarians may have been praiseworthy in the circumstances of the time; but it was certainly not suf-

ficiently well grounded, either in knowledge or in principle, to serve as a basis for regular and trustworthy cooperation with other peoples. Too often, indeed, as foreign statesmen and peoples have had occasion to discover to their cost, a general election has caused an agitation to evaporate in smoke and has led to the adoption of some different policy, whose sponsors have been at no loss to discover suitable moral precepts and watchwords in its justification.

We may regret the passing of " the Exeter Hall spirit " and deplore the callousness which seems sometimes to reign in its stead. But it remains true, nevertheless, that sobriety of temper is an indispensable prerequisite for the exercise of a sound judgment in any branch of affairs. The important thing, therefore, is that the electorate should become accustomed to exercise its judgment in foreign affairs in the same spirit and temper as in the domestic affairs with which it is more clearly acquainted: for unless this habit has been acquired it is vain to expect that citizens will decide wisely in an emergency. From this point of view it matters little whether such an emergency decision is set down to the effect of a movement of " public opinion " or ascribed in certain quarters to the workings of conscience. One of the first duties of a conscientious democrat should be to ensure that his conscience should never be called upon for a decision in ignorance of the facts. No doubt it is not so easy to command the facts in a foreign as in a domestic issue. Yet, despite the so-called secrets of the chancelleries, the main elements in any international problem are today easily ascertainable in any democratic country. Newspapers and reviews are indeed crammed with information for those who have the trained and critical judgment to sift and use it. Within the last thirty years adult education — the very expression is only some twenty

years old — has raised the standard of discussion and judgment on domestic issues to a new level. There is no reason why, in the coming years, a similar improvement should not take place in the field of world affairs. Public libraries, tutorial and other classes, broadcasting, the increasing inclination and facilities for foreign travel, all contribute to this end. Fifteen years ago one of the wisest political thinkers of our generation, Mr. Elihu Root, reflecting on the demand for "popular diplomacy," summed up this whole issue in a few sentences: "When foreign affairs were ruled by autocracies or oligarchies," he wrote, "the danger of war was in sinister purpose. When foreign affairs are ruled by democracies the danger of war will be in mistaken beliefs. The world will be the gainer by the change, for, while there is no human way to prevent a king from having a bad heart, there is a human way to prevent a people from having an erroneous opinion. That way is to furnish the whole people, as a part of their ordinary education, with correct information about their relations to other peoples." When this has been fully carried out, be it added, the resulting change will be not greater, but very much less than the change brought about by the transformation from illiteracy to literacy. The decisive step in democratic advance was the institution of compulsory education. What remains to be done, urgent and indispensable though it is, is no more than the crowning of the edifice.

There is a third limiting condition, which emerges indeed from the foregoing. It is clear that we can only expect to mobilize a social conscience on world affairs in communities where the individual citizen has already become habituated to the exercise of responsibility on domestic issues. What we are seeking to promote is an *enlargement* of the sense of social responsibility. How can we hope to secure steady cooperation on issues of world-concern from men

and women living in countries where this sense of social responsibility is not an active force in free and continuous operation? Enfeeblement or atrophy in this respect may arise from many different causes, into which we need not enquire. It may be due to immaturity or to forcible suppression or to a combination of both. No two oligarchies or tyrannies are alike. All that concerns us here is that where, for whatever reason, the reservoir of social responsibility — which is all that we have to draw upon for our larger project — is empty, where freedom of conscience and opinion and the consequent free flow of public spirit are not part of the habitual daily life of society, there is lacking an indispensable prerequisite for regular association in such a system as we are contemplating. This would not prevent the authorities in such countries from taking part in it on occasion and as they might see fit. But such cooperation would be spasmodic rather than organic, for its continuance would remain subject to the overriding influence of incalculable factors, such as the play of local interests or of individual caprice or even of "sinister purpose."

This limitation circumscribes the scope of our scheme in a degree which would have been bitterly disappointing to President Wilson; for it compels us, for the time being, at any rate, to abandon the hope of establishing anything approaching a universal system of world order. This does not mean — be it repeated once more — that we must despair of evoking the social conscience of the great mass of mankind in a particular emergency on some quite clear-cut and definite issue. But it does mean that there is no immediate hope of institutionalizing this larger body of opinion in any effective manner: for though the *content* of this mass of opinion may be the same as that of the inner group on any particular question its *quality* will necessarily

be very different. And, as St. Augustine knew, in a system of right relations it is the quality and not the content — *how* men feel, not the kind of business that they are doing together — which matters.

In view of the prevalent confusion of thought on the subject of " bringing back " this or that country " to the League of Nations " it is perhaps worth while to pursue this subject a little farther. The analogy of the British commonwealth may be helpful in this connection. We think of the group of independent states — for such they are — which make up the commonwealth as constituting a system of order and indeed as an indispensable constituent element in any conceivable larger system. What is the nature of that order? A great constitutional lawyer, Sir William Harrison Moore, in a paper [3] written, shortly before his death, for a " Commonwealth Relations Conference," attempted to answer that question: and it is strange how clearly his thought approaches that of St. Augustine. " Ultimately," he says, " the purpose of the empire must be found, and is to be found, in the moral and spiritual sphere. And this too seems confirmed by our actual experience and consistent with the quality of our feelings. What distinguishes this group from the closest of military alliances or the most expedient of economic relationships? The distinction is to be found not in the *content* of the actual relations between the partner communities but in the *quality* of them. They are, in short, in the actual sense, moral relationships. It is not only that the partners would not willingly depart from law in the conduct of their policies as regards each other, but that they are actuated to no small extent by those higher feelings which we call moral. . . . Charity is conceivable between them — free gifts.

[3] Published in part in *British Commonwealth Relations: ed. A. J. Toynbee* (1934), pp. 53–4.

Is this conceivable between nations strictly foreign to each other — nations which would be astute to observe any relevant law scrupulously?" And he goes on to suggest that unless this enlargement of the social sense or of the affections, this "moralization" of the interstate relationship, is developed between other states "reasonably identical in structure and organization" — and, we may add, in the sense of civic responsibility — "our civilization is doomed."[4]

Such a development is indeed already proceeding. What is the *quality* of the relationship between Canada

[4] Sir William Harrison Moore may have been too optimistic in his analysis of the Commonwealth relationship, particularly as regards certain regions of the empire. To discuss this in detail would be to transcend the limits of this essay. But it is relevant to observe that, in so far as serious difficulties have arisen, and still subsist, in the field of commonwealth relation these are not, strictly speaking, political at all. It would, for instance, be difficult, and certainly misleading, to set forth the "opinions" of Mr. de Valera or Mr. Gandhi on the British empire in the language of political science. An illustration may make this clear. Supposing that they were asked by the imperial conference or, better still, by some non-British authority acceptable to themselves, to put forward a list of their political desiderata and supposing that every single item in such a list were dealt with to the satisfaction of the supervising body, would that be the end of the whole trouble? Would not some elements of dissatisfaction or disharmony be left over, coloring the new relationship, whether constitutional or international? The "content" of the grievances would have been disposed of, but something of their "quality" would remain. This is not to say that such deeper difficulties are beyond the resources of wise and patient statesmanship to overcome. But it does suggest that those who concern themselves with the "reform of the League of Nations," in terms of political machinery, have not begun to realize the *dimensions* of the problem of international relationship. The British Commonwealth is grappling, whether successfully or not, with the real problem, which the statesmen at Geneva have never yet been in a position even to approach. Let those who are disposed to doubt this compare the quality of the discussions at an imperial conference with those in the Assembly or the Council of the League, or even with the more informal conversations in the corridors and hotels at Geneva. And then let them consider whether it is not a little unhelpful, and more than a little old-fashioned, to fix on "sovereignty" as the root cause of the troubled condition of interstate relations.

and the United States, and between Great Britain and the United States, and between Great Britain and France, and between Great Britain and Sweden or Norway or Denmark or Holland or Belgium or Switzerland — and between each separate pair of these various states? Is it not of a kind which " feels different " from " the closest of military alliances or the most expedient of economic relationships "? Like the relationship between members of the British commonwealth, it is difficult to define it in political or any other terms. Common usage has therefore found a convenient negative formula. War between the members of this group has — as the saying goes — become, not unlikely or inexpedient or criminal, but " unthinkable."

Here at last we have a clue to follow up in our search for an issue on which the enlarged social conscience can be brought to bear.

What is meant by saying that war between two states has become " unthinkable "?

It does not imply that the citizens of those states will abstain henceforward from all resort to violence — that strife and rioting and murder will become things of the past and that perpetual tranquillity will settle down over the common area. No, what is implied is that, should resort to violence occur — as happens in all human societies from time to time — it is not likely to occur between the two states as such, and that in the unlikely event of its so occurring it would be felt to be not a war in the ordinary sense, but an internal dissension or, as the term goes, a " civil war." In other words, although for purposes of government, or, shall we say, of administration, the two areas remain separate, they have become, so far as resort to violence is concerned, a single society. The two " bodies politic " remain; but to use the convenient expression of Professor Toynbee, they form, for this particular purpose,

one " body social." In such circumstances the bodies politic do not lose their separate identity: they remain, as we say, " local authorities." But they have become enveloped in a larger custom — the custom of peace-keeping — and out of this custom or habit or state of mind or " ethical presupposition " — and out of this alone — can come the beginning of a common law.

We have pushed the argument forward through several stages in order to show how the rule of law between states, or rather between the citizens of different states, can be brought about. It is not maintained that the relations between Great Britian and Switzerland are today of the same quality as those between Great Britian and Canada. But what we can already see today is the emergence of a group of political units (we dare not yet say " local authorities ") which together constitute an area of order in the world. These states inspire no fear in one another and inspire no fear in other states. Together they form a considerable proportion of the population of the world and cover a considerable area of its territory. *If they covered the whole world, the problem of world order, in its strictly political sense and within the limits of human weakness, would be solved.*

But we must take the world as it is and thus our main problem still remains open, for disorder may spring up — is indeed most likely to spring up — outside the area of customary peace-keeping. Can we ask of the inhabitants of the new " body social " to enlarge their sense of responsibility even a little further? Can we expect them, not merely to abstain from armed conflict between political groups *inside* the system but also to be ready to act together to repel an attack on one or more of their number from outside? In other words, can we hope that the average peacefully-minded twentieth-century democrat will

not merely *accept* the rule of a common law but become an active agent in its enforcement? For readiness to take action in vindication of the common law — the people's law — is, both historically and logically, the first stage in popular government. If democracy is the most satisfactory (or the least unsatisfactory) form of government which mankind has yet devised it is not because it guarantees equal rights or distributes an equal share of power to all, but because it calls out the maximum of responsibility and public spirit in the individual citizen: it enlarges the scope of his duty from the household to the community, from private business to "the common things," the "republic." It was the founder of the Athenian democracy who laid it down that the best governed city was that in which "those who are not wronged are equally forward with those who are wronged in indicting and punishing wrongdoers."

This brings us to the familiar principle of collective security. But, approaching it from this angle, we see it in a new light. We realize that, as embodied in the covenant, the principle was premature; for it assumed, as between the heterogeneous members of the Geneva league, a stage of social development and an attitude of the mind and spirit which could only be expected — and that not without prolonged discussion and education — from a small, if powerful, group of advanced states. Nevertheless, so far as those states were concerned, the convenant did not set forth a remote and visionary doctrine. It merely asked them, so to speak, to turn a negative into a positive — to pass from a regime of *abstention* from war in their mutual relations to one of war-*prevention* by common action. Or, to put it in another way closer to the thought of St. Augustine, it asked them to insure political order over the whole peace-keeping area by substituting a

system of active relations for a system of passive relations, or, in the language of the present day, a system of social responsibility for a system of nonintervention. That such a transformation is *desirable* has been generally admitted by the leaders of democratic thought for the best part of a generation — although, as we have seen, there has been much confusion in the way in which the issue has been presented. That it is *practicable* we are beginning to realize through the working of the process of trial and error: for the ruthless elimination of the easier remedies has thrown the democratic countries back on to their own individual responsibilities. Thus the time is ripe for proclaiming that the enlargement of the social conscience is the heart of the international problem. The other issues, great and small, political, social, and economic, which fill the columns of the newspapers, however grave their " content " may seem to be, are of subordinate importance. In the atmosphere created by the firm establishment of a rule of law, they would quickly yield to treatment: in the absence of such an atmosphere they can only be dealt with by means of palliatives. It is therefore largely wasted labor for well-meaning amateurs to concern themselves as Christians with such problems as economic nationalism, or access to colonial raw materials, or the manufacture of armaments. Sometimes indeed it is worse than wasted labor: it is an excuse for shirking nearer and more unpleasant duties. There are occasions when intellectual confusion is worse than a blunder and amounts to a crime. One wonders what the doctors of the church would have said to those who find it compatible with their consciences to be both anarchists and busybodies, to insult Caesar in one breath and to call for his assistance in the next, to bring the idea of law enforcement into contempt in their own country whilst advocating policies which are mean-

ingless unless they presuppose an extension of the authority of law — of the common law of the free peoples. The most charitable interpretation of attitudes of this kind is that they spring from some inner disorder. Perhaps the first of the ethical presuppositions of world-order is that its advocates should have tested the quality of their own thinking.

THE MATERIAL FOUNDATIONS OF AN INTERNATIONAL ORDER

by

O. H. VON DER GABLENTZ

THE MATERIAL FOUNDATIONS OF AN INTERNATIONAL ORDER

1. THE STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

As Christians, why are we concerned with the material foundations of human social life? The usual reply would be couched in the following terms: because we ought not to ignore these realities, because " matter " is continually interfering with the spiritual side of life, and is therefore a disturbing factor. Within this idealistic fundamental view there are again two different attitudes. One is pessimistic: it regards this disturbing " matter " as the result of the Fall; hence it accepts these disturbances as the unalterable and deserved wrath of God on the fallen world, and it conceives the proper task of the Christian to consist in the search for the salvation of his soul in a region beyond this " vale of tears." The other view is optimistic: its protagonists believe that by means of guile and technical skill the spirit can master matter, and force it into its service, and that after this aim has been attained — either wholly or in part — real human life upon earth, as God has willed it, could begin. Both these views have an eschatological frame of reference: to the pessimists the last judgment is at the end of all things; to the optimist the end is the kingdom of God upon earth.

In both views, however, the economic sphere — contact with things — is regarded as something on a lower plane, something which is not quite worthy of man as he is, of man as a " spiritual " being. This attitude is in striking contrast with the facts of the twentieth century. For not

only do most of our contemporaries, and public opinion as a whole, ascribe immense importance to the economic sphere — the pessimists indeed, with their view of the " depravity " of the world, or the optimists, with their sense of its " imperfection," might easily come to the same conclusion — but it is also a fact that the real achievements of our own day lie in the sphere of technique and economics: the agriculturist and the architect, the chemist and the engineer, know what they are doing, and they also know why they are doing it; thus they realize the meaning of their activity, whereas teachers and research workers and, still more, parsons, stand outside this life as spectators; they look at it anxiously and without understanding, and the politician makes feverish efforts to order life according to methods and standards which have been borrowed from the mentality and the condition of the past.

This state of affairs leads men of the technical and economic sphere astray, so that from their own experience they try to construct a " materialistic " world-view. They either adopt Marxism, which regards the development of the methods of production as the decisive element in human life, and — so far as it is logical — as giving meaning to history; or they construct a " technocratic " theory which aims at regulating the whole of life on the principle of the least outlay. Both these mistaken attempts are intelligible because they are aiming in the right direction; they are, namely, trying to give its rightful place in the human view of the world to those things which have been created by God and entrusted to man. Neither view therefore can be confuted by any kind of idealism, nor by that supposedly Pauline or Lutheran ideology of Continental Protestantism, nor by the optimistic evolutionary ideology of the progress of the kingdom of God upon earth, which I suppose only exists at the present time in Anglo-

Saxon countries, or in those countries which rank as "neutral" in time of war. But the moment that we reach a genuine Christian realism the error of these views is exposed.

Christian realism sees man in relation to the creation. Man is a member of the creation: his life is bound to its rhythm; he is preserved by its orders. God does not will a spiritual life far removed from things, but He wills right order *in* things. He has called man not only to be a member of the created order but to be its master, to shape the right order in freedom. Man fails to achieve this task. He cannot find the right center, and throughout the whole course of history he oscillates between these two poles: either he becomes absorbed in nature, as a mere part of the created order, or, as an arbitrary master, he seeks to subdue nature by violence. But in Jesus Christ we have the standard for the right attitude: to him who does the Father's will all things are obedient and find their own proper use. The resurrection of Christ gives us the certainty that such a transformation really takes place.

It is from this point of view that we understand the confidence of Paul (Rom. 8:21): "Because the creature itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God."

This discloses a wholly new meaning in technics and in the economic order. Nature has not only been entrusted to man on his own account, in order that man may be able to use it for his own purposes, but man has also been set within nature for its own sake, in order that he may shape it according to the real divine intention, in order that — to take the simplest example — he may turn the wilderness into a garden. This truth gives dignity to the daily work of the greater part of mankind: the service which our hands render to the earth, and to the materials which are gained

from the earth, is not only divine service because in doing it we are thinking of our Creator, but it is a direct service to God because the work itself has been willed by God. This is true not only of the peasant and the manual laborer, the workman and the engineer, but also of the tradesman and the book-keeper, when they help by their business to restore the rightful purpose of things.

The pessimistic idealism of "the worried servant of the Lord" — as Wilhelm Raabe once called this kind of churchman, whose spirit is so remote from the created order — is thus unmasked and revealed as self-righteous intellectualism. When we perceive the truth that the right shaping of the world depends upon the fact that always and everywhere we are simply doing the Father's will; that what matters is not first and foremost technical and organizing dexterity, but that technical ability and organization are only of use in so far as they are applied by a humble and believing human being, we are preserved from that optimistic idealism which believes in the possibility of "building the kingdom of God upon earth," here and now; which believes that we ourselves — evading the judgment — can inaugurate the new creation. In the sphere with which we are here concerned this humility certainly assumes a form alien to the ecclesiastical development; it consists in what Goethe describes as "reverence for that which is beneath us."

In so doing, however, Christian realism strikes a note which is also sounded in Marxism, and one which has done a great deal to help the latter to gain adherents, especially among thoughtful people. One of the chief tasks of humanity in the present century consists in the development of the methods of production in general, and in the overcoming of this idealistic remoteness from nature in partic-

ular. And the technocratic element — divested of its distortions — certainly belongs to our doctrine.[1]

In order to understand the following pages it is not necessary to share from the outset the point of view which is here suggested. It will, however, become evident that it will be very difficult to attain a clear and simple order, even in the realm of facts, without it.

2. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DOWN TO 1930[2]

About two thousand millions of human beings live on the goods produced by the earth. Until a few decades ago at least three-quarters of these human beings lived exclusively on the soil of their own country or district. Apart from some ports and plantations this was true of Asia with its vast and in part thickly populated plains upon which there live more than a thousand millions of human beings. It was truer still of Africa. But even in Europe and America, in the chief capitalist countries, where the international system of the division of labor was in force, there were wide tracts of country which were only superficially affected by these facts: namely, those inhabited by peasants and handicraftsmen. Although such people used material for clothing and tools manufactured from foreign raw ma-

[1] This attitude has been little represented in Christian literature, and it has been clearly expressed in very few places. I myself came to see this truth through reading the works of Vladimir Soloviev — especially "The Justification of the Good" — and the writings of Nicolas Berdyaev. With these two names I would associate that of Friedrich Dessauer, the Catholic physicist and political economist.

[2] On this compare Ernst Wagemann, *Struktur und Rhythmus der Weltwirtschaft;* Rolf Wagenführ, *Die Bedeutung des Aussenmarktes für die deutsche Industriewirtschaft (Sonderheft 41 des Instituts für Konjunkturforschung);* *Wirtschaftsberichte der Reichskreditgesellschaft;* League of Nations: *Balances of Payments.*

terials, and used "colonial produce" (groceries) — as we still characteristically call it in Germany — all their essential needs were met from their own land and from its immediate neighborhood; people knew where their goods came from, they knew the people who made them, and they knew the whole process. Production and consumption took place on traditional lines within a limited area which could be surveyed as a whole. Rural man formed part of the landscape, even though he had himself done much to help to shape this landscape; the standard of technical ability consisted in the energies and the size of man and of the domestic animals. So far as the means of communication and the provision of power (such as railways, gas and electricity) was concerned, for the central European handicraftsman and peasant these were fixed powers in the hands of the state, which belonged rather to the political presuppositions of economic life than to economic life itself.

Capitalism was superimposed upon these conditions like a foreign body. In 1914 the following countries were regarded as the chief capitalist industrial countries: Great Britain, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Germany — west of the Elbe (east of the Elbe only Berlin and Silesia) — parts of France, northern Italy; in Austria: Bohemia and parts of the Alpine districts; and, in addition, some parts of Scandinavia, and the east and middle west of the United States. In these regions alone was there a workers' problem in the sense of a class struggle. Here only — and in the "one-crop" countries of the tropics — was the social life as a whole drawn into the changing conditions of the international economic situation. Here alone were food and work absolutely dependent upon the inflow of foreign raw materials and foodstuffs and on the sale of domestic products to foreign countries.

World trade included three very different processes: (*a*) Exchange — mainly of finished products — between the chief capitalist countries; (*b*) exchange of consumption goods from the capitalist countries for raw materials and foodstuffs from the other countries; (*c*) the supply of investment goods from the capitalist countries for the opening up of noncapitalist countries, at first mostly on credit. These supplies flowed more strongly into the thinly settled new regions of America, Australia, and South Africa — neo-capitalist — than into the thickly populated, semi-capitalist countries of eastern Europe and Asia.

The other branches of the international economy — above all, communications and credit — are closely connected with the range and development of commerce. Even if we admit that now and again, historically speaking, lending or the capacity to pay back have been the causes of movements of trade, commerce itself represents all the essential features of the world economy.

Within the international economic situation free competition prevailed. The conditions of competition were slightly modified by tariffs, but this did not materially alter the situation. In principle every Schmidt in Hamburg or Leipzig could buy any earthly thing he wanted, at any price, and to any extent, from any other Smith in London, Chicago, Buenos Aires, or Shanghai, and could lend any amount he liked to foreign countries or could borrow in foreign countries. The unrestricted international economy of one quarter of humanity stood directly alongside the narrowly confined domestic and neighbor economy of the other three quarters. No other system in the form of a " national economy " [3] lay between these two extremes.

[3] Certainly the mercantilism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries contained the rudiments of such an economy, but they were destroyed in

That which was cultivated and exchanged within a domestic and local economy was determined by the consumers' direct knowledge of their own needs, and according to their own tradition. In the international economy there was only one formal standard: the payment of interest upon capital. Misdirection of capital led to falling prices, to an exaggerated demand for capital, to a heightened rate of interest, and then to limitation of production, dismissal of workers, and bankruptcies. Those undertakings which managed to survive the crisis, owing to the fact that the price of raw materials was low, and wages were low, were able to go on producing and thus to extend their market considerably as soon as the rate of interest fell. The equalization of prices and of interest was achieved without difficulty beyond the frontiers, because the gold standard provided a common basis for the currency, and also because, in principle, there was no restriction of any kind on the international movements of capital.

The crises were modified by the fact that the misdirection of capital did not first become visible when too many goods of one kind actually came upon the market, or when the production of another kind, on previous conditions, was technically impossible, but that the first signs of such a development were already shewn by the extremely delicate barometer of the exchange, and that new arrangements could be made to meet this. As time went on, it became still more important that the crises could be shortened by expansion in a region " outside the domain of capitalism." For instance, if too many machines had been built, although not on the old conditions, they could be got rid of

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the course of development, partly because they were sponsored solely by the state, and partly because they did not take sufficiently into account the genuine international division of labor which is conditioned by climate and cultural changes.

at lower prices and with increased risk in the sphere of domestic and neighborhood economy. Above all, if the costs of production fell after a crisis, this outlet provided a chance for the future. Further, the sphere " outside capitalism " is not only to be understood spacially as in Marxism, but it also covers the domains previously belonging to handicrafts, small business, and the peasantry in the capitalist countries themselves. To build the theory of imperialism upon these facts, therefore, and to explain the World War as a capitalistic economic crisis, is only correct in a very limited sense.

Since the World War, however, this situation has completely changed. The world has become small. First of all spacially, through the improvement in communications.

	1910	*1914*	*1937*
Fastest Passenger Traffic			
Berlin-London		24 hours	5 hours
Berlin-New York	8/10 days	5 days	5 days
Berlin-Buenos Aires		18 days	3 days (post)
Berlin-Sydney		6 weeks	9 days

Foreign markets, however, have not only been brought nearer to one another; they have already been occupied. The industrialization of the new countries themselves plays an important part in this development, although in theory this is usually greatly overrated. This means that cheap European consumption goods, on which it was easy to make profits, have been increasingly crowded out. Likewise the period of extensive railway building has almost come to an end. Even when instead of this, as in China for instance, there has been a new expansion of road building, with an increased need for motor lorries on the main roads, this business does not bring large orders to foreign countries, as used to be the case with rails, engines, and rail-

way carriages in earlier days; here what is required is rather the intensification of the technical apparatus. In this respect and in the raising of the standard of living in the new countries, there is certainly still a good deal to be gained. It is therefore quite possible that the expansion of world trade may soon exceed the extent reached at the last boom in 1929. Further, the balance of trade between Germany and France shows that even fully industrialized countries can have a vigorous exchange of manufactures.

	1928	*1931*	*1935*
		Millions of RM	
German exports to France	693	834	253
of these: manufactured articles	312	542	151
German imports from France	741	342	159
of these: manufactured articles	365	158	87

But an intensive form of exchange of this kind requires a different development of foreign business, presupposes intensive long-term agreements between one country and another, and to a large extent requires the establishment of long-term capital. This is a great advantage for the new export countries overseas, the United States and Japan.

	1913	*1931*	*1935*
Share in world trade in per cent			
Great Britain	15.1	13.9	14.1
Germany	13.0	9.9	8.7
United States	11.1	11.3	10.9
Japan	0.0	3.9	4.7

The altered role of Russia and Germany is very important. Russia, indeed, from the technical point of view, is absolutely in the position of a new capitalist country, which, with the aid of the more developed countries, has built up its apparatus of industry and communications. But the initiative does not lie, as it used to do, in the hands of the exporters. They cannot sell what they want to get

rid of. This means that the exporters of consumption goods cannot utilize the state of the market for industrialization. Only a few large business undertakings and groups can do the business, which is further often burdened with an incalculable political risk.

Even in Germany, from the point of view of trade, nothing has materially altered. Germany is still, as it was previously, a highly industrialized country, which exports investment goods and consumption goods for a high standard of living, and is obliged to import foodstuffs and raw materials. But owing to the loss of the war and the cession of its foreign assets forced upon it by the Versailles Treaty, Germany has become a debtor country instead of a creditor country.

GERMANY'S FOREIGN DEBTS AND CLAIMS IN MRDS. RM.

	1913	*1930*
Long-term debts	—	10
Other long-term foreign investments	—	6
Short-term debts	—	12
Total liabilities	—	28
Long-term investments in foreign countries	—	5
Short-term investments in foreign countries	—	6
Total claims	—	11
Balance	+25—30	—17

From the point of view of the world economic situation this means: that, instead of raw materials and food supplies pouring into Germany from the new countries as the payments of interest and liquidation of debts, she herself has been forced either to buy on credit or to live from hand to mouth. At the same time Germany is a fully industrialized country, and she cannot revert to a domestic or neighborhood economy when she is in difficulties of any sort, as the newly industrialized countries can do. Since Germany also

had to bear the burden of reparations, which had been increased to an insane extent, she was obliged to incur debts which were far beyond her power to meet. She had to pay more than her creditors were willing to take from her in goods, and in so doing she became a dangerous center of economic crises.

Further, the new indebtedness of Germany is only one section of the whole problem of the liquidation of war debts. The mutual indebtedness of the Allies, which indeed they had hoped to abolish by laying the burden of reparations upon Germany, had at various points led to a fresh piling up of debt; this finally took its revenge on the chief creditor, the United States.

REVENUE OF THE UNITED STATES IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS

	1925	*1931*	*1934*
From state foreign claims			
From interest	160	92	1
From amortizations	26	21	—
From private foreign claims			
From interest	689	655	453
From amortizations	140	257	114
Total	1,015	1,025	568

Since the decision to reduce these debts as a whole was not made at the right time, and since, as the state of the market improved, means were continually found of shifting or "commercializing" the debts by transactions in private capital, there was finally piled up an enormous structure of at least 250 milliards RM. of international credits of which more than 50 milliards were short-term, which naturally collapsed in the years 1930–1932 with a tremendous smash. (On these questions cf. the Basle Reparations Conference of 1931, above all, the Layton Report.)

The way in which this collapse took place revealed to

the astonished eyes of the world that in the interval the inner structure of the capitalist countries had completely changed. It became evident that in the meantime even the inner reserves of domestic and neighborhood economy had been swallowed up. This was true of Germany and the United States in particular which were the centers of the crisis of 1930–1934. This is evident, on the one hand, in the fact that the indebtedness of agriculture and the financing of consumption led to particularly disastrous sectional crises, which required costly and considerable assistance from the state. On the other hand, and this is the real change, it became evident that so many lives depend upon a large capitalist undertaking, and especially upon a large banking concern, that for social and political reasons bankruptcy is impossible. This was the reason for the German emergency decrees of July, 1931, from which the whole new banking and " devisen " policy was developed; this, too, was the reason for the vigorous measures adopted by Roosevelt as soon as he came into power. If the social structure of a nation could no longer endure the re-shifting of fortunes, income, or occupation, which were bound up with a normal capitalistic " cleaning-up " of the situation, then new methods had to be sought.

3. THE WORLD ECONOMIC CRISIS

The task was everywhere the same. The economic crisis had not merely caused a superficial disturbance in the social order, it had shaken it to its very foundations.

UNEMPLOYMENT IN MILLIONS

	1925	*1929*	*1931*	*1932*	*1933*	*1936*
Germany	0.6	1.9	4.5	5.6	4.6	1.1
Great Britain ..	1.3	1.3	2.8	2.8	2.3	1.6
United States ..		3.9	7.4	10.4	11.9	9.0

INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION IN PERCENTAGE FROM 1928

Germany	83	100.7	68.5	54.0	61.5 rd.	108
Great Britain ...	93	105.1	88.8	88.4	93.5 "	120
United States	94	105.2	73.0	57.7	68.5 "	93

Unemployment had to be reduced by public means, and, indeed, at the same time — not afterwards — as the liquidation of internal and foreign debts. The methods used were in principle the same: Public works; control of credits and investments; a " managed " currency; bilateral contracts in foreign trade.

In detail the various governments used different methods. The German situation was rendered peculiarly difficult by the fact that after the outbreak of the worst crisis in July, 1931, for a whole year longer we had to carry on negotiations about reparations; further, it was only then that the belated results of the loss of the war were fully realized; also, after the experiences of 1923 all direct measures of inflation were automatically excluded. This was why, at first, there was a delay in moving towards a positive solution. At last it began, very cautiously, in the autumn of 1932; after National Socialism came into power in the spring of 1933 this movement was greatly extended and was prosecuted with the utmost vigor.

INVESTMENTS IN GERMANY IN MRDS. RM.

1925	*1929*	*1931*	*1932*	*1933*	*1936*
10.3	12.8	6.5	4.3	5.1	13.5
Of this for Public Administration and Communication					
3.5	4.5	2.4	1.8	2.2	7.4

Moreover, the credit monopoly of the state had been practically secured since July, 1931; but it was only fully utilized from 1933. The course of the currency and foreign trade policy had no freedom of choice, owing to the

fact that at the beginning there had to be a moratorium from foreign debts, which found its expression in the various stand-still agreements. This was followed by the control of all the foreign payments, and, when it appeared that an adverse balance of trade had swallowed up all the last reserves of gold and " devisen " (foreign exchange), by the complete control of each import business in particular. This again caused a systematic shifting of imports; from manufactures to necessary raw materials and food-stuffs; from countries which scarcely consumed German goods at all to those which purchased many of them.

Since Germany was one of many countries which regulated their foreign trade in the same way, the system of triangular transactions whereby Germany buys in the United States, sells to Argentina and pays in New York with the dollar which it receives in Buenos Aires, was replaced by an extremely complicated system of bilateral clearing agreements; today Germany has payment — or clearing — agreements with thirty-five countries. The value of the currency can thus be fixed at will for the various countries and the different kinds of business and methods of payment. The only important thing is to succeed — to some extent — in keeping the internal price level stable.

England, however, which had not experienced inflation and was also still one of the two great creditor countries, was able to follow a course of action which was exactly the reverse of that followed by Germany. England began with the " management " of the currency, and in September, 1931, the pound went off gold. The devaluation of the pound had almost no influence upon the price-level within the country, because it took place at a moment when prices were already going down. The short-term foreign debts which were reckoned in English pounds were

also devaluated. The devaluation of (mainly long-term) foreign credit could be reckoned into the bargain all the more because this eased the situation for important purchasers. The chief import and export countries — also those outside the empire, as for instance Scandinavia — joined the sterling block. The common trade policy of the most important countries within the empire — the Ottawa Agreements — also worked out favorably. Thus England was able to do without a detailed control of foreign trade, and she was able to confine control of the banking system to prohibiting the emission of new foreign loans. There was no appreciable increase, on the other hand, in public measures designed to increase employment.

The authorities only intervened in a hesitating manner and — apart from the numerous but indecisive efforts to help agriculture — without any particular system, even though orders for armaments may have had something to do with the comparatively satisfactory state of affairs during the peak of the crisis, and the gradual improvement down to the present time. The distressed areas are a sign that it was somewhat dangerous to lay so much emphasis on the "money" aspect of the situation in the measures which were adopted.

In the United States the whole social structure was just as insecure, while in England it was secure owing to tradition and financial reserves. The American crisis contained the following elements:

The economic crisis, intensified by the fact that a decline in the value of shares affected far wider circles of the population than in other countries, and further intensified by unsound financing of consumption.

The internal crisis in agriculture, caused by exhaustion of the soil for decades in the prairie regions, by a one-sided "one-crop" policy in the cotton country, and by an in-

debtedness which was only tolerable while exports were at their zenith.

A state crisis, caused by the split in the administration, the predominance of capital in public life, and the new attitude to the " social question "; the masses can no longer believe in individual " success."

Here the management of the currency served above all to discharge internal debts; it was intended that prices should rise; the debtors should thereby be released from their burden. The stimulation of economic activity by public works, however, brought about far-reaching changes in the economic sphere as a whole — afforestation, laying out of reservoirs, building of power stations, etc. The control of the banks had to be far more rigid than in disciplined England. On the other hand, foreign relations could afford to be almost entirely neglected. Those raw materials which people could not provide for themselves still came in without difficulty, the export quota was small, and a final regulating of obligations would have probably required greater leniency towards the debtors at the moment of the crisis than later. On the other hand, it was of great importance that the various measures taken dovetailed into one another, and that by public opinion they were regarded as securing the primacy of the state over the economic system.

Thus from these three examples we see that however different in kind and in intensity the intervention of the state for the redress of the economic crisis may be, in one respect all methods come to the same thing in the end: between the individual business enterprise and the international economy a new structure is inserted, the national economy, systematically planned. There is no fundamental difference between the planning which is limited to a control of investments and foreign relations, and is

kept as hidden as possible, with a cautious guidance of credit policy, with only occasional direct intervention, and one which extends to individual business enterprises as well. In every case all external relations are tested by a standard — even if very vague — of what is right for the national economy; in every case the state has the right, recognized by public opinion, to intervene in all business undertakings; in every case the leaders of business are required to think and act in connection with the national economy.

In the meantime, the international economic crisis has been largely surmounted, partly by public intervention, partly by the old methods of self-recovery: fall of prices, rise in interest, failure in business, unemployment; following that, decline in interest, and the resumption of business at lowered prices. The first stage of the ascent, the situation in which there are a large number of orders but at unsatisfactory prices, has already been passed. We are now [4] standing at a second stage in the ascent; with the rising prices in raw materials, foreign trade is once more gaining significance.

In spite of this, however, the hindrances to foreign trade have not been removed. International debts have not yet been cleared away; neither England nor the United States is thinking of returning to the gold standard; currency restrictions have nowhere been modified; bilateral agreements have nowhere been abolished. It is generally accepted that it is not possible to return to free trade, that therefore all we can do is to discover how, and to what extent, bonds can be loosened which at any moment may have to be drawn more tightly.

[4] At the time of writing, end of 1936.

FOREIGN TRADE TURNOVER

Year	Values		Volume*	
	In Milliards RM.	Alteration from Previous Year in Percentage	In Milliards	Alteration from Previous Year in Percentage
		92 Countries		
1929	284.1	+ 1.9	284.1	
1931	164.1		242.3	
1932	109.8	— 33.1	210.4	— 13.2
1933	99.7	— 9.2	215.2	+ 2.3
1934	96.0	— 3.7	215.9	+ 0.3
1935	96.6	+ 0.6	220.4	+ 2.1
		52 Countries (1929 = 100)		
1 quarter 1936	22.7	+ 6.6	76.2	+ 2.3
2 quarters 1936	22.7	+ 7.1	75.7	+ 1.6
3 quarters 1936	23.6	+ 9.8	76.6	+ 4.8

* Values upon the basis of the prices for 1929.

Already new difficulties are looming ahead which have arisen out of the particular way in which the governments dealt with the crisis. Since the psychological factor of exchange prices has been eliminated, a margin has been gained which lies between the caution of the careful banker and the real beginning of difficulties. It was only possible to restart the economic machine as quickly as possible by means of public works and government guarantees. Now, however, we cannot simply re-insert the mechanism of prices, for in the economic sphere a great section of public investments has been inserted, which supports the national economy as a whole, but is not profitable in detail. Now with cautious planning we must ascertain how far this section may be expanded without reaching the limit which lies in the nature of things, in the productivity of the soil, the capacity of the works, the possibility of creating the most difficult factor of production at any particular time.

For if we push developments to these limits, without the buffer of prices, it would set new dangers in motion. Hence even in England, which has the largest reserves both inside and outside the country, Keynes now demands, at the beginning of the rise, a systematic planning of public investments and the control of private investments, in order that the rise in prices and in employment may not soar too high, and in order to avoid a slump.[5] This states the task of a planned national economy quite plainly. Now we must inquire into its presuppositions and its significance for the international economic situation.

4. THE POSSIBILITIES OF A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER

(a) *Excursus on the social and psychological presuppositions of international economic cooperation.* An international economy is a matter of careful calculation, like every other economy which goes further than traditional neighborhood relations. But this does not alter the fact that all reflection on the international economic situation must inevitably bring in its train a whole series of factors which lie outside the sphere of economics altogether. When we remember how grotesquely impotent all the exhortations to economic reason by international conferences have been for the past eighteen years, and when we realize that probably we shall hear the same exhortations at ecumenical conferences themselves, which will doubtless be favorably received, we perceive that it is certainly worth while giving renewed consideration to these factors.

In all lands we find a small class of people who cross the frontiers of their own country fairly regularly, or who at least keep in rather close touch with the thought of foreign nations. To this class it is a matter of course that the

[5] "How to avoid a slump": article in *The Times,* January, 1937.

nations depend upon one another, and that they have something to give to each other. Both the linguistic and the intellectual and psychological presuppositions for mutual understanding are already present: in part upon the basis of the old Western humanism, to a small extent upon the basis of the *Una Sancta,* for the most part upon the common basis of a certain way of living, which may be characterized as bourgeois life on the grand scale. In so doing this class is in danger of losing connection with the life of its own nation, or at least of overestimating the impression that its own experiences in international life make upon large circles in its own nation. To this class there belong exporters on a large scale and financiers, as well as leading scholars and journalists, official diplomats, and private individuals who travel for pleasure. This group composes the main element in international congresses; such people easily forget that at these conferences they are quite by themselves and they are inclined to regard this island of culture and comfort as " foreign parts."

With this group we may contrast those large circles of peasant and bourgeois tradition who are fundamentally critical of all international relations. It was they who were the supporters of the pre-capitalistic economic system. To them foreign goods, foreign fashions, political dependence on foreign countries, are primarily a menace to traditional powers and institutions. They find it very difficult to understand any kind of new order. Their outlook is not broad, but the sphere they know, narrow as it is, they know thoroughly. Hence it is this group which always raises the question of nearness to the soil and a clearly defined sphere of economic relations. For the problems with which we are here concerned it is extremely important that these claims should be fully recognized in all their significance, and it should be admitted that in principle they are fully

justified. Only when this has been done will it be possible to meet their exaggerations with success. We ought to take special note of the fact that the attitude of this middle group is to a large extent the determinative force in the nation, above all in nations which have a strong and sensitive national feeling, and that it also determines the attitude both of the masses and of the upper classes.

The masses, above all the less they are organized, will at first understand only one thing about international relations: that here are great possibilities of raising the standard of living, and that these possibilities are not being used. Thus it is easy to kindle an enthusiasm for internationalism among them. But since they have no understanding of the special tasks of their own nation and country in particular within the framework of the international division of labor, this attitude, which is largely a matter of sentiment, although it may be a useful corrective to narrow bourgeois ideas, cannot be made fruitful for vital decisions.

(b) *Return to a free international economy?* We see that today there is very little feeling for, or likelihood of a return to the free play of economic forces; even the psychological presuppositions for such a return are unfavorable. In spite of this, however, the following question should be thoroughly re-examined: should not the "economic reason" — which has been so much vaunted — push its way through all these difficulties and assert itself? And its champions can at least point to the fact that many a time during the last decades prophets of a planned economy and self-sufficiency have been made to look foolish.

During the World War we became acquainted with phenomena which were exactly like those which we see at the present day — from the primary claim of the public administrative boards to currency restrictions. Many people, some of them very intelligent, have lauded the economic

conditions of the war as the way to socialization. And yet the economic regulations set up during the war have gradually been removed, even in Germany, where they lasted for a long time owing to the inflation; they finally disappeared in the year 1923, and after that we experienced a revival of international trade, and even a grotesque increase in international inter-filtration of capital (see above). But it was only a brief reaction under the leadership of American bankers, which began with the Dawes plan and ended with the German standstill agreements. After these experiences no state will let itself in for the uncontrolled piling up of foreign debt and foreign investments. In consequence of this, too, there is no inclination to return to the gold standard. Since we can do without it for our credit policy, the states will no longer allow themselves to be deprived of the possibility of maintaining an elastic internal and external economy by means of a managed currency. Without an unrestricted financing of foreign trade, however, no really free exchange of goods can take place.

It was this contradiction which caused the breakdown of the London Economic Conference in 1933. The majority of the statesmen and economists spoke, it is true, in all good faith, of a return to a free economy as the one panacea, but no one of them dared to begin with the abolition of trade barriers, for, as responsible politicians, they all knew why they dared not expose their respective countries at that time to these storms; from the practical point of view also, they could not imagine a future with different presuppositions. It was an interesting fact that in the plenary sessions as a whole the only speakers who held the attention of the audience were those who related how in their own lands — Russia, Turkey, and Mexico — they were trying to create order by means of systematic planning.

Since that time in all countries the element of public planning has rapidly increased and the influence of the generation which has a great longing to go back to the conditions of 1913 has largely declined. People are no longer afraid that every intervention of the state means setting foot on the slippery slope towards Bolshevism, and they already have certain theoretical ideas of the way in which a systematically planned and controlled economy will take shape, without its being on that account a dictatorial organization of the authorities. If, in some directions, grave errors are being committed by allowing the tendency to autarchy to be too highly developed, on the other hand it is, of course, also possible that feverish attempts will be made to recover from this by a return to a free economy. But these attempts are not likely to be permanent — even to the extent in which they were realized in the period between 1924 and 1931.

(c) *World planning.* Then are we not driven to the opposite extreme, to the idea of world planning? This would be the logical consequence of the Bolshevist economic system. We would not start from the idea of profit but from that of need and powers of production. For each country we would have to fix what each could provide best according to the climate, means of communication, state of the population, stores of raw materials and possession of machinery. On the other hand, need would be examined, the standard of exchange for all goods would be calculated and compensations for the elimination of risks would be inserted — and we would then have covered all the material needs of humanity as completely as it would be possible to do, from the technical point of view.

Anyone is at liberty to imagine a utopia of this kind, either under the political regime of Bolshevism, or under a more friendly one of pacifism. Here too we do not intend

to deal with the political and psychological improbabilities: it is highly improbable, but not absolutely impossible, that mankind might light upon a planned economic system of this kind. Here we are only concerned with this question: Is such a solution " economic " in the usual sense of the best provision of humanity with material goods, and in the sense of the intelligent use of the created world as was suggested in the first section of this paper? To both questions we reply: " No, it is not."

(1) A collective plan of this kind must start from the present condition of knowledge and from the present situation of technique. The country may have been examined as thoroughly as possible for raw materials before the plan is fixed, yet only those which are known today will be included in the plan, and all attention will be given to those raw materials, and to them only. We see the dangers this involves when we reflect on the difficulties experienced by Chile after the invention of synthetic nitrogenous manure, when it tried to free itself from the onesided orientation of its whole economic system toward saltpeter, and what anxieties Brazil experienced owing to the fact that nothing but coffee was grown in certain districts. At the same time these particular countries possessed great reserves in the shape of a primitive system of agriculture which was scarcely affected by the international economic situation at all. Still more difficult would it be to make a change of this kind after the economic system as a whole had been thoroughly rationalized! From the point of view of a national economy these ideas cause the same misgivings as are aroused by the one-sided attempt to carry out the Taylor system in the world of business: the better the machine or a workman is adapted to a special process the less can he or it be used when this particular process has been scrapped, owing to progress in technique or to a shifting of demand.

Just as today we would rather that a workman should possess a certain intelligent elasticity than great powers of specialization, so for the land we would prefer to see it used in an all-round way, with moderate profits, than in a one-sided way with high profits. (For exactly the same reasons, from the time of Friedrich List, even indirect planning, by means of absolute free trade, has been rejected.)

(2) So far, however, the biological reasons which are against a process of exhausting the soil by using up its energies have not even been mentioned. This brings us to our second line of thought: and we ask: Have we a right to treat any land in this way? And the answer that we receive is this: We are destroying powers with which we have been entrusted, whose final strength and significance are incalculable, when we exploit the soil for a one-sided human need instead of really " cultivating " it, and taking care of it, as a dwelling-place and a source of nourishment, by developing all its powers.

(d) *The decay of the world economy?* If we reject world planning and at the same time declare that the free play of economic forces is impossible, does not this mean that the world economy will relapse into an economic situation which will mean autarchy pure and simple? Even that is not wholly impossible, although it is at least as improbable as collective planning, for strict autarchy assumes that such a large part will be played by the agrarian population that the destiny of population in the present industrial countries would have to be greatly reduced. But there are ideologies which do not see these inevitable consequences and wish to make a virtue of necessity. The same arguments can be used against this as against schematic planning, only with the opposite sign.

Even the champion of autarchy does not deal sufficiently carefully with the powers of his country and his nation, for

he neglects its particular gifts and powers and only cultivates those which are common to all. If the western European nations, both by gifts and education, have more specialized workers than they can use for their own needs, it would be a culpable waste of this power if the people who could work for export purposes were put to break stones — presupposing of course, that there are already enough workmen or machinery for the urgent requirements of the building trade. The same is true of the mineral wealth of a country or of the products of agriculture. Evidently the right use of economic forces, and thus the divinely willed form of the land and the nation, is only attained when the whole earth and the whole of humanity is included in the plan of work, but this is not the case when everything is planned in a short-sighted way, round the present population, and the present state of science and technique.

(e) *The world economy composed of national economies.* And so, after we have examined the various general ideologies, we have again returned to the present condition of the world economy. One point, which deeply impressed the attentive observer at the London Conference of 1933, stands out clearly: all responsible political and economic leaders realize that the national economies need to be completed and fructified; they know, however, that they cannot apply the old methods, and they cannot find any new ones. In the course of the present enquiry it will have become clear that method is not the only thing that matters, but that primarily what matters most is the spirit; after that, however, the question of method is certainly of vital importance. The answer can now be summed up in a few sentences:

Intelligent order in the economic sphere can only be attained if:

(1) A cautious elastic collective planning for the in-

dividual national economies is undertaken; (2) these national economies, which are thus ordered internally, are in relation with one another; (3) these international relations are established upon the sense of a common responsibility on the part of the whole of mankind for the earth as a whole.

(1) *We must begin with the national economy.* The sphere which, as a national economic unity, may be made the object of a systematic plan may vary greatly in kind; it may be a "state" in the sense of international law, or a group of states with a common supreme head, like the British Empire, or a group of states which formed a joint economic covenant, or perhaps it may be merely part of the territory of a state, possessing distinctive economic characteristics. The right kind of plan will not aim at making everything new. First of all it will observe what is already going on and will throw light on all economic relations. It will not disturb the fixed organizations or the system of mutual exchange which already exists within its domain, and it will merely reserve to itself the right to intervene in case of emergency. It will intervene where the resources of private enterprise no longer have sufficient breadth of outlook, or where they can no longer shoulder the necessary risks; that is, it will control all investments and will take over the larger ones itself. For the great tasks of building workers' settlements, of transport, of the provision of power, and also of the synthetic acquisition of new raw materials can no longer be undertaken from the point of view of probable profits. They can only function if all the other parts of the economic sphere cooperate with them.

(*a*) The first great task of central planning is the establishment of public investments. When all economic measures are regarded as a unity the significance of profit in the economic sense is altered. The calculation of profit is cer-

tainly of decisive importance both before and after, for even a planned economy cannot in the long run consume more than it receives. And in every particular project it must have detailed information showing whether it will bring in a profit or will require a grant. But in the individual instance it does not need to act in accordance with these calculations, if, within the framework of the whole, it can equalize it at some other point. Then, however, it will need a new standard. It will seek this, first of all, in politics, in the security of the nation, and in a standard of life for the masses which is worthy of the dignity of mankind. If both these are regarded from the point of view of permanence then means and ends are interlaced in a peculiar way. Even in private business on a large scale the maintenance of the plant and of the workers may become in time a provisional goal instead of a mere means of gaining profit, and this aim will push the short-sighted desire for profits into the background. This applies still more to a national economy. We will then ask: How must we deal with the land and its natural treasures in order that for many generations it may be able, with undiminished strength, to feed our people? In order to answer this question we need a standard which will take into account both the technical and social points of view. We believe that this can only be found in the religious experience of the meaning of *things*.

(*b*) The second task consists in the fact that the investments must be harmonized amongst themselves, and with consumption. So far do the tasks of central planning extend. Everything else may be decentralized in self-administrative bodies of a professional and regional character. Planning must establish the framework for business enterprises, but it is not its affair to interfere with the individual business. Naturally central planning also means a central distribution of credit. And equally obviously a system-

atic distribution of credit can operate more delicate methods than a schematic one. For instance, if it regards a certain investment as questionable, it can reject it directly, without raising the rate of interest and thus making difficult other suitable investments. The decisive question, however, is not how, but to *whom* the credit is given; that, namely, the credit will be granted for definite purposes and not only for the fulfillment of formal conditions. Under such a system of planning conjunctures will not cease to exist, for the result of harvests, as well as the boldness of the entrepreneurs, and many other elements which influence the economic sphere, and which at the present day we can scarcely foresee, will remain subject to fluctuations. The planning authority will therefore never put all its methods into action at once; it will keep some in reserve, when the private initiative which it has stimulated is vigorous, and it will employ its reserves when their means have been exhausted, etc., as Keynes has shown us. But it will not allow itself to be *dominated* by such fluctuations.

(2) Foreign relations in such a system of planning would take the following form: the establishment, as far as possible, of quota limits only, but no tutelage over individual business (if the reserve of the bank of issue for the equalization of international balances permits this). These quotas will be fixed, as before, in exchange agreements. Bilateral agreements will scarcely disappear, but they will be constituted in a more elastic way and they will be connected with polygonal agreements. The starting point for international agreements, however, will always remain the important question: what commodities do we wish to exchange? For this reason a currency agreement will probably stand at the close of an important agreement upon economic policy, but it will not be worth much if it is contracted in advance.

Since the planning of an internal economy of this kind, when it is extended to international cooperation, deliberately renounces that wild expansion which was a token of unfettered capitalism, Demant is right in describing this aspect of " economic nationalism " as a " force for peace."

(3) We can, however, well imagine that such agreements on the harmonization of the economic policy of two countries will prove their worth in common tasks in a third territory. Quite apart from the question of the form which juridical sovereignty over the European colonies will assume in the future, this will provide a fresh solution of the economic and social aspect of the colonial problem. The common opening up of unexplored territory was a promising task for the bank for international payments. It has not been able to solve this problem, for it was at the same time a political instrument of the creditors regarding reparations. The task has remained open. It may be that in such new tasks the meaning of a deliberate division of labor in terms of a world economy will be easier to perceive than in direct exchange, where we are far too often entangled in traditional anxieties and contradictions.

Here, however, the question of the standard, with which we have already been confronted, becomes very urgent. For we are here concerned with great problems: the opening up of vast territories, the resettlement of masses of human beings, which will give a new aspect to whole regions of the earth, which will mean the actual creation of new nations. With this question of the standard we return to the reflections with which we began this paper.

5. THE STANDARD OF THE ECONOMIC ORDER AND THE TASK OF THE CHURCH

First of all, it is clear that the formal standard of the rate of interest is not sufficient, that we need a standard which

lies in the very nature of the matter itself. The peasant of the old stamp possesses such a standard in his unconscious attachment to the soil. Non-European cultures sought it in magic correspondences with a cosmic rhythm, like Chinese geomancy. Even the capitalistic entrepreneur possessed a standard in his intuition, that is, in so far as he was a really effective man of business; interest was for him merely a method of controlling accounts.

Today we are on the way to discover such an internal standard in two directions; from the point of view of politics, and from that of technique. The technician shows us how the *optimum* is to be extracted from the soil, without exhausting it; he has discovered the right way to treat matter, a way which does justice to the work and also to the material, which, as a rule, is equally economic, social and esthetic. In the permanent advantage of the nation the politician also sees the standard for his economic decisions, and to a large extent he will agree with the technician. For different reasons, but with a similar attitude, they will both reject all methods of treating natural powers which will exhaust them; they will see that joy in work is an important factor of production; they will advocate industrial decentralization, etc. A new type of economic official will be developed, who will possess the sober clarity of outlook of the engineer and the auditor, that view of public life which we associate with the official, and the will to shape things in a responsible manner which is characteristic of the entrepreneur. Men of this kind will approach the task of national and international order with expert knowledge and with reverence — and we cannot demand more than that for " if all knew what things require and all were to do what the things require, then we would do the will of God " (Adalbert Stifter).

Certainly, such a development is indeed possible; thank

God, it is not even absolutely improbable. But it is far from being secured. For it presupposes that the men who are called to lead in the economic sphere really acquire this knowledge, that they will find that inward peace and freedom which they will need in order to obey this knowledge, and that they will gain political power. It already means something when the picture of nature and the picture of history meet in the obligation to the blood of the nation and the soil of the country, when the economic sphere is regarded — still more often by peasants and architects than by the entrepreneur — as a responsible shaping of nature. But this picture of nature and of history must not be chosen arbitrarily or merely from sentiment. It must be correct. Here our reflections merge into the demand for an anthropology — a view of history and of nature which recognizes in all seriousness that the resurrection of Christ is the center of all life.

And even when this truth has been perceived, supreme moral courage is needed to apply it and to renounce all hope of brilliant momentary effects in favor of modest permanent results. And perhaps still more courage is needed in political leadership to insure that such an economic policy, which is planned with the long view, is also supported for some length of time, so that it may have time to become effective.

Only now do we come to the task of the church in this connection. It is not the task of the church to carry on an economic policy or to conduct propaganda for it. And yet apart from the church there will never be any good economic policy. But its task is indirect: the church must be *church;* she must administer the sacraments and, by her preaching, as well as by the lives of Christians, she must proclaim the gospel in a way that creates faith.

The members of the church, strengthened and illumi-

nated by the power which flows into them through the fellowship of the church, have to show in their secular activity that the Christian has a truer view of the world and a greater certainty in action than the unbeliever, or the believer in another religion.

SOME OBSERVATIONS UPON THE CHRISTIAN UNDERSTANDING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

by

MAX HUBER

SOME OBSERVATIONS UPON THE CHRISTIAN UNDERSTANDING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW[1]

Introductory

1. The world of facts, the processes of the course of history, the demographic, political, economic, and cultural phenomena which are important for international life and international relations are the same for the Christian and non-Christian observer. For both the findings of historical science and of sociology constitute the point of departure. But the point of view of the observer who surveys, sifts, and judges these questions from the point of view of the Christian faith, is different from that of the non-Christian. The origin and the aim of all historical events only become intelligible when they are seen in the light of another dimension, which is given to us in the revelation of the Word of God. The same applies to the limits of human action; in this light also we see the promises which are given to man. The Christian faith alone has a real relation of history; for it history is neither a merely natural process, nor is it a meaningless tragedy, nor a way of deifying man, but it is embedded in the history of salvation which transcends time.

Christian reflection upon these subjects should be characterized by that unerring sense of reality which meets us on every page of Holy Scripture; the Christian attitude is

[1] See the following works by the author: *Staatenpolitik und Evangelium*, Zürich, 1923 (French version: *Politique internationale et évangile*, Genève, 1924; Dutch version: *Internationale Politick en Evangelie*); *Die soziologischen Grundlagen des Völkerrechts*, 1928.

equally remote from that hopeless pessimism which is the result of a realism alienated from God, and from that unreal optimism which is the fruit of an idealistic humanism separated from God, for it is aware both of the fact that man has been created in the image of God, and of the fact of sin and of the power of evil in a fallen world.

2. There are two ways in which the Christian may judge international relations from the point of view of his faith:

(*a*) His reflection upon these questions may begin with the surface of historical political life and its visible happenings. Here the observer's attention will be drawn to the brutal policy of might, and moreover, to might in its extremest form, that is, war. It is evident that from the point of view of the love-commandment the only possible course for the Christian is to reject war. But when we merely condemn war we overlook the fact that the possession of territory which is menaced by war is, itself, very largely the result of earlier wars, to a certain extent in the form of law which perpetuates a state of war; this produces the paradoxical situation that the condemnation and suppression of a war may mean the sanction of a previous war.

Evident as it is that the Christian must reject war in principle, it is equally evident that it is his duty to support all efforts which aim at creating a peaceful settlement of international tension and conflict, and at furthering mutual understanding between the nations. At the same time we must not overlook the fact that a purely legal settlement of disputes can only protect an existing law, but that it cannot create a new law which may be required by justice, and that unfortunately the free course of development in the international sphere — especially the effort to create better and more just conditions — is greatly hampered by the collective egoism of each nation.

But if the Christian is to have something to say about international questions, he must leave the surface of phenomena and probe into the depths of existence. He must seek to unveil the roots of human sin in international relations in order that he may then put the question: What are we to say about these things from the point of view of the Word of God? A Christian who studies these questions must look at international problems every whit as realistically as a true and far-seeing politician and must take all the difficulties into consideration. But even when we have looked at the world in which the Christian has to obey the divine command in this way, we have still gone no further than secular thought can go as well.

(*b*) The question may, however, be considered from another angle: from the point of view of the Christian faith we must try to understand international life, its history, and its present state in the light of revelation. In so doing, we enter a sphere which secular thought either ignores or rejects. But the Christian must not be afraid of giving offence to others by a strictly Christian statement of the question, or even to seem to stand for what is " foolishness " in the eyes of the world. Only if he accepts this, and, holding on his way undisturbed, seeks for an understanding of these problems based upon the Word of God, will he be able to speak to the secular world a message which can only be given from the point of view of the Christian faith. We cannot here discuss in what language the Christian should give this message if he is to be understood.

The truth that is based upon revelation is *a priori* in character; from it conclusions are deduced. The secular method of perceiving truth is inductive. This difference between the deductive and inductive method produces a tension between the commandments of the Word of God and the norms derived from human understanding.

Christian thinkers have often considered the problem of the state. The Old Testament, which includes the history of the chosen people, also contains much which serves as a basis for the biblical doctrine of the state. The New Testament contains few expressions of opinion upon the problem of the state, but those which it does contain are fundamental. Where interstate relations are concerned, however, the situation is quite different. The nations mentioned in the Old Testament, of which the Bible speaks with great realism, were either hostile to one another, or they were great world-empires which absorbed into themselves what would have been a number of different states. Even for the Roman Empire, which only fought with the so-called " barbarian " peoples on its distant frontiers and had scarcely any relations with the civilized empires of Asia, what we know today as the " international problem " hardly existed at all. It is, therefore, only natural that the New Testament should not speak directly about these questions.

But this silence does not mean that these questions are a matter of indifference for the Christian faith. Faith has the certainty that revelation tells man everything which, according to the divine decree, is necessary for him, no more and no less, and that from all the light given him in this way the believer, led by the Holy Spirit, finds an answer to every question which is put to him by any situation and any period in history.

Hence it ought to be a primary concern of the Christian Church to try to gain a clear perception of the Christian view of the relations which exist between states and nations, in order that — upon this basis — it may also find a solution for the ethical questions involved in these relations.

In our opinion the theology of all denominations has

given far less attention to these questions than to those connected with the problem of the state as such. Here it will be impossible to attempt to give an account of the attitude of the Holy Scriptures to the problems of the international and supranational spheres, that is, of matters which transcend the state itself. All we can do is to mention certain elements which, in our opinion, should be taken into account, and we would also express the hope that the ecumenical movement will pay special attention to these problems in the future.

Since all relations within a state, and all supranational relations, are, ultimately, relations between one human being and another, the Christian understanding of man is the starting point for all questions of international relations.

The early chapters of Genesis, especially when we do not conceive them as actual history but as a profound interpretation of the meaning of cosmic and historical existence, are of fundamental importance for the Christian understanding not only of man, but also of human society. The eleventh chapter of Genesis is important for the understanding of the question of international conflict, although it does not throw light upon the variety intended by the Creator. The fact that the nations are ranged against one another, based originally on the fact that they cannot understand one another, is the result of man's alienation from God.

A particularly difficult question is that of the character of the nation in accordance with the purpose of creation, and of its own distinctive value in relation to other nations. In any case it is an important fact that the sacred history of the Old Testament took place within a nation which — from a nomad tribe to an enslaved people in a foreign land, from a conquering people to an independent state,

and then into new slavery and complete political annihilation — passed through all forms of national existence and strove for and attained a very high degree of physical and spiritual distinctiveness.

Since relations between nations are always dominated by what in spite of all variations we may describe as the state, the Christian understanding of interstate relations is necessarily determined by our view of the state itself.[2] If the state is not a divine gift and institution, but an independent creation of man as a political animal, it is intelligible that the state as the organization of a particular nation might be outgrown in the course of the development of the human race; that is, that it might simply represent a passing stage in the progressive integration of the family and the tribe into mankind as a whole. If, on the other hand, the state is an order given by God for the preservation of fallen humanity, for the purposes of redemption, then it represents an actual fact with which all history has to reckon. It is, of course, true that a world-state would still be a state and could wield the sword in the sense suggested in the thirteenth chapter of Romans, but the concentrated power which it would possess, since the world-state would be restricted by no other institution of a similar kind, would give it a new and still more dangerous character. The " great beast " of the Book of Revelation would have come into existence.

If the state is not to be understood either as a purely human order or as the gift of God, but if the view is taken that it is a demonic phenomenon which belongs equally to the sphere of the divinely willed necessary order (Rom. 13) and to the sphere of anti-Christ (Rev. 15), then the

[2] I would here suggest that the reader consult the Report of Section II of the Oxford Conference (*The Oxford Conference — Official Report,* Willett, Clark and Co., Chicago; pp. 65 ff., 224 ff.).

attitude of the Christian to the operations of the state in the international sphere will be determined by this double nature of the state.

But however the state may be understood from a theological point of view, a Christian process of reflection upon the international sphere can never ignore the question of the meaning of the Cross as judgment, even for this sphere of human will.

The Bible, however, is not only aware of the disintegrating tendencies of humanity and the means for checking chaos, but it also suggests the unity and the mutual understanding of mankind. We may point to the prophets, and especially to the second and sixtieth chapters of Isaiah, and to the second chapter of Acts as the removal of the curse of Babel.

The problem of the international, supranational, and universal is an essential part of the greater problem: history and the kingdom of God. Only in this whole connection can it be rightly grasped for the Christian understanding. The sword, the sinister attribute of death, is given to the state. By its means the state prevents chaos, which always threatens to disturb the peace of the national community from within. But the state itself stands alongside the other states in a space which is not controlled by any power of the sword, so that the swords of the individual states may themselves again produce chaos and war. If this chaos is to be overcome, can it be that the world-state, with its demonic concentration of power, can be the only solution, when we think of all the temptations which are included in such a possession of power? Is there any possibility of ordering the sphere in which the individual state exists in an intelligent and effective way, or is the state itself the historical phenomenon in which the rent which traverses the whole of fallen creation becomes particularly visible, and in

which we perceive the contradictory character of all human existence, containing always both good and evil? Is the state, because it uses force (and on account of sin must do so), a necessary order for the preservation of humanity, in which, however, in the fact of force, evil also is continually threatening to break in? Or can this dangerous character of the state be overcome? Only upon the basis of these considerations can an answer be sought to the question which continually emerges: What are we to do?

1. LAW

1. In order to establish the nature of international law some observations upon law in general are required.

(*a*) Law is the sum-total of the rules which, by their claim to validity, order the external relations of human beings among themselves. In contrast to custom, the rule of law is independent of its actual observance. It has an independent existence. It should prevail particularly when human beings would not act in the prescribed manner from inclination, interest, or custom. Law wills that which, at a given time, seems necessary or desirable to the persons exercising authority in the state (legislation), or that which seems to different men or states as in the common interest (contracts and treaties), in order to preserve the state for the future, and to secure it against changes in conditions or circumstances and interests. Law, whether it be legal enactment or contract, is therefore always something which is rooted in the past. It is already there when the concrete situation arises in which it has to prove itself as the valid rule.

In contrast to power, which is always fluctuating and relative, because at every moment it is determined by its relation to every other force which wields power, law is fundamentally fixed and equal for all. This comes out

especially clearly when law or subjective rights are created by contract; for this law stands as long as the parties do not unite to alter it as a foreign entity confronting them. This nature of law does not only become evident in Shylock's demand, but still more in the often mythical idea of fidelity to contract as one of the fundamental convictions of both primitive and highly developed peoples.

(*b*) Law is always the concern of the community; usually indeed this community is fairly comprehensive, e.g. a "fellowship" (*Genossenschaft*),[3] a clan, a people or a nation. The legal relations of individual human beings among themselves, whether as rulers or as ruled, or the relation between the community and the individual, or whether they are freely created relations amongst persons who are capable of so acting, as derived parts, as subjective rights and duties, are subject to the law of the community. This law of the community corresponds to a collective interest which in some way or another asserts its right and imposes a barrier upon subjective rights. The claim of the legal community to alter its legal order, and its acquired rights if they have become incompatible with the common interest is also based upon this collective interest. Even an institution like that of the blood-feud, which is so widespread in primitive legal systems, is, unlike warfare between completely sovereign states, still an assertion of law within the framework of the community.

2. (*a*) Law between states is, in its origins, a law outside a greater community. In previous historical epochs communities which had gained some independence, whether as primitive tribes or as developed states, were

[3] For the meaning and rendering of the word *Genossenschaft*, see *Political Theories of the Middle Ages* by Otto von Gierke (translated by F. W. Maitland, p. xxv in Translator's Introduction), and *National Law and the Theory of Society, 1500–1800*, by Otto von Gierke (translated by Ernest Barker, p. xc Translator's Introduction).

usually remote from and even hostile to one another. Among all primitive peoples, and among many civilized peoples, law is connected with religion, and the form of religion is usually peculiar to each tribe and each state. To such peoples, therefore, the idea of a legal order which extends beyond their own national community is foreign. Only where, as in ancient Greece, a number of states existed with common religious and cultural foundations, do we find a comprehensive supranational organization, as, for instance, in the amphictyonies. In early antiquity, however, legal communities did exist which actually only consisted of two states. Treaties are a primitive and very ancient element in civilization. Treaties of this kind were secured by the fact that each party appealed to its own gods. The very fact that all the peoples which made such treaties did so with a pledge of fidelity to their own gods, is a proof of their profound belief in the myth of fidelity to contracts. The idea of *Pacta sunt servanda,* whose origin has not yet been wholly cleared up by sociology and psychology, is the presupposition of all primary creation of law beyond the national community constituted as a state.

Only where the beginnings of a common ethos or of a large and permanent community of interest are present, can the international legal order go beyond the practice of concluding treaties. The ethic of Stoicism and the law of nature might have provided a foundation for such an order, but the fact that the Roman Empire included the whole civilized world practically known to its inhabitants prevented the ancient *jus gentium* from developing into international law.

(*b*) It is only through the Christian church that a possible basis for an international and supranational law has been created. At an early stage in history the common possession of fundamental ethical convictions was en-

hanced by the organization of the community in the double form of church and empire. The medieval legal system was not really international in the sense of a union of those who were fundamentally equal upon one plane. Rather it was a hierarchical order in the twofold sense of this word. For it, however, it was essential that the more or less independent principalities and communities should be regarded as integral members of a higher whole; therefore the idea of an unrestricted law could not arise, since ultimately the whole order was anchored in the *jus divinum*. The swift disintegration of the empire and also of most of the kingdoms which took place from the twelfth century onwards, produced a mass of legal relations between more or less independent communities; as also that flower of the system of arbitration and confederation of the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries, of which the Swiss federal pacts alone have been maintained to the present day.

(*c*) The development of an international legal system within the sphere of the medieval Christian community was interrupted and diverted into another direction by three phenomena. The process of the disintegration of the empire, which had never exercised real supremacy over the kingdoms of the west and north, nor over the Eastern Roman Empire, was accompanied by a process of integration of territorial powers. Impelled by the idea of sovereignty, the latter strove to achieve the consolidation of the internal power of the state, and also their complete external independence. The attribute of majesty, which originally belonged to the *imperium* alone, now became the characteristic mark of the true existence of a state in the form of sovereignty.

This process of dissolution and concentration, which began about 1250 (Frederick II) and came to an end about

1750 (the period of absolutism), was greatly strengthened and deepened about the end of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth century by the awakening of the national consciousness in some of the leading states, and also by the great religious upheaval of that day. The Reformation shattered ecclesiastical unity, while the unity of the empire had long been a mere fiction. At the very moment when Europe's isolation was ended by the great age of discovery, and when Islam was making a great bid for power from the East, Europe split into sections, politically, ecclesiastically, and emotionally.

Although the period of the Enlightenment and of secularism had not yet begun, the representatives of the new doctrine of sovereignty, Machiavelli, Bodin, and Hobbes, were thoroughly secular. International law, which since the sixteenth century had been developed as the law of independent states, was indeed recognized as a law of the Christian nations, and the countries which lay outside Christendom (*pays hors chrétienneté*) did not belong to this sphere of law. The *Corpus Christianum,* however, was a mere shadow of the former reality, still mentioned in the solemn introductory formulas of treaties between states. But not only were international politics secular through and through, with a few exceptions the church and theology also ceased to bring international concerns into the sphere of Christian ethics. The law of nature, which in the seventeenth and eighteenth century took the place of the Christian medieval legal system, was decidedly secular, but the law of the sovereign states was not only secular, it was amoral. The medieval distinctions between a "just" and an "unjust" war were abandoned. The abstract idea of the sovereignty of the state leaves no room for limitations of any kind, not even for those which may be self-chosen and on a small scale.

(*d*) The spiritual and political upheavals which characterized the close of the eighteenth century and the nineteenth century as a whole, the French Revolution, the growth of nationalism,[4] the American War of Independence, the emancipation of the powers of Asia from their traditional forms of life, all these movements have not altered the situation which had been created by the preceding centuries. The sovereign state is the universal form of political life at the present day; its will to a separate existence has been greatly strengthened by nationalism. The only barrier to an unrestricted policy of might was erected by the pacifist movement which arose first of all in America and in England during the nineteenth century. The character of this movement was partly religious; mainly, however, it is a secularized form of an originally Christian humanism. Politically, however, this movement had scarcely any influence. The great economic upheaval produced by the industrial revolution during the last one hundred and fifty years, and the remarkable development in the means of communication between the peoples of all continents, have indeed produced a comprehensive system of contacts between states, but they have not in any way altered the legal structure of the world of nations.

(*e*) It was not until the World War took place that men saw the danger of such a widespread state of international economic and cultural intercourse without a corresponding legal system. This was why during the war the idea of a completely new international legal system was able to gain ground, and in President Wilson's idea of the League of Nations it was able to take shape in the treaties of 1920.

The uniqueness and audacity of the League of Nations can only be appreciated by those who are familiar with the

[4] By the author: *Das Evangelium und die nationale Bewegung* in *Die Kirche und das Staatsproblem der Gegenwart,* 1934.

whole history of the development of international law, for they alone remember how great were the obstacles to international peace and understanding produced by the concept of the sovereignty of the state. Only those who appreciate the league from this point of view can speak intelligently of the failures and the hopes of the League of Nations. If the effectiveness of the League of Nations at certain crises has been weakened or paralyzed by the political interests of its members, or by their desires for self-preservation, there is another aspect of the problem which, especially for the Christian observer, is no less important. This is the question whether such a broad and comprehensive community of law and peace as the League of Nations desires to be is possible, or at least is permanently possible, without a common ethos to support this legal system. Undoubtedly many of the statesmen who took part in the establishment of the league, and in any case many who welcomed its inception, certainly possess an ethos, and many of them have a decidedly Christian one. Since, however, the league necessarily includes both states which bear the name of " Christian," and others which have either been dechristianized or were never Christian at all, the question arises whether a permanent legal structure can be erected on such a heterogeneous foundation? Whether such a body contains enough concrete common convictions, although in particular instances the basis for these convictions may be different? And finally, whether religions or philosophies of life do exist outside the Christian faith which can give a solid basis for international and supranational law? The ecumenical movement ought to consider carefully how the Christian churches can make their contribution, in the form of a Christian ethos.[5]

Whatever measure of hope we may place in the League

[5] Cf. below, section 5.

of Nations, it is a fact that some of the most important states have either never belonged to it, or they no longer belong to it. The world of nations as a whole, therefore, is in an unstable and unorganized condition. The various states confront one another as individuals, not as members of a strong community based on law. Hence they seek their security in their own power of self-defense, in economic independence, and in seeking the support of other states or other groups of states. At the same time we must not overlook the fact that no state denies the idea of law for the world of nations. Even in its imperfect and fragmentary condition the system of international law is a fact. But the various states do not only appeal to law; they also appeal to justice. Far too often, it is true, such an appeal — even though perhaps unconsciously — simply serves to mask self-interest. But this appeal to law and justice could not be made continually by states of all kinds were it not that in the depths of the human soul there is a desire for it, and a feeling that such a reality actually exists.

3. When law is based upon an ancient custom, as a rule it is in harmony with man's innate sense of justice. If this law is established by the state it can be carried out or imposed by the power of the state, even if many who are subject to this law only accept it with reluctance. In the long run, however, no law can be maintained which contradicts man's feeling for law. Either such a law will be altered — by legal or by violent methods — or the general feeling for law will be weakened, and all law will suffer from this fact. Not only the human interests which have been injured by the imposition of such a law will react against it, but the moral sense also will react against it, even when no important interest has been directly affected. Owing to the fact that in primitive society and often even among civilized nations, law is closely related to religion — the Jewish law

represents the highest point of such a union — positive law has a boundary and an aim in the ethos which is rooted in the religious sphere. But even where the deliberate union of law and morality determined by religion no longer, or at least no longer consciously, exists, the current law is measured by those who are subject to the law by a norm which is felt to be superior — this critical norm is the idea of justice.

Justice is of religious origin. For the Old Testament this is indubitable. Human justice is the reflection of the divine justice (II Chron. 19:5). But even the Greek *Dike* has a religious foundation. What it is that constitutes the material content of justice cannot be described once for all. Ideals of justice vary greatly, and their concrete content in particular is determined by changing factors. Even the principle of distributive justice, the *Suum cuique,* needs in any case to be made concrete. It is essential to justice that the law should be adapted to the case to which it has to be applied. An abstract rule can only be an approximation to this demand. Hence even the divine justice which emanates from the divine sovereignty is absolutely individual and concrete; so also is the justice which the gospel proclaims to men.

The content of human justice may be defined first of all in a negative way, namely, that justice excludes all arbitrary dealings, that is, all legislation and application of law under the influence of motives which are unavowable because they have no objective concrete basis. A particularly bad form of arbitrary behavior is legal hypocrisy, that is, the concealment of purely egoistic interests in the form of an apparently useful law, that is, a law which is useful for the community. Positively it is essential for justice that the law should impart to each member of the community rights and duties in such measure that each individual may

have a maximum amount of freedom for the development of his own nature alongside of the maximum of the power of the community. The adjustment of a law, right in itself, to the special character of the individual case is called "equity."

Justice operates itself in three ways. First of all in the application of the law in each individual single instance, such as the judicial decision. Its realization is comparatively easy, because here all that matters is to assert the law that now exists in all its purity, free from the influence of any irrelevant (subjective) personal factor.

Secondly, in the system of legislation in which the legislator has the particularly difficult task of finding the just solution among many possible solutions, and possibly among several which all seem suitable for the purpose.

Finally, in the transformation of the law. What is just at one period may, under certain circumstances, cease to be a suitable order owing to changing conditions, whether these affect those who possess rights and duties, or questions arising out of the relation between the individual and the community.

By its very nature law is intended to be permanent, but in face of the process of constant change it cannot always and everlastingly remain the same. Law must contain a dynamic element, legislation, and lawful transformation of law, in order to remain just. This aspect of all law is of particular significance and difficulty in the sphere of international law.

2. THE DISTINCTIVE CHARACTER OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

1. In order to understand the distinctive nature of international law, and the special problems which this raises for the Christian, particularly in connection with the question of war, we must be fully conscious of the completely

different situation in which man finds himself, on the one hand in the national community, and on the other hand, in the world of nations, as a member of a national community.

(*a*) The national community, however primitive it may be, possesses an organization which is endowed with a monopoly of power (the state), by means of which it maintains order (law and peace), and is accordingly able to regulate the legal sphere of the individual and of groups, in virtue of its undoubtedly superior power, in the interest of the community (legislation).

(*b*) The national communities which are organized as states exist first of all in an isolated way alongside of one another, that is, so long as they have not become fused with one another, either forcibly or voluntarily. No higher social organization exists which can secure peace, the observance of existing treaties, and the maintenance or improvement of the conditions under which they hold their territory because it wields greater power. Hence nothing hinders the states from following their own interests even forcibly, to the extent in which this is actually possible. In consequence, their mutual relation is continually changing. It is one of constant menace, and, therefore, frequently one of latent or open hostility. Owing to the fact that the state stands outside a system in which any one single authority wields the sword (Rom. 13:4), but every state itself wields the sword on its own responsibility, its situation is quite different from that which Christian thought presupposes as the basis of the relation of the individual to the state. Since, however, the individual owes obedience to the authorities, i.e. to the national community organized as a state, he is indirectly involved in the relation between states which is continually menaced by enmity. War and participation in war represent this relation in an acute form.

(*c*) In consequence the state, as an organized power, divides social life into two essentially different spheres: (1) into that of the national community, which is secured by an internal legal system where force is applied only in exceptional instances, and where the individual interest is subordinated to the interest of the whole, and (2) into the uncertain sphere of international life, where war always exists as the final possibility in order to protect the interests of one particular state.

For the Christian, therefore, the question arises: Is it his duty to support all efforts to include social life as a whole in an organization which totally or at least approximately, subordinates all conditions to a legal and if possible just order which would be secured against violence?

Fundamentally the Christian will answer this question in the affirmative, for in a legally ordered world, secured against arbitrary violence, that justice which is in accordance with the divine will could be more easily realized, and in it there would not be so much danger that man, on account of the obedience which he owes to his national community, would be obliged to oppose his fellow man with violence because the latter happens to belong to a different national community.

How can this comprehensive system of law and peace be achieved? Two ways at least seem possible: the states, as the primary supporters of the legal order as such, may themselves form a mutual order of peace, and together secure peace; or all human beings may join to form one single community, and in so doing remove the tension which results from the coexistence of numerous states.

The Christian cannot escape from the dilemma which is produced by the existence of these two possibilities: a latent state of war and world-wide organization. For the Christian conscience this situation means a very heavy burden if no way out can be found. The greatness of the difficulty

comes out in the fact that the relation of peoples to one another from the days of the prehistoric wanderings until the present time has always been a fluctuating one, again and again hostile, and not that of an established order of law. Great empires, as, for example, the ancient Roman Empire and the ancient Chinese empire, the British empire and the United States, have created a stable peaceful order for their inhabitants over wide territories, and, indeed, for whole masses of people, and in part for long periods of time. Even smaller states have to some extent been able to avoid wars for a long time. From the point of view of the world as a whole, however, nations are always in an unstable condition, one which includes the possibility of the outbreak of war.

A world state seems to contradict all the experiences of history. It might, indeed, be possible that such a huge state, not held together by the necessity of facing a common enemy of the same magnitude, would soon be exposed to a speedy process of decay (Gen. 11); or, by some unimaginable concentration of power, it might become a truly demonic force of an apocalyptic character (Rev. 13 and Matt. 4:8–9).

The only way out of the dilemma, therefore, seems to be a universal community of states for the preservation of peace. The only attempt of this kind, which at the present moment still remains a torso, is the League of Nations. A peace community which, although extensive, is not universal, and, existing alongside of powerful states, may indeed prevent numerous possibilities of conflict, but cannot in principle alter the political structure of the world of nations. It might even, by furthering the concentration of states in a few powerful — for instance, continental — groups, strengthen the dynamic of inter-state relations.

2. It is also necessary to see clearly the boundaries and

the difficulties of a world-wide order of law and peace even on such a foundation.

It is comparatively simple — though the political difficulties may be very great — to secure an existing order of law and existing conditions of possession among states by the establishment of courts for the peaceful settlement of disputes and by the obligation to mutual aid against law-breakers. The older pacifism, and to some extent even the pacifism of the present day, believes that international law and courts of arbitration are a sufficient guarantee of peace.

This conception overlooks two essential points:

(*a*) So long as the states which are united in a covenant of peace themselves remain in possession of military power, or of other means of coercion, the functioning of the collective apparatus of power, as the history of all alliances and even of all confederations shows, is uncertain, and when a great conflict of interests arises it is even possible that war may break out between the states which are allied to each other (the internal wars of the ancient Holy Roman Empire and in the feudal states in Switzerland in 1847 and earlier, the American War of Secession and the German war of 1866). If, however, the military power and the monopoly of the power of coercion is concentrated outside the allied states in a federation of power, or if a so-called "international army" is established, then practically we are standing on the basis of the state, that is, a world organization, the "world-state" or something very like it.

(*b*) But even if the problem of securing law by the exercise of power in a preventive and repressive way can be satisfactorily solved, a second question arises which is no less important.

Law is only able to guarantee peace in the national community, even with the help of the state monopoly of the power of coercion, because it fulfils a twofold function:

First, it orders the acquired subjective rights (possessions, contracts, etc.), and protects by the courts of law (static law), and second, it includes legal machinery by means of which the legal system can be altered even against the will of some who have an individual legal title, that is, the system of legislation (dynamic law). Law may indeed be maintained in the state, even if individuals, or whole sections of the population, are prejudiced by it even in their most important interests; but if a law is maintained which great sections of the population regard as unjust, a tension arises which finally leads to revolution, which is the substitute for the phenomenon of war.

(*c*) The twofold nature of law as static and dynamic is naturally present also in international life, for life is everywhere in flux. Acquired rights, however, are always based upon a law which arose in the past. Since the acquired rights of states are based upon possession or upon treaties, and are not derived from a positive legal system higher than the states themselves they can only be legally altered by the consent of those who possess these rights. Now, it is a fact that a modification of a legal situation is rarely desired by the interested parties at the same time, and perhaps still less in the same way. Usually one desires to maintain what the other desires to change. For this reason the political history of interstate relations is a series of arbitrary breaches of law, some of which may even be represented as morally justifiable.

Even the League of Nations foresees that an alteration of a state of law which has become untenable can only take place with the agreement of the interested parties. This, too, has been the case in individual confederations whose rigid federal pacts have led to war, and as a result have brought about the transition to the federal state.

Now, the great difficulty consists in the fact of securing

the necessary reshaping of the international conditions of law. Will the states voluntarily, in each individual instance, make the treaties which are required? Or will they even entrust the community of states in anticipation with the right to establish a law of this kind? And if this were to happen, will the states be ready to enforce the new law against the will of the states which think that they are injured by it? The possibility that the community of states may posit a new law for the member states, and against the will of some individual states, also includes the danger of bringing the existing conditions of law and possessions into a state of instability, and, in so doing, of endangering the essential stability which law requires. We are here confronted by the dangerous dilemma either that the law because it is too stable is not adequate to life, or that the security of the existing laws is shattered by the possibility of their alteration. In international life the problem of the transformation of law has essentially a different character from that which it possesses in the national community or in the state. Here the interest of the individual, or even of a group, may be subordinated and even sacrificed to the interest of the whole in the preservation or the alteration of a law. In international life, however, we are not dealing with individuals and groups which are small fragments of the whole, but, even with smaller states, with collective entities which possess a strong self-consciousness and have their own means of enforcing or resisting power, and therefore cannot be sacrificed in the same way to the interests of the whole.

3. For the understanding of international relations the fact of the possession of territory, that is, of dominion over large stretches of the earth's surface, is of decisive importance. Even among primitive peoples their own possession of territory is taboo — it is something for which they fight.

For the contemporary state the maintenance of every square mile of national territory is a matter of almost mythical concern. The whole of the present system of international law is connected with the question of the possession of territory and in essence this has always been the case. This possession of territory is the basis of the rights and duties of states.

Certainly since prehistoric days the tension between the needs of a people and the space it occupies has been the impelling force in the external history of mankind and the cause of migrations, whether peaceful or otherwise, and even of wars and conquests. Where this tension is not relieved by labor, that is, by the intensive exploitation of one's own soil or by the enjoyment of the advantages of space in another country through export of goods and labor or by emigration, this produces violent outbreaks. It is, of course, true that tension in the economic sphere represents the most important cause of violent conflict, but it is not the only cause. For the fighting instinct (Cain) in fallen man may break out spontaneously or as a result of education, apart from economic difficulties.

Possession as the right of states is the stabilization of a situation which has arisen out of the dynamic of international life. Meanwhile, this dynamic proceeds without hindrance through the growth and the decline of nations which can scarcely be controlled. International peace is based essentially upon the adaptation of the right to possess territory to the actual realities of life, an adaptation which may not only consist in an alteration of the territorial frontiers, but also in the restriction of the exclusiveness of the possessor in the exploitation of his possessions. The social problem emerges on a gigantic scale in the international sphere.

Hence it follows that the importance of law in interna-

tional life ought not to be overestimated so long as a right balance between the static and dynamic elements cannot be attained. Another element in this situation, apart from the question of the securing of law by methods of power, is agreement about objective principles derived from the nature of justice, which would determine the alteration of acquired rights in all cases, and also for the establishment of a new law. But it is a very difficult matter to make the establishment of law, which is always concerned with new and unforeseen circumstances, once more the object of legal maxims. But if the objective principles for a just development of law are lacking, the latter would simply be formed according to the dynamic of the existing tensions and conditions of power between the nations. On the other hand, it must not be overlooked that the further one is removed from these conditions of power the less likely is it that these principles will be actually realized.

3. POWER, FORCE, WAR

1. War has engaged Christian thought more than any other phenomenon of international life. It is not our intention to go into this problem in any great detail in the present article but simply to indicate certain aspects of the question which have often been overlooked, but, from the Christian point of view in particular, ought not to be overlooked.

War is a phenomenon which must be looked at in a wider context in order to be rightly judged. War is a definite form of force; force is an expression of power.

Power, whether for a human being or for a state, means the measure of the possibility of shaping his or its existence according to his or its will, in independence of others and by means of influence upon others. Power can only be maintained if it is able and ready in the last resort actually

to break down resistance by means of force. Force means the exercise of physical pressure upon human beings, or upon things, which is able to create a free way for the will of the one who exercises force, directly or indirectly. War is the application of such pressure by nations, between one state and another, by the method of armed force. All force is concentrated in the state, and it is only in a slight measure transferred by the State to the individual (self-defense, or disciplinary methods in education). The exercise of force without the authority of the state is either crime or the break-up of the state itself (civil war).

2. The relation of the nations to one another, in contrast to the relation between the members of a nation, is essentially dominated by power. The states call themselves " powers " and those which are predominant are described as " great powers."

Power is only exercised by force in exceptional instances. As a rule the threat and, indeed, the bare possibility that it may be used is sufficient. The very fact of the possession of national territory, the exclusive jurisdiction and possibility of disposing of the human beings and the goods within this territory, and of closing the entrance to this territory to other human beings and their economic enterprises, confers power upon a state. The fact that individual nations can secure for themselves large reserves of territory for the purposes of colonization and for the exploitation of the riches of the earth may bring great economic pressure to bear upon poorer nations — affecting both their economic and their population policies; such pressure may affect the interests of the poorer nations to such an extent that if they possessed greater power, war would break out. The fact that war does not break out does not prove that conditions are normal or just. It simply means that a nation is obliged to accept certain diffi-

culties in a peaceful manner which another nation, and a stronger one, would try to overcome by threatening to go to war or by actually declaring war. Within the state, it is true, individuals and minorities must submit to the whole; but a state itself represents an attempt to bring interests, under the supremacy of the community, to a certain just balance; and the swift changes in human life caused by birth and death always result in producing new conditions. In the world of nations, with its relative stability, this regulating collective power is lacking, and the situation of each individual state is therefore conditioned by its own power, that is, by the play of forces of all the powers.

The power of the state is ultimately determined by the territory it possesses. The latter is almost always the result of military conquest or of severance from another state. Hence it follows that war, as an element of the historical process, is not only present in war itself but also in the fact of the possession of territory whose inviolability is an essential mark of peace. Thus the whole of history is permeated in a sinister way by violence.

3. Even in Christian circles very often the extreme danger, and thus the senselessness, of modern war is described as a reason for getting rid of war as a method of international politics. As a motive of expediency this point of view, although historically it is not absolutely correct, may be taken into account, but from the specifically Christian standpoint there is no room for the quantitative element in judgment of evil.

Modern peace policy has therefore devoted most of its attention to the prevention of the outbreak of war, and by casting the blame upon the aggressor it has tried to frighten the nations away from warlike methods or from war as a political method. The covenant of the League of Nations with its mediations, delays, and sanctions, is a great attempt

in this direction, in which even the eventual possibility of a war as an element of peaceful settlement has been included in the dynamic of international politics.[6] The Kellogg Pact, on the other hand, confines itself to outlawing war without trying to eliminate the causes of war. Even for the Christian the definition that " politics is the art of the possible " is applicable, and therefore he too must often be content with half-measures. Yet the realism of the Christian politician ought to be shown in the very fact that everywhere he presses through to the final causes of the evil, and is not satisfied simply with checking the symptoms, and also that he never attempts to separate a principle, in itself ethically good, from the actual possibility of carrying it out in practice.

4. The terrible character of war, both ethically and materially, and the greatness of the difficulty of shaping international relations aright and of protecting them against violent disturbance, even in Christian circles, have produced the idea that violence itself ought to be abolished. Two ways of doing this seem to be possible: on the one hand, the renunciation of violence as a political method, not only as in the Kellogg Pact for the accomplishment of one's own purposes, but even in defense of one's own country, and, on the other hand, the refusal of every individual to participate in the acts of violence undertaken by the state.

(*a*) The fundamental renunciation of force raises the question: Ought the use of the sword to be renounced also in the internal order of the state? Few go so far as this, since those who desire to abolish force regard the legally restricted police force as something essentially different from war — and not without reason.

[6] By the author: *" Die allgemeinen politischen Grundlagen des Völkerbundsvertrages," Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht,* 1920.

If, however, a defense force, organized by the state, exists, there is always the possibility that it may also be used against other states. The compulsory power of the state must not be reduced too far, otherwise individual groups which wish to disturb order would find it too easy to enforce their will upon the state. So long as the state exists, therefore, if it remains a state in the sense which is suggested in the thirteenth chapter of Romans, an element of violence is always present in the world. The possibility of waging war — this is proved by the whole history of war — is based far less upon the amount of armaments than upon the relative strength of the parties which are confronting each other. Behind the front of a war which is carried on with meager forces and appears to remain stationary, a war with great means at its disposal may be organized.

The endeavors to restrict and reduce armaments are thoroughly justifiable and necessary, both for economic reasons and in order to relieve tension in the political sphere, but they do not fundamentally alter the dynamic of international relations so long as the structure of the international world is not changed.

Mere renunciation of force, in the special form of the use of military methods against other states, is no solution in a world which itself is full of force, even when this does not appear externally. If the power of the state in its foreign relations disappears, then all conditions of power and possessions, which are themselves the fruit of force, will be perpetuated, or those nations which do not renounce force will impose their will upon all the others and involve them in the conflicts which they will be carrying on among themselves. Force can only be intelligently renounced when the will for a just ordering of the conditions of life, a will which can never be paralyzed, is present. It is impossible to anticipate the coming of the kingdom of God,

although this is what some individual revolutionary elements in the Christian church have always desired, but the renewal of men as well as of nations must be extended to life as a whole.

(*b*) The refusal of individuals to participate in a particular war — as the refusal of military service — is either a revolutionary method to force the state to abandon force, as we have already mentioned, or it is an act of personal decision of conscience. Here we are concerned only with the latter.

The church may and ought to give directions to its members in order to help them to make decisions in all possible conflicts of conscience, but the real decision can only be made by the individual in obedience to God and as such it should be respected by the Christian.

It ought not to be overlooked, however, that the problem of war cannot find a solution from the individual point of view which can satisfy the Christian. If by a special treatment of conscientious objectors the latter might be spared a conflict of conscience, or if compulsory military service were replaced by voluntary enlistment, the question of war service for the majority would no longer be an actual problem. But the responsibility for this whole question would not have been removed from these Christians. Whosoever bears any responsibility at all for the state in any form — and political rights are not an absolute presupposition for this — cannot avoid considering the question how the state should act towards other states and towards war in particular. Here, too, it is not sufficient to fix our attention upon the symptom, that is, war, and to hold oneself aloof from it. The Christian must go down to the root of the evil and at this point he must try to improve the situation.

The question of conscientious objectors is one which

concerns the relation between the individual and the state, but we ought not only to think of the former, but also of the state; that is, in concrete terms, the concerns of those who act responsibly for it should also be taken into consideration. It may indeed be possible, and it is desirable, that the state should so act that its citizens may be spared conflicts of conscience, but the claim of the citizen to be able to demand as a right that the state should renounce its claim upon him by taking his subjective decision into consideration, makes, in principle, the whole authority of the state an open question. Here two demands confront one another, for which perhaps both the individual and the state claim divine authority; or it may be that two demands are made from two incompatible standpoints, namely, the Christian obedience in faith and a purely secular claim of sovereignty on the part of the state confront one another. From the standpoint of the Christian faith it is perhaps not necessary that a rationally unimpeachable solution should be found. The state, with the power of the sword which it requires, belongs to the fallen world. The renunciation of force is an attitude which is directed towards the kingdom of God. A rational adjustment is possible in some concrete situations but in others it is impossible. The possibility of this impossibility is the tension between both realms. This tension can only be overcome in personal decision by the state in its government, its legislators, and judges as well as by those who are summoned to military service. Here, in a special situation, that tension which exists (and can never be removed) between church and state becomes visible

4. THE ELEMENTS OF THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW

1. As the church has always viewed law as an essential element of human society, and especially law in the national

community of the state, so also it will acknowledge international law as an order of relations between nations organized as states.

International law has, it is true, no compulsory power like that of the state behind it. Nevertheless, it is not, as many believe, a hopeless fiction. In any case it gives to inter-state relations a certain security and provides a standard for the estimate of the attitude of the states. At least it points to the fact that these human relations ought not to be left to arbitrary decisions and thus to chaos. The Christian therefore will support all attempts for the development of international law in order that this may form — more than it has done hitherto — the basis of just and peaceful relations between the nations and therefore also between individual human beings. The Christian recognizes the peculiar difficulties of this task, which are indeed great, but he does not allow these difficulties to dismay him because he acts in a spirit of Christian responsibility. He takes what is possible into consideration, hence he is able to support attempts which represent a serious effort to approximate to the aim which lies before us.

But as a Christian he will not lay the chief emphasis upon any kind of legal agreements, institutions, or methods of coercion, but upon the spirit which — living in human beings — works itself out, directly or indirectly, in institutions, and through the policies of states. All the legal institutions in the world cannot achieve their purpose in the long run by their own efforts, however intelligent these may be, but only through human beings who quite seriously intend to put into practice the possibilities which these institutions afford.

2. In spite of the fact that international law is expressed in the terms of juridical technique which has been developed in the sphere of the highly developed law of the state,

international law, in accordance with the conditions of the world of nations, is an extremely primitive, and utterly individualistic, not a social, law. Its central idea is that every state practically exercises unrestricted sovereignty over its own territory, and in the same way it recognizes the same right for all other states. From this point of view of independence, by means of treaties, common or complementary interests of two, or of several, or even of all states may be regulated. But in the last resort all cohesion and community depends at least in principle upon the will of each individual state. A duty to the community, a sense of solidarity, does not form part of the essence of the universal international law. Indeed, until very recently, this law recognized war, and even today it is forced to tolerate it as a stark fact.

Nevertheless, even the present international law, as it claims validity for most or all states, contains the rudiments of a higher system of law. The most important of these elements will be briefly mentioned below, with the exception of the League of Nations, which would require a special and comprehensive presentation.[7]

3. Owing to the exaggeration of the idea of sovereignty, the public tribunals of arbitration which had been so highly developed in the Middle Ages had been almost forgotten. The first and second Hague peace conferences (1899 and 1907), and especially the establishment of the League of Nations (1920), and of the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague (1921), have given a powerful impulse to the idea of arbitration and of arbitral and judicial settlement of international disputes, and have caused the states to recognize mutual obligations in a way which could not have been imagined a few decades ago. Hence this development must be recognized as full of sig-

[7] Cf. above section 1 (*e*), and quotations under section 3, 3, section 4, 4.

nificance and hope. At the same time it ought not to be over-estimated, for the most dangerous conflicts between states do not turn upon the interpretation of a law which is already or is still recognized, but on the preservation or the alteration of the law. The greatness and the significance of the judicial decision lies in the fact that in a world of nations that is almost completely dominated by power and opportunism it is the place where the ethos of the spiritual rule of law and the just application of law is asserted.[8] On the other hand the fact that the way of litigation, by which a dispute may be decided even against the will of one party, is set up as an ideal, whereas between individual human beings the way of litigation is regarded as the extremest kind of unfriendly conduct in legal form, throws a lurid light upon the conditions which exist between the states.

4. At all times attempts have been made to settle international disputes by means of the mediation of a third party, whereby, in addition to the expediency and equity of the mediation proposals, the political weight of the mediator is of importance. Such mediation forms the heart of the covenant of the League of Nations and of its early drafts.[9] In addition to mediation there is another method of international law which is also important, and since 1921, like the judicial decision, and usually in connection with this, has been employed in a large number of treaties between states — I mean conciliation. Conciliation commissions are set up beforehand by any two states in order that they, at the desire of one or of both, may make impartial proposals for the settlement of a difference of opinion which can-

[8] Cf. the *Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice:* Series C7 – I, pp. 14 ff. and E4, pp. 18 ff. (Speeches by Max Huber.)

[9] Cf. section 3, 3, above, and papers by the author on *Völkerbundsprobleme* in the *Botschaft des schweiz. Bundesrates vom 4. August, 1919, betr. Eintritt der Schweiz in den Völkerbund.* Bern, 1919.

not be overcome by direct negotiations between the parties. Since those who make these proposals are not representatives of states themselves, but men regarded by both parties as individually worthy of confidence, the value of their proposals is only conditioned by their justice and their relevance, and since the conciliation proposals are only obligatory when they are accepted by both parties, the conciliation commissions are not, like courts of justice, bound unconditionally to the law, but in a freer way they can propose that which seems to them to be constructive and the most just and relevant solution for the future relation between the parties concerned. Indeed, the term "pastoral care" in the international sphere has sometimes been applied to this conciliation activity. This may be saying too much, but this expression is certainly entirely apt when applied to the conciliation and advisory activity of the Swiss statesman and hermit, Brother Nicholas von der Flüe, to whom a special place of honor must be assigned in the history of arbitration and conciliation in the later Middle Ages.

5. A ray of light falls upon the often dismal sphere of interstate relations with the entrance of the really human element into this sphere. Apart from the influence of the church upon medieval international law, we may mention for modern days the campaign against slavery since the declaration of the Vienna Congress, and the later agreements by which the various powers support one another mutually for the suppression of slavery. In this connection too there are other conventions which we ought to name which likewise serve moral interests — for instance, the suppression of the white slave traffic and of immoral literature.

Whereas, however, as a rule in these contracts between states the main concern is that the moral achievement which a state is striving to realize within its own territory

has to be assisted by the cooperation of other states, the Geneva Convention of 1864 (and also of 1906 and 1929) — the most universally accepted series of treaties — from the very outset introduced a specifically Christian idea directly into international law, namely, the same treatment of sick and wounded soldiers in war-time regardless of the side to which they belong.

It is paradoxical that first of all, in the most inhuman situation, at the very lowest point in international relations — war — a genuinely Christian idea should be asserted in international law. The introduction of this idea into law has also in the course of time proved very fruitful. On the one hand, in connection with the Geneva Convention there has arisen the world-wide movement of the Red Cross, which seeks to realize the idea of readiness for help which is unselfish, and makes no distinctions in either the national or the international sphere.[10] On the other hand, the Geneva Convention has given an impulse to further political treaties which aim at making war less inhuman, and finally are destined to limit and prevent it.[11] In this connection also the organization for mutual help between nations in case of catastrophes (known as the International Relief Union) which was founded in 1929, should be mentioned.

6. Finally, a brief mention of two principles of international law, neutrality and solidarity. Here we are not concerned with occasional neutrality, but with a stable political policy in relation to other states; nor with the

[10] By the author: *Die Idee des Roten Kreuzes in der Gegenwart,* in the *Festschrift für Heinrich Zangger,* Zürich, 1934, and (French) in the *Revue internationale de la Croix Rouge,* 1934, also *La Croix Rouge comme facteur de rapprochement entre les peuples, R.I. de la C.R.,* 1930.

[11] Cf. by the author: *Das Rote Kreuz und die neuere Entwicklung des Völkerrechts,* in the *Blätter des deutschen Roten Kreuzes,* 1929, and (French) *Revue internationale de la Croix Rouge,* 1929.

solidarity of political alliances, but with more comprehensive systems of federation for the preservation of international peace. If something can be said from the point of view of the Christian faith on these extremely political problems it must first of all be this, that it is not the system as such which is most important, but the spirit in which it is administered, and the way in which it actually works out. Neutrality, especially when it is observed by a great power which can exercise a great deal of influence upon interstate relations, may perhaps seem egoistical, whereas solidarity may seem to incorporate a higher ethical principle and to be better able to secure the order of law. But that which is rationally correct in an irrational world — the world of history and politics — is not necessarily that which is adequate. The nations will always allow their politics to be primarily determined by their interests, whether they observe the principle of neutrality or of solidarity. Neutrality may result in the effective limitation of wars and in the preservation of decisive material and spiritual factors of international reconstruction, whereas a fully developed system of solidarity, unless it is operated in a reliable and impartial manner, may increase the dangers and risks in an unjust way in the international sphere.

5. THE ETHOS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

1. Without an ethos no law can exist. Power and expediency are necessary for law, but they do not constitute a foundation strong enough to resist changes, nor a point of contact for renewal if the law has been broken. Continuity and dignity are given to law only by something which transcends law and external circumstances, namely, the sense of obligation which is found in the conscience of the human being who is subject to law. Nowhere is the moral foundation so necessary as in international law, which is

not supported by any higher exterior authority. Indeed, where international law means more than the legal sanction for a position of power and the independence of states, its very life depends upon moral ideas drawn from the common stock of mankind, from time immemorial: respect for the country and the life of another nation, the obligatory character of treaties, the protection of ambassadors.

When we speak of the ethos of international relations we ought not to overlook the terrible condition of the latter: distrust and fear, arrogance and hatred, alternating with self-interested friendship, preparation and preparedness for deadly conflict with all the methods of modern warfare, and a ruthless struggle in the economic sphere. There are, however, some rays of light in this dark picture; honest attempts at real understanding, at least an effort to live peacefully side by side. But the realistic observer who looks for the elements of an ethos of interstate relations in the present political, economic, and spiritual situation, who desires to build upon historical experience, upon the immanent compulsion of necessities and expediences, upon a sense of common and permanent interests, may well turn away from the sight in discouragement. Why should he dedicate himself to an apparently hopeless task if he can find nothing in the world of human experience which can overcome his scepticism and his pessimism? For the Christian the power to overcome these obstacles springs from his knowledge of his responsibility in the sight of God which has been revealed to him.

2. (*a*) In every situation the Christian may be faced with this responsibility. Indeed, he can never evade it. Even if he takes refuge in a zone which is supposed to be protected, the very fact of his flight to this zone, by which he leaves the responsibility for responsible action in the

hands of others, is also, in its own way, his choice of an attitude towards this particular situation.

The sphere of international relations is frequently regarded as one which concerns statesmen, diplomats, and high military officials alone. The responsibility, however, extends much further; it does not only include all those who influence public opinion, but also those who form part of it. A policy which aims at peace as well as one which is dangerous to the peace of the world, is determined essentially and is effective through the spiritual atmosphere which is the result of the purely personal attitude of each individual, his attitude towards the human beings who live on either side of the frontier.

(*b*) For the Christian ethos in the question of international relations a twofold fact must be borne in mind: on the one hand, the directly personal attitude of the human being who is dependent on himself alone and not at the same time also on others, the distinctively personal, the condition of the person who is permeated with the sense of the presence of God, and of his responsibility for his neighbor; and then the responsibility of the Christian as a member of a national community over and against his fellow creatures of another national community. The fact that every human being is an integral part of a political community, a fact which he can by no means evade, inevitably produces relations between one human being and another which, although in the last resort they must also be judged in the light of man's personal responsibility in the sight of God, mean that the individual is always concerned with the nonpersonal relation between himself and the community, and between community and community. In this collective ethos the personal seems to a certain extent to be broken by the existence of historical forces.

(*c*) In the following closing remarks the occasional and

fragmentary character of these reflections will become very evident. All that the writer can do is to indicate some points which certainly ought to be noted in a Christian consideration of the ethos of international relations. This paper is simply a personal contribution towards an outline of further work. Such work is particularly suitable for the ecumenical movement; for in the latter not only are the various views of the different ecclesiastical bodies voiced, but also the manifold spiritual, political, and social concerns of the individual peoples and races; yet all this is not expressed as a confusion of conflicting interests, but as tasks laid upon us by the Word of God; God, however, does not only lay this obligation upon us. He shows us the way to achieve it.

3. (*a*) The personal attitude which should spring from the Christian faith is love to one's neighbor. Actually, to adopt this attitude, however, becomes increasingly difficult the wider and the more remote the circle of our "neighbor" becomes. Even the sense of kinship with our own fellow countrymen is intensified by the sense of opposition to other countries, while the main attitude of the citizens of one country towards another is usually one of indifference, distrust, arrogance, or even enmity, as contrasted with love.

Even now it would mean something great for the relations between the various nations if Christians were to fulfil *one* presupposition of love, namely, that of the comprehension of one's neighbor. Such understanding is only possible upon the basis of truth and honesty, and this again, since it presupposes self-criticism, upon the basis of humility. The significance of such a spiritual attitude becomes clear when we remember what a burden is laid upon international relations not only by the hatred, mistrust, and prejudices of the nations, but also by the self-deceptions, the false ideologies of unconscious self-justifica-

tion, sometimes concealed under the guise of religion. Without the will to truth and honesty, even in the understanding of every nation, even of one which is quite different from one's own and possibly even unfriendly towards it, every effort to stabilize international order is impossible, and if it could establish itself outwardly it would even be dangerous. This sphere in the eyes of many people, outwardly so insignificant and so vague, within which every individual Christian can be responsibly active every day in speech and writing, and also in reading, above all in reading the newspapers and in the judgment he passes upon what he reads, is comparatively little noticed. Like the secular optimistic or utilitarian reformers the church far too often begins with the circumference of external organizations instead of with the center, from the conversion of the individual; the result is that even Christians within each national community have either no influence at all, or, at best, they exert a very indirect and fragmentary influence. The personal concrete action of the Christian is continually menaced by the temptation which is characteristic of rationalism, that is, a mechanical abstract way of thinking about these questions.

(*b*) The strict truthfulness which should characterize the behavior of the Christian, owing to his responsibility in the sight of God, should issue in the fact that he will remain able to resist all empty ideologies and rhetoric, and even that he will be proof against all national or personal selfishness, disguised as humanitarianism, which has done so much to undermine the moral authority of international endeavors. But the Christian's realism and freedom from false illusions cannot turn into cynicism or into passivity, because he is aware of his responsibility in the sight of God.

For those on whom great responsibilities rest in international life, the knowledge of this responsibility is of de-

cisive importance. The dangerous and brilliant power which is connected with the direction of foreign policy, and the necessity for making personal decisions of the widest significance, ought to be counterbalanced by a foundation and support in such a sense of responsibility. The same is true of those to whom a task is intrusted on which confidence in supranational institutions depends.

4. The collective ethos of interstate relations is derived from the unity which Christianity has brought to the West.

(*a*) After this common Christian basis had been shaken, and to a large extent destroyed by the splitting of the Church and the growth of secularism, an attempt was made to create a substitute for it. The law of nature, upon which international law has been based since the sixteenth century, and especially since Grotius, was held to be both a moral as well as an actually juridical basis for interstate relations. Kant's work, *For Perpetual Peace,* constitutes an important landmark in this process. The nineteenth and the twentieth centuries sought to base the order of state relations mainly in a utilitarian way upon the economic and intellectual interdependence of the nations.

All these systems, even when they contain elements which can be used by Christian thinkers, are inadequate. For one thing, they distort the irrational elements in history; above all, their ground and their center is in man, in the reason of the autonomous individual. These systems, whether they are ethical or utilitarian, can constantly be removed by man; they are undermined in his consciousness and then they are swept away by changes in interests and ideologies.

The Christian faith alone provides the presuppositions for an ethos which stands firm; for it is based upon foundations which are given to the Christian by revelation, but have not been thought out by his own efforts. The Chris-

tian adopts an attitude towards the problems of international life from a sense of responsibility, not from merely human knowledge, or from motives of expediency.

(*b*) As bases for a Christian collective ethos possibly the following should be mentioned first of all:

First, the church, the *Una Sancta,* whose head is Christ, is the unity which is already given, a unity which is both transcendent and immanent in history. It is original, it has not been constructed or reconstructed like all communities which start from sections of mankind, such as individual states or nations. Severance of relations, separation, opposition to one another mean falling away from the divinely willed unity; the unity is there, so long as men do not destroy it.

Second, it is not only among Christians, however, that this unity is or should be present. This unity embraces all who have been created in the image of God and have been called to salvation. Foreign missions is an essential presupposition of this ethos, which, indeed, can only be perceived from the point of view of faith, but it does not only exist for Christians and for Christian nations.

Third, no Christian ethos, even when it has for its object collective entities like the state, can elevate the latter to the level of an absolute and ignore human personality. In such an ethos, however, man is not regarded, as in the secular cosmopolitan systems, as the central point of existence, but as the being which has been created by God and called by him.

Fourth, the Christian faith takes history, in which man is set, seriously. A Christian ethos must therefore come to terms with the historical facts of state and nation. Above all it takes evil into account, the sin of the individual and the evils connected with power.

(*c*) As a rule the secular ethical systems of international

relations have concerned themselves only with the state, and very recently chiefly with economic relations, with the mutual interdependence of the nations upon one another. A Christian ethos which starts from the unity of the *Una Sancta* has necessarily a much wider horizon.

First, the state, upon the basis of the whole history of historical development which is known to us, is the point of integration of the strongest external community among human beings. The ethos, therefore, takes this factor into account with the divinely willed task of the state, as well as with the distinctive character and dangers of power in the state and in the world of nations. In no case can the state, as, indeed, would be suitable for it in accordance with its claim to sovereignty, take the place in the world of nations which is claimed by the autonomous individual within the world in secular thought. Such an individualism of the state, which is a collective, inflated individualism, is completely opposed to the Christian view, in which all men and historical communities are regarded as within the framework of the order willed by God.

Since for the Christian ethos the state is not an absolutely independent institution, this ethos must not only protect the individual human being in his divinely intended independence, but it must also protect the collective institutions which are within the state, or which reach out beyond the state, that is, the nations as agents of common spiritual values, the minorities, the churches. The tensions which spring out of the geographical differences in the external organization of power of the state on the one hand, and out of the various human communities which proceed from nature and from historical development on the other — races, nations, churches, etc. — must be an essential subject of the Christian ethos. The latter cannot evade these difficulties by simply ignoring the prob-

lems springing out of physical and historical differences, after the fashion of a superficial cosmopolitanism.

Second, we have already pointed out [12] the immense importance of the geographical factor in international questions, the fact of the possession of territory, and of the power connected with it. It is therefore evident that for the establishment of just conditions between states the economic possibilities are of the very highest importance. The social problem is an interstate problem in a twofold sense: a just social order within each state is not only an important basis for peace (as has been proclaimed by the International Labor Organization of 1920), but the problem of social justice also arises in the relation between one state and another, and between one race and another. Communism lives in the illusion that the state, and with it the tensions and injustices which arise out of the existence of states alongside of one another, will be overcome by means of the classless society.

Finally, however, in addition to the great importance of a just ordering of the possibilities of economic life for the peoples who are organized into states, there is another point which must not be overlooked. The collective entities have a sense of honor. This aspect of international relations becomes especially important when international law, on the analogy of the legal system of the state, wishes to introduce the idea of punishment, in the form of partial deprivation of rights, of legal, moral, and economic sanctions against states. The analogy of the individual and the state, the nation and the world of nations, which comes so naturally to rationalism, is not a matter of course for Christian thought, because behind the collective entity it always sees the individual human being in his dignity and his need.

[12] Cf. section 4.

(*d*) An ethos which is to be the standard and supporting basis of a legal system must give a central place to the idea of justice. Justice within a greater community must always keep in view not only the individuals with their rights and duties but also the community as a whole. From the point of view of the *Una Sancta* the community of the nations can only be conceived as a universal one.

All rights and all duties are therefore to be regarded in the light of the community in which they find protection and restrictions. The idea of the community in the light of the Christian faith is, however, determined in a still higher sense by the fact that all good gifts come from God. Hence all possessions must be regarded from the point of view of stewardship. Not only possessions, however, but all other rights can only be rightly estimated from the ethical point of view if they are measured by the standard of their usefulness to the service of the community. Here the essential principle, for all law and for all community, of contractual loyalty, finds both its basis and its limits.

All justice, even among states, deteriorates into a rigid legalism, which is alien to the spirit of the Christian ethos, unless it is regarded merely as a penultimate stage which is transcended by love.

5. The Christian must also be aware of the vast difference which exists between that which may be asserted as a Christian ethos in interstate relations and the actual historical world. He knows that even the members of the church of Christ, in their personal attitude, as well as in their influence upon the state and the nation, are very far from being and doing what they ought. He knows also that these Christians, who are aware of their responsibility before God for international relations, are themselves a very "little flock" in the midst of the Christian nations, and still more in the world as a whole.

Yet this perception must not hinder the Christian for a moment from trying as hard as ever he can to create a just order among the nations, for he is involved in these relations, together with all his fellow creatures. Whether he can actively intervene or whether, against his will, he is drawn into international conflicts, whether he regards them from the point of view of silent spectator, in some way or another, whether by action, speech, or silence, he bears a measure of responsibility for them. Hence he must know what line he ought to take, and when he is confronted with difficulties he knows that even then, in the actual concrete situation, he will be given the guidance he needs. The discriminating, directive habit of " thinking ahead " characteristic of the Christian ethos does not relieve the Christian of his personal responsibility. In particular, the awareness of this Christian ethos, even in its collective form, cannot lead the Christian astray to try to make from it a program of Christian international politics. Every system of that kind would be hopelessly involved in the current of secular politics and of political opportunism, especially if it were based upon external power.

The Christian — and this is a great thing — is not dependent upon success: neither in the present nor in the future. It is enough for him to follow the way shown to him by God. For indeed it is not he who directs the course of history — even if he had all the powers of all the empires of this world at his disposal. Therefore he can be free both from illusion and from disappointment. The view of the " last things," of the end of this historical time, makes him aware not only of the immense gravity of all human action within history, but also of the transitory character of the historical world, and gives him the consoling certainty that the Lord of History is guiding all things to the end he has chosen.

THE PROBLEM OF PEACE IN A DYNAMIC WORLD

by

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

THE PROBLEM OF PEACE IN A DYNAMIC WORLD

It is easy to become discouraged as to the possibility of eliminating war. There is danger of becoming too quickly discouraged. We should recall that it is only since the World War that peace sentiment has reached governments themselves and influenced them to espouse a new world system from which war would be eradicated. Until then the war system had been accepted without question. International law and practice recognized war as legal, and elaborate codes were developed with reference to the declaration and prosecution of war and the rights and duties of neutrals. "Peace" conferences were occasionally held. But they were designed primarily to liquidate a past war and to award to the victors strategic advantages for the next war. Even The Hague peace conferences of 1899 and 1907 were not designed to eliminate the war system, but rather to devise new rules of war to meet advancing technique. It was hoped to arrest the mounting costs of preparation for war and, when war came, prevent recourse to new methods which threatened greatly to increase the destruction of life and property. The Hague conferences were in essence an effort to perpetuate the war system by making it more bearable.

The World War verified the fear that the advance of science would enormously increase the destructiveness of war. It also demonstrated that war measures could not be limited in accordance with predetermined rules, but that nations which felt their existence at stake would resort to

any available means of achieving victory. Up to then, wars, while costly in life and property, had been tolerable. It now became apparent that a recurrence of war — at least a war involving great industrial nations — threatened annihilation and a destruction of civilization itself. For the first time in history, world opinion became crystallized upon the proposition that we must devise a world system from which war would be excluded.

Two major efforts were promptly made to achieve this result. By the covenant of the league, the member states bound themselves to unite to resist any aggression by one upon another. By the Pact of Paris the signatories bound themselves to renounce war as an instrument of national policy and to settle all their differences by pacific means.

It is already apparent that these efforts are inadequate. The signatories of the Pact of Paris have not, in fact, renounced force as an instrument of national policy and the covenants of the league have not deterred members from aggression as against each other. Discouragement results and world opinion tends to revert to its pre-war status. The war system is again coming to be accepted as inevitable. Peace efforts are losing their universality and are confined, within each country, to efforts to prevent that particular country from becoming involved in or destroyed by the next great war.

Our discouragement is premature, our abandonment of an essential objective is unjustified. It was not to have been expected that, with unerring judgment, we should have immediately found the way to change a system which had become engrafted upon the world by centuries of usage. We have made an effort; the effort is obviously faulty, but today we can profit from our mistakes while there is still time and while the need is more urgent than ever.

The change which we seek is fundamental. It is no less than the eradication of what has heretofore been a primary factor in world evolution. If we are to effect a change so fundamental, we must, I think, go back to fundamentals. What is war? It is manifestation — a violent manifestation — of human energy. The achievement of peace involves the control of such energy.

Many will consider that the foregoing statement involves a simplification so excessive as to be useless. They are accustomed to think of war as a problem of personalities, or of ethics, economics or psychology. There can be no doubt that all of these factors are involved and that the problem of war can usefully be studied from each of such aspects. But I prefer, in the present paper, to start from the simple generalization that modern war constitutes a violent manifestation of the mass energy of human beings. I believe that if we avail ourselves of this concept — as a provisional and working hypothesis — there readily emerges the general outline of a solution. For once we see the problem as that of controlling energy, we at once find ourselves in a familiar field.

The problem of controlling energy is far from a new one. Mankind has always had to deal with it in relation both to animate and inanimate forces. In the world of the physical we know that everything is in motion and that if there is any one principle of general applicability, it is that of movement and change. Everything is energized to greater or lesser degree. We recognize that there is no possibility of suppressing the dynamic forces which surround us and substituting a static world. Many forces, indeed, we welcome. They are gentle and benign and readily lend themselves to our purposes. But there are others which are violent and destructive. These we might prefer to see wholly eliminated. But we have learned by long experi-

ence that the proper procedure is not blindly to oppose and seek to suppress such forces. To attempt this merely results in a piling up and a concentration of the dynamic forces until they finally burst forth with even greater violence. In such cases we find the solution through a planned diffusion of such forces into channels such that destructive violence is avoided. The river which periodically bursts its banks we do not hold in check by a frontal dam. We go back toward the sources and canalize them so as to effect a peaceful diffusion. We have also learned that even if an appearance of quiescence can be attained, this is apt merely to mask the forces of destruction which are at work. The pond which is stagnant breeds disease. Only through motion can water be kept pure. In sum, we have learned that " peace " in the physical world does not mean a condition of quiescence, where all is static. It means a condition where alternating quiescence and violence are replaced by change which is constant and which, because it is constant, is moderate.

When we turn to the field of animate energy, we find that the same problems confront us. The problems are perhaps rendered more difficult by the fact that manifestations of human energy are even less predictable and less ponderable than those of inanimate energy. At the morning service, when our energies are replenished, we sing " Onward, Christian Soldiers," and in the evening " Peace, Perfect Peace." In our youth we are vital and keen for action; as we grow older, our energy is less abundant. There are variations which seem to depend upon racial or climatic or dietetic considerations. A condition of economic satiety often tends to diminish energy as against a condition of need which arouses to action. Even here, however, no general principles can be laid down. As with the inanimate, a condition of apparent quiescence and stagnation may in fact be breeding a human explosion. Above

all, there exist in every human being vast potential reserves of energy which under normal conditions are dormant, but which are susceptible of being called forth by psychological influences. A peaceful gathering can quickly be turned into a rioting mob. To an increasing degree, leadership goes to those who have mastered the dangerous art of arousing in their followers a high degree of emotional energy.

The problem faced by intelligence in appraising and seeking to control human energies, is thus one of great difficulty and delicacy. Considerable progress has, however, been achieved through the applicability of basic principles such as have proved workable in the case of inanimate forces. We can minimize the risk of sporadic outbursts of violence by devising a social system which provides channels for the current discharge of human energy. If order is to be maintained within a state and destructive violence avoided, it can only be as part of a social system which affords an adequate daily outlet to individual energy. We cannot consistently with peace deprive men of the opportunity to change their material, social and political status according to their efforts and deserts. The attempt to do this and arbitrarily to perpetuate a static situation inevitably leads to revolution. No central forces can be maintained sufficient to preserve such a rigid social order. If it is temporarily perpetuated, the inevitable outbreak, when it does come, is only the more violent and destructive. To this the French and Russian revolutions bear witness. On the other hand, if an elastic form of society is provided, then the human energies peacefully diffuse themselves. Such violence as occurs is sporadic and due to abnormalities which, under healthy conditions, are rare and of insignificant proportions. The restraints required to suppress them are well within the range of possibility.

When we turn to the world of nations, we find a sur-

prising absence of any rational effort to maintain peace and a complete failure to apply the principles which alone have been found efficacious in every other field. We here find a world divided by artificial lines into compartments within which each nation is "sovereign." The boundaries of nations are in theory immutable and each nation has the right, which in practice is largely exercised, to convert its boundaries into barriers against intrusions from without, whether it be of goods or people or even ideas. Thus it is that the boundaries of one nation become the barriers of another. The human energies thus impounded are, as always, variable in their intensity. It may be, and often is, that the boundary barriers do not have to resist any strong pressure. This may be for any number of reasons. The energies of the people concerned may have fallen to a low ebb or their territory may be so vast or rich as in itself to give ample outlet to the energies of the population. Frequently we find national groups so small as to be incapable of generating a quantum of energy which is dangerous in relation to the greater forces by which they are contained. On the other hand, boundary barriers may, and often do, confine energies so dynamic that they not only press but burst through. This again may be due to a variety of causes. It may be that a national territory is inadequate to absorb a normal expenditure of energy; it may be because the state itself has imposed a social order which does not permit of adequate internal change and thereby induces an explosion so violent that its repercussions reach abroad; or it may be because dynamic energy is aroused to an abnormal pitch by the hypnotic stimulus of political leaders.

Whatever the causes may be, it is the indisputable fact that ever since the world adopted the concept of national sovereignty, there has been a periodic recurrence of vio-

lent outbreaks through those barriers called national boundaries. The history of the world of nations is a history of war and of changing boundaries. A constant recurrence of this phenomenon over the centuries and throughout the world should be sufficient to convince us that sovereignty as it is usually practised inherently involves an attempt to restrain dynamic forces which periodically become irresistible.

The world has, indeed, up to the present time, been practical enough to recognize that the concept of sovereignty involved as a necessary corollary the use of violence to effect international changes. This is the reason why war has heretofore been regarded as an entirely lawful procedure. This has not been because war has at any time been regarded as desirable or because the killing of human beings had been looked upon as a beneficent pursuit. War has at all times been recognized as a curse and peace as golden. However, there has been no other escape from the consequences of sovereignty. Its rigid barriers have had to be broken down in the only way left available, namely by force, and consequently force has been recognized as a legitimate measure as between nations.

It may be that the world system which we thus created was the result of an instinctive choice such as we often have to make in dealing with potentially destructive forces. It has been a pleasant thing for the favored nations to have the privilege, at least for a time, of doing precisely what they pleased within their own territory, free from any sharing with those without. Even though it might be recognized, as an academic proposition, that such a situation could not be indefinitely perpetuated, nevertheless war seemed an indefinite and unpredictable eventuality, the risk of which might well be taken as against the present enjoyment of doing what one pleased without regard to

one's neighbor. War, when it came, would be bad, but could at least be endured and its losses would be made good in the future as had so often been the case in the past. A regime of complete non-change interrupted by occasional violent change, seemed preferable to a regime designed to encourage a constant, though moderate, interplay of dynamic forces.

It is from this background that we must judge the efforts for peace which have been made. With such a background we can, I think, detect the reasons for their non-success. The World War had led us to alter the choice we had theretofore made in favor of tolerating the war system. The intelligent way to change systems was to devise new channels permitting of a constant, but moderate, discharge of those energies which, under the old system, were repressed until they reached a bursting point. Actually we adopted a purely negative course. We confined ourselves to renewed efforts at suppression, giving no thought to the provision of peaceful outlets compensatory to those violent ones we would block up.

The Pact of Paris is notable only in that it records a state of world opinion opposed to the war system. Not by an iota does the treaty change the underlying conditions which have always made war inevitable.

The League of Nations represents an attempt to secure peace by piling up forces to make national boundaries more durable and impenetrable. The member nations are pledged to apply economic or military sanctions to any nation which threatens the boundaries of another. Thus the Treaty of Peace emerged as a rededication of the nations to the old principles of sovereignty. The world would be maintained as an area cut into unchanging and unchangeable compartments, the walls of which would

continue as perpetual barriers to the interplay of dynamic forces. The pledge of mutual assistance against " aggression " merely meant that the barriers might, with apparent impunity, be made the more impenetrable.

This invitation to extreme nationalism was, in fact, accepted. We have seen in every nation a striking trend toward national isolation. Emigration and immigration have been sternly restricted and largely prohibited. Great difficulties have even been placed in the way of casual travel. The movement of goods has been impeded by embargoes, prohibitory tariffs, and the imposition of quotas. Superimposed upon these obstacles have been those arising from the cutting off of the monetary units from any stable relationship to each other. Fluctuating and disparate moneys have not only greatly impeded the movement of goods, but have impeded the movement of capital and have made hazardous that form of enterprise which is represented by investing abroad. In addition to these material impediments which have been created, there has grown up a public opinion intolerant of anything foreign. " Buy American " and " Buy British " are slogans designed to discourage the international movement of even those goods which might, perhaps, surmount the multiple barriers which had been interposed. Importers are looked upon with suspicion, and so-called " international bankers " are classed with traitors.

The creation of such areas of economic isolation has in turn rendered necessary a " planned economy " and an internal regimentation which further represses natural energies and initiative.

Nor can we ignore, in this connection, the use of boundaries to prevent the exchange of ideas and to create closed compartments of unanimous opinion. Human energy finds outlet not merely in physical exertion, not merely in

striving for economic and social advancement, but also in intellectual debate and effort at persuasion. From the standpoint of peace, the intellectuals provide the least problem. They notoriously are not men of action. They seldom agree with each other and find full outlet for their energies by seeking to persuade other intellectuals who disagree with them. Where differences of opinion are not tolerated and " subversive " ideas are banned, the problem of providing peaceful outlets for energy becomes much more difficult. This is not merely because a normal outlet is blocked, but because unanimity of opinion is in itself dangerous in that it obviates different trends which normally nullify each other, and it can be achieved only by raising emotion to so high a pitch that it overrides reason. The creation of a highly emotional state in turn raises the quantum of energy to an abnormal level.

In the light of what has thus occurred since the World War, it is not surprising that we are rapidly moving into other wars. We could scarcely have found any procedure better devised to assure this. We were faced by a problem created by natural energies becoming excessive in relation to the possibilities of current, moderate diffusion. We have thereupon proceeded, on the one hand, to increase artificially the quantum of such energies, and, on the other hand, to block further the already inadequate possibilities of peaceful outlet.

Where then does the solution lie? A grandiose solution lies in the abolition of the entire concept of national sovereignty and the unification of the world into a single nation. All boundary barriers are thus automatically levelled. This, however, is not a solution for which the world is prepared. So long as widely different cultures and civilizations exist nations play a vital role in providing for

necessary differentiations in government. Further, such a solution is so remote that it can scarcely be expected to secure the adherence of those who see peace as a practical objective. Fortunately it does not appear that so radical a step is necessary. Our requirement is not that there be no boundaries but that safety valves be cut through the barriers of boundaries so that human energy will diffuse itself peacefully and not be suppressed and compressed within a rigid envelope until a bursting pressure is attained.

What we do not know and what we cannot accurately foretell is how large are the apertures which must be cut in order that the dynamic forces will peacefully diffuse themselves.

In this connection we may draw useful guidance from the early history of the United States. During recent years the states have tended to fuse into a nation, the relationship losing much of its federal aspect. But it should be remembered that the union was formed by states originally exercising the same sovereign rights as any other nations, and typically jealous of and even hostile towards each other. Yet through the adoption of a multilateral treaty known as the Constitution, they have found an essential basis for peace in the renunciation by each of the right to interfere with the interstate movement of people, goods, and ideas. In order that such renunciation might be fruitful of practical results, they arranged to establish a single monetary unity. Each state retained, however, a large measure of sovereignty. Each independently legislates as to all social, educational, and religious matters: in some the common law prevails, in others the civil law. Each has its own courts and its own system of taxes — having only recently given the federal government the power also to impose income taxes. Each has its own armed force for the preservation of internal order. Legal, social, labor,

and material conditions have, in fact, varied greatly as between the states.

The independent and dissimilar treatment of matters as to which each state has reserved full sovereignty may often prove troublesome, as for example when lower labor conditions in certain southern states operate to destroy a textile industry in certain northern states. There are not infrequent attempts by states dominant in the federal legislature to infringe the sovereignty of the minority states. Such efforts the Supreme Court, sitting as an international tribunal, has the duty to denounce. The state boundaries are, however, not sufficiently formidable as barriers to arouse any effort on the part of one state to extend its own barriers at the expense of another. It is sufficient that the resident of one state can invest his money in another or call on capital from another to finance his own investment; that he can sell goods to or buy from another, and if he chooses, travel freely back and forth and enjoy an unrestricted exchange of ideas. It results that when, in a given state, there is found a density of population and a high degree of energy, there also exist sufficient opportunities to project that energy beyond the boundary line, so that alteration of the boundary itself is no objective.

There occurred, to be sure, the Civil War. This was an effort by some states to reestablish a condition under which they might again turn their boundaries into barriers against other states. They desired to withdraw from an arrangement soundly conceived to promote peace and prosperity. That, if ever, was a " war to end war " so far as the states were concerned. If it had been admitted that any state, for any passing interest or pretext, could withdraw from the union and reestablish itself as fully sovereign, with the customary restrictions of intercourse with others, then there would have begun a process which

would almost inevitably have accentuated state boundary lines to a point where they became unduly repressive. There would then have been duplicated here the conditions which make war so recurrent in Europe. As it is, in a territory as large as Europe, with even a greater number of sovereign states, one hundred and fifty years have elapsed without one such state using force to aggrandize itself at the expense of another.

I do not cite the example of the United States as one that can be copied in its precise form by the nations of the world. This again may not be practical. We can, however, draw two conclusions: (1) that the attainment of peace does not require us wholly to abandon the concept of sovereignty and to take all significance from national boundaries, and (2) that if relations between nations were such as to facilitate what is conceived in the American federation as "interstate commerce," then we would have cut apertures through the boundary barriers sufficient to make it probable that human energies would diffuse themselves without threatening a violent change of boundaries.

What we do not know and cannot learn without further experimentation is what *lesser* facilities for international intercourse will serve to attain the same result.

It is, however, foolish to stand passive while we debate this academic proposition. It is as though a house were on fire. Several hydrants of varying sizes are available. We know that water will put out fire, but we do not know whether we have enough water to put out this particular fire. If we value our house, we shall not stop to argue or make nice calculations, we shall promptly turn upon the fire all the water that we have, hoping that it will suffice.

So it is with war. We do know that war is a violent manifestation of human energy. We know that if such energies can be peacefully diffused they will not concentrate in

violence. There are certain available means for bringing about a greater peaceful diffusion of energy. Let us try these, knowing that we are proceeding in the right direction, hoping that the available methods will be sufficient wholly to eliminate war, but knowing that at least they will tend toward this result.

We can also have the satisfaction of knowing that one will be working toward a world order more closely conforming to Christian precept. The natural bounties which God has provided for the benefit of mankind are not apportioned in accordance with the national boundary lines which man has drawn. If those more fortunately situated are really disposed to share with others; if we would provide human beings throughout the world with a reasonable equality of opportunity, then we must open up the world so that national boundaries do not operate to create for some a monopoly of advantage which is largely fortuitous.

What are the apertures which it is practical to cut in the boundaries of sovereignty?

We must, I think, recognize that there is no uniform pattern which can be applied. We cannot treat all boundaries alike. Nations forming a regional group may be able to work out arrangements between themselves more far-reaching than those that can be generally applied. A distinction must be made between those that enclose a highly developed and industrialized society and those which enclose areas which are as yet inadequately developed. The former cannot be suddenly exposed to new competitive conditions without serious disturbance. When a social order has been created which itself provides the peaceful outlet for a large quantum of human energy, then we would not advance our program were we to effect in-

ternational changes which were so radical and abrupt as to close these domestic outlets.

This is not to suggest that there is nothing to be done by the industrial nations. There is much that they can contribute. Take, for example, the matter of international monetary exchange. We have seen how purely national moneys, when they are unstable and non-exchangeable in relation to other moneys, constitute a most severe restraint to travel, the movement of goods and people, and the participation, through investment, in natural advantages and special opportunities which are abroad. There can and should be a reestablishment of national monetary units in some reasonably stable relationship to each other. Some steps towards this have, indeed, already been taken. If the progress made can be extended and consolidated, we shall have done away with one of the most formidable barriers to international intercourse. There can, in addition, be some substantial removal of barriers to the exchange of goods. This is, indeed, a necessary concomitant of stable exchanges. Care must be taken to avoid economic disturbance on a wide scale. But consistently with this, international trade can be greatly facilitated by a gradual and reciprocal reduction of duties and elimination of quotas.

Immigration could doubtless be freed from some of the severer restrictions which are now imposed. This does not mean that the door should be opened to wholesale importations effected by contractors for the purpose of securing cheap labor. Such shifts of population involve no diffusion of pent-up energy and are to be avoided. But if immigration is left to the initiative of the individual immigrant, then it will be restricted to those of unusual energy and strength of character, for it is no simple matter to break away from an hereditary environment and move into a new land, a strange language and habits, and where one is prob-

ably not wanted. It is of the utmost importance to peace that we should avoid repression and restriction of those who possess such qualities.

Measures such as the foregoing may be taken by the highly developed industrial nations to facilitate the diffusion of energy as between each other. When we move on to those nations which are less highly developed, and particularly when we consider colonial areas, a much more ambitious program is practical. In such areas the sovereignty system is not maintained by or for the benefit of the local population. The boundary barriers do not protect a highly developed form of society which might suffer severe dislocation were the protection abruptly withdrawn. In the colonial areas the sovereignty system is imposed by the colonizing or mandatory power to the end that its nationals may have a preferential right of exploitation. There would seem to be no insuperable obstacle to opening up vast areas of the world through the application of the principles of the " mandate " and " open-door " system as proposed by President Wilson, namely, where the territory is to be administered in trust, first for the well-being and advancement of the local populations, and then for the benefit and equal opportunity of the whole world.

It may be that, on this basis, mandatory powers could not be found. The proper discharge of a mandate involves serious responsibility and, often, heavy cost. But it is more expensive to secure colonial administration at the price of closing up those areas of the world which offer a natural outlet to energies which may otherwise express themselves in war. Some form of mandatory or international administration can certainly be found which will avoid engrafting upon colonial areas the worst and most dangerous features of the sovereignty system.

If we could promptly effect changes along the lines sug-

gested we would have greatly opened the world. Boundaries would have become much less important. We would have cut apertures adequate for the peaceful diffusion of a large percentage of the energy now repressed thereby. But some would question whether in the face of certain practical conditions, which confront us, the present is an opportune time to inaugurate such a program. The danger at the moment comes primarily from Germany, Italy, and Japan — three countries often inaccurately referred to as " have nots."

They do not, to be sure, have areas and natural wealth comparable to the British empire, the United States, or France with its colonies. But there are many other nations less favorably situated. From the standpoint of wealth, it is a serious error to consider that natural resources are all-important. They are obviously a desideratum. But a population, by industry and inventiveness, can make itself a source of wealth far superior to any that nature provides, assuming (as is not now the case) that it has reasonable access to raw materials elsewhere. It is as within a state where he who owns the coal, iron, or copper in the ground does not necessarily profit the most.

The geographical status of Germany, Italy, and Japan involves no such suppression of normal energy or initiative as in itself to make violent outbreaks inevitable. The danger comes from the coincidence of three factors, namely (1) territory which is far from unlimited, (2) boundaries which have become serious barriers, due to the trade and monetary policies which they and others have adopted, and (3) a population which is numerous and capable and which has been energized to an intense national will.

It is futile here to debate where the responsibility primarily lies for the fact that these peoples have been whipped up to a highly emotional state. What is important is that

a vicious circle has been created. Excessive external restraints have created unsound internal conditions, which in turn accentuate the isolation. Is it safe to open up the world, in an economic sense, to nations in the state of mind of Germany and Italy? Does the greatest assurance of peace lie in perpetuating the present difficulty which these nations have in accumulating reserves of raw material adequate for a major war? Or will abnormal emotion and extreme development of " national will " subside under freer international conditions?

To adopt an analogy which is far from perfect, let us assume that an average individual is isolated and treated as an inferior. An almost inevitable consequence is that he will develop anti-social complexes. Shall we restore him to an equal place in society, trusting that with free intercourse he will again become like his fellows, or shall we keep him apart lest his warped views endanger the peace?

Such problems are perplexing and generally no answer can be given which is demonstrably correct. However, when we are dealing with whole populations, it seems to me that we must risk the course of according equality of status and opportunity, if for no nobler reason than that we cannot effectively isolate such groups with immunity to ourselves. A proud, industrious and inventive people will always find ways of forging weapons for themselves. Merely to interpose difficulties is to adopt one of those halfway measures which generally prove the most dangerous. We risk accentuating those anti-social traits we fear, without rendering them impotent. The only other solution is quickly, broadly, and generously to create freer conditions in the hope that abnormalities will then disappear, leaving a mind clear to perceive that it would be folly to use force to change boundaries through which large apertures have

already been cut. Particularly is such a course to be commended if it can be accomplished through a general scheme of opening up the world to individuals of all nations. We thus avoid granting to particular governments concessions which may be made to appear as triumphs for their political methods.

In such a program as we discuss, what role is left to the league, with its obligation on members to unite to maintain existing boundaries? This undertaking cannot serve to preserve peace if boundaries are to remain for the future the barriers which they have been in the past. What, then, is our alternative? Can we seek to make boundaries movable by providing some machinery for their being shifted to and fro? Article XIX of the League Covenant suggests this by providing for the consideration by the Assembly of treaties — boundary and others — which are no longer applicable and the continuance of which may endanger the peace of the world. But no machinery is set up to implement Article XIX, and it remains a dead letter. This is inevitably so, as nations are far from being ready to empower some international tribunal to hand over their territory to another.

Article XIX is, of course, sound in suggesting that we should seek to mitigate the rigidity of our treaty structure. In the past, it has been usual to provide an indefinite duration for political — as distinct from commercial — treaties. The idea that any treaty can have perpetual duration is, of course, unsound, and the making of treaties in such terms establishes an artificial rigidity against inevitable dynamic forces. An alternative and preferable procedure would be to limit the duration of all treaties so that they would periodically and automatically come up for re-negotiation on

their merits, in the light of then conditions. A number of post-war treaties have been cast in this form with beneficent results.

We cannot, however, in such ways make boundaries responsive to changing conditions. Territorial changes are the most difficult form of change to achieve peacefully. There will, from time to time, be exceptional conditions permitting of territorial adjustment by negotiation. But, broadly speaking, we must assume that boundaries will remain static except as changed by force.

We are, then, faced by one of those dilemmas which call for the exercise of intelligence. On the one hand we find that the energies of the different national groups are too variable to permit of predetermining for all time the adequacy of the several compartments into which such groups are to be fitted and by the walls of which they are for ever to be contained. On the other hand we find no present possibility of effecting peacefully the relocation of national boundaries.

There remain only two practical alternatives. One is recourse to force — the other is a program such as we propose, designed so to change the significance of boundaries that their location becomes a matter of relative indifference. If boundaries cannot be made changeable as to their location, they can at least be altered in character.

If this be done, it then and then only becomes both feasible and morally justifiable to make boundaries inviolate and to provide for some collective effort to assure this. No legitimate reason exists for the forcible demolition of boundaries, once we have cut apertures through which human energy and initiative may peacefully pass. However, even under the most ideal form of society, there are breakers of the peace, and some preventive machinery is necessary. If our international society be well conceived, threats

to the peace will be of rare occurrence and the collective force required to suppress them need not be formidable. Some assurance on this score should, however, be provided contemporaneously with making provision for the opening up of boundary barriers. For nations which hold strategic economic advantages will not make them generally available except as part of a program whereby they obtain security from unwarranted aggression.

There appear to be no insuperable obstacles to the accomplishment of such a program as we suggest. The league covenant already contains the framework for a system of sanctions. The several proposals for cutting apertures through boundaries already have strong support — not merely as peace measures but as steps in themselves economically advantageous. Most of the suggested objectives may ultimately be achieved, if only as a matter of slow evolution. It is inevitable that we have a reversal of the cycle of extreme nationalism through which we have been passing. But present progress is not sufficiently rapid to be good insurance against war. To achieve the necessary impetus, such measures as we discuss should be considered in terms of war or peace, rather than as domestic economic problems to be pondered and decided by experts, and resolved by politicians if and when it seems expedient.

Take the question of stable international exchanges versus unrelated and relatively fluctuating national moneys. There are few decisions more momentous from the standpoint of peace. Consider it, for example, in relation to Germany. Germany cannot get foreign exchange with which to buy essential imports. Consequently — and naturally — her people feel that the natural wealth of the world is inequitably divided and should be reapportioned. To cope with the shortage of food and raw materials, it is

necessary to develop a planned economy with a high degree of regimentation. This not only blocks normal outlets for energy and initiative, but means that there must be invoked a high degree of emotion.

It is not surprising that such emotion, in an atmosphere of confinement and injustice, develops abnormalities akin to claustrophobia. This in turn leads to demands for outlets for which no logical justification exists.

The foregoing statements in relation to Germany could be made with equal truth in relation to several other countries.

In the face of such a situation, it is no mere technical problem whether nations should have unrelated moneys. It is a question of war or peace and should be decided as such.

Once the issues of international trade, stable exchanges, colonies, etc., are seen in their true significance, we will have gone far to assure progress towards a warless world.

The obstacles which remain will not be those of reason but of prejudice. Each nation counts many individuals who derive self-satisfaction from feeling that the group of which they form part is superior to those found elsewhere in the world. The logical development of this point of view is national aggrandizement and national isolation. Vicarious pleasure is derived from national prestige and the frequent occurrence of events which publicly attest such prestige. Not only do such persons desire to see their nation retain every possible advantage over others, but they desire to see such advantages consolidated and enlarged. Those who feel their national culture to be superior can readily find a moral justification for its projection over others who are so unlucky as to be of a different nationality.

It is essential, from this point of view, that the nation

should function only on nationalistic lines. The self-gratification derives from a personification of the state and an identification of the individual with the exploits of this fictitious entity. Thus, whatever blurs national distinctions renders the personification more difficult. Furthermore, such pride always needs exclusiveness to support it. It cannot risk the disillusionment which comes from freer international intercourse and its teaching that no people has a monopoly of the virtues or of the vices.

The program we propose is equally obnoxious to those who, through selfishness or lethargy, would avoid contact with the problems of others. Those whose lives fall in pleasant places seek to avoid intrusion from without. It is good to be master in one's own house provided it contains all that we reasonably require for a life of comfort. Selfishness, in this case, dictates the building of walls so thick that we are immune from, and pleasantly unconscious of, the troubles of the less fortunate who are without.

How are we to overcome the obstacles created by pride and selfishness? Not by negative measures. We cannot expect the elimination of these very human sentiments by a mere effort of the will, leaving as it were a vacuum. We can get rid of them only by replacing them by some sentiment more dominant and gripping and which will contain in it the elements of universality as against particularity.

This is no visionary dream. Before us today we have the spectacle of communism and fascism changing almost overnight the characteristics of entire peoples. Millions of individuals have been made into different and, on the whole, finer people. Elemental virtues are again treated as matters of concern. Immoralities and dishonestness, personal prides and prejudices are replaced by courage, self-sacrifice, and discipline. There is a conscious subordination of self to the end that some great objective may be furthered.

We may, on our part, question the worthiness of the ob-

jective. We may deplore the fact that so fine qualities can be evoked for the accomplishment of such inferior ends, but we cannot deny the power of the spirit.

What of the democratic nations? What of the so-called "Christian" nations? They boast of high ideals, but have they the spiritual fire with which to drive out the petty instincts which bind them to a system that spells their doom?

It is these nations which can still exercise a leadership in world affairs. It is they who above all should want a warless world, for neither democracy nor religion can thrive under the menace of war. The objective is thus one which should logically command their full support. But, unhappily, pure reason does not suffice to assure action. Reason can chart the course. It can point out what are the obstacles, the human weaknesses, that interpose. But to overcome these obstacles is the task of spiritual leadership.

THE TRAGEDY OF WAR AND THE HOPE OF PEACE

by

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Introduction

It is surprising and distressing that Christian thinkers have made so little use of the specific Christian understanding of human nature in expressing the church's concern for the solution of the problem of war. This failure is twofold. First, Christians have been content to see war as a directly moral problem, the consequence of the conscious will of nations and peoples; they have been impressed with the terrible results of war, but they have *not* detected its tragic nature, the tragedy of its origin. The modern war situation, from and including the World War, should have impressed us that war in modern times is the most blatant expression of the tragic nature of man. It appears as the final result of a number of forces in society which operate in peace time without any conscious aggressive intention. Indeed the arrival of the final result in conflict is resisted, postponed, feared, and planned against in most heroic fashion. We see that many of these forces are the desires of peoples for certain valid satisfactions. War comes as the last tragic resort by which they either definitely seek the fulfillment of satisfactions they know no less terrible way of obtaining, or the emotional release of psychic and social tensions brought about by frustration. This tragic nature of war is seen in the way men speak of it. The church's litanies include it among evils from which we pray to be delivered; it is something men and nations are " drawn into "; it " breaks out," and it is regarded increasingly as

a calamitous necessity rather than as a deliberate enterprise.

The second reason why there is little distinctive Christian understanding of war is simply that there is little understanding of the specifically Christian gospel. Christians have based their peace efforts upon the assumption that war is within the sphere of conscious and moral ideals, whereas they should have known that war persists today in defiance of very widespread desires for "no more war." And Christians should have seen that this is the very kind of problem which the Christian revelation has especially understood and met. The Christian message is not unique in its attitude to "the wicked world," but in its contrast to "the good world." The world does not need the church to give it moral ideals, it has plenty of these and to spare. "The good world" needs the faith, because its final tragic problem is not the poverty of its aims, but its inability to follow them. It needs redemption, not advice. The church should know that it is fruitless to make moral appeals to men who are not in a position to respond. Many a drunkard wants to be sober, and many a thief to be honest, but their problem is that they cannot do what they want. Theirs is the divided will described by St. Paul: "What I would not that I do." Advice to keep the moral law is futile until the person is healed and reintegrated. Then he can function as a responsible being. "I will run the way of thy commandments, when thou hast set my heart at liberty." The redemption of the whole man is the work of Christ. But the need for redemption in man as such should have put our Christian workers for peace on to a much surer track than they have hitherto found.

At this moment, when the world's best efforts for peace are clearly in a very rickety condition, it will be fatal if the Christian church has no better word than desperate appeals

to support them, or to suggest that the League of Nations, collective security, and international-mindedness are *the* message of the church on this matter. It is wicked and false to suggest that if these things fail, the problem of peace is hopeless, or that we are back in a condition of international rapacity. The church has no business to be dismayed at the failure of secular idealism. In fact it is its business to maintain and revivify hope when the world's ideals collapse. A condition of this is that we as Christians shall have disentangled ourselves from the whole diagnosis of the war situation which is accepted by secular idealism. The specifically Christian message can never be merely a better answer to the world's problem as stated in the world's own way, however noble the world's interpreters may be; still less can it be taking the world's answer to its own problem and trying to give it a kind of religious intensity. No message about the world is truly Christian if it does not first of all restate the nature of the world's problem, for the Christian faith is primarily a doctrine of the nature of what is actual; and here resides its radical contrast to the world and its answer to the ineffective moralism of the world. By means of the specific Christian understanding of the nature of man and the forces that operate within and upon him, it should be possible to arrive at a Christian understanding of war and a real message of hope for its cure. But this must be clearly distinguished from the diagnoses of secular idealism, so that hope does not disappear when these diagnoses are proved false by the course of events.

1. THE TRAGEDY OF WAR

The modern war situation reveals by itself its tragic nature. It has been expressed as " everybody's fear of a war that nobody wants." It is the problem of the disparity between the aims of men and their achievement, the very

problem that the gospel of redemption is given to deal with. Therefore no mere exhortation for intensifying or extending the good aims of men is of any real use. As well tell a drunkard how much better he would be if sober. He knows that already. What he wants to know is how to be delivered "from the body of this death." And to advise people to be peace-minded or to be international-minded is as futile as recommending health to a sick man. The war problem is just that they have found no way of being these things effectively. Nor is it of much greater help reasoning publicly that war will not ultimately pay, and that the objectives men seek in it will be deceptive. One of the major factors in creating a dangerous war situation today is that peace doesn't pay and *its* promises have been deceptive.

It is not here pretended that there are no definitely evil forces behind war, and that poor innocent humanity is being swept into something which has no relation to human nature. But it is contended that sinful human nature does not naturally tend to crystallize itself in warfare between nations, and that its effect is to be sought rather in its indirect influence upon the defeat of men's deliberate objectives. There are certainly evil factors in man which thrive by war and which unconsciously support it, and no Christian peace effort may ignore them. Christian hope means that having reckoned with the worst in man it is still possible to believe in a remedy, for man is not malicious, only sinful. One of these definitely evil factors is the element of sadism or cruelty in all of us. It is part of man's fallen nature, and its force grows directly in proportion as men are frustrated, torn, and tormented by their normal circumstances. This aspect of original sin, manifest also in the success of books depicting cruelty, newspapers recording crimes and so on, is a factor which in large measure makes war a possibility in spite of ideals, theories, and good will.

There is the unconscious rivalry between the generations which exercises pressure upon the elderly to make the younger do a bit of suffering. The hidden rivalry of the sexes plays its part, war being " a costly device for restoring to men their pride and self-respect " — especially before women. These and some other elements in unredeemed human nature, while they unconsciously welcome it, do not themselves cause war.

Wars are caused by the pursuit of many valid satisfactions which are unattainable in peace time because the social structure and its imponderable elements have a certain contradiction in them, and most of the satisfaction sought is a relief from intolerable frustrations. *Men are moved not so much by what they hope to get out of war, as by what they hope war will get them out of.* And these motives exist along with very genuine and serious desires for peace. That is the tragedy of war, and there is much guidance for dealing with it in the traditional Christian understanding of human nature, which has been so distressingly replaced in Christian leadership by a parade of moralizing international politics. There is, of course, ample material now for laying down the conditions of a just war as developed by Aquinas and the schoolmen and its modification by later theologians.[1]

On these conditions, or at any rate the earlier forms of them, it is doubtful whether any of the major wars since the seventeenth century could be justified.

2. SPIRITUAL DIAGNOSIS

But there is a prior problem upon which the Christian teaching can contribute much, namely the problem of preventing conditions arising in which war appears tragically

[1] See Eppstein, *The Catholic Tradition of the Law of Nations;* F. Stratmann, *The Church and War;* Gigon, *The Ethics of Peace and War.*

as the lesser of two evils. In the first place, it can be laid down that peace is not an achievement into which man may painfully evolve from a presumed natural state of warlikeness; on the contrary it is part of the natural structure and essence of man's nature which is destroyed by the disruptive forces of sinful human living. The most penetrating secular anthropology and psychology today confirm this. Peace is something man has in him but has destroyed. It is to be recovered rather than manufactured. It is essential to base all peace work upon this assumption, implicit in all Christian theology, that sin is a fall and redemption a recovery. It is then necessary for the church to undertake diagnostic understanding of the forces that disrupt peace with the aid of her own doctrine of human nature. We have seen that war — and today more than ever — is an acute collective example of the "divided will" that St. Paul and St. Augustine describe in terms of the single person. On this point too Abelard writes: "The fact is that this kind of will, existing with much internal regret, is not, if I may say so, will, but a passive submission of the mind. It is so because the man wills one thing on account of another. He puts up with *this,* because he really desires *that*" (*Ethics,* chap. 3 McCallum's translation, p. 21). "The submission of the mind" to war is made not because it wants *this,* namely war, but because it wants *that. That* includes things like the prestige that claims loyalty from a nation's own people, the unifying effect of a common aim, economic opportunities and so on.

It matters not that these objectives are seldom or permanently obtained by war, nor does it matter that the reasons given to justify a war are never genuine and are always given in terms of cultural or moral purposes. The tragedy of war lies just in the belief of peoples that they can thereby obtain certain satisfactions or reliefs which are de-

nied them under peace conditions, whether it be a decent livelihood, a sense of significance, or the consciousness of doing something worth while. Modern wars are the activities of whole populations, not of paid armies, and the more recent they are the more they show signs of being efforts to break out from a disintegrating or cramping peace. Even in the days when war was a specialized activity, theologians recognized this tragic nature of war. St. Augustine says that men seek war to improve a defective peace: "They that perturb the peace they live in, do it not for hate of it, but to show their power in alteration of it" (*De Civitate Dei,* Book XIX, 12). Most frequently, however, men are not moved to war by clear objectives of what they want in the way of a better peace, but in irrational desires to break up or get away from a peace that is galling to them. Aquinas, commenting on this book of Augustine, carried the argument of Christian insight still further. He shows how, behind the break up of concord which is strife, there lies a defective peace in which it is the conflicting purposes of the same men that leads to conflict between men.

> Concord, properly speaking, is between one man and another in so far as the will of various hearts agree together in consenting to the same thing. Now the heart of one man may happen to tend to diverse things and this in two ways. First, in respect of the diverse appetitive powers: thus the sensitive appetite tends sometimes to that which is opposed to the rational appetite, according to Galatians 5:17. "The flesh lusteth against the spirit." Secondly, in so far as one and the same appetitive power tends to diverse objects of appetite, which it cannot obtain all at the same time; so that there must needs be a clashing of the movements of the appetite. Now the union of such movements is essential to peace, because man's heart is not at peace so long as he has not what he wants, or if having what he wants, there still remains something for him to want, and which he cannot have at the same time (*Summa Theol.,* II. ii. Q. 29. al).

St. Thomas does not work out the connections between the destruction of peace which is the conflict of purposes in the same men, and the destruction of concord which is strife between men. But we have in this whole treatment of Question 29, as well as in Book XIX of the *De Civitate Dei,* the foundation of any serious grappling with the tragedy of war.

The Christian contribution to peace begins, therefore, not with ethical exhortation but with spiritual diagnosis, for the problem is that peoples are not in a position to respond to moral appeals. The causes of war lie much deeper than the will to war or absence of the will to peace. They lie today in the conflicts within nations that press them into rivalry in spite of the will to peace. And a fruitful peace policy consists in dealing first with those conflicts that represent the crossed purposes of each people. As with persons so with nations, men always endeavor to solve an internal conflict by external means, changing their relations with other men and groups. The others, however, do not allow themselves to be used as conveniences in this way. And war is just the attempt on the part of one people to make the others do its will. So a Christian message of peace will be based upon the understanding of man's nature which Christians should have learnt in their acknowledgment of the need for redemption of the individual. The powers of life, whether of a man or a people, need integration into a whole before either can act as a moral personality.

3. THE ECONOMIC MIASMA

We have to discover just why there is war, especially at a time when there is a widespread and deliberate aversion to it. What makes people embark upon enterprises they do not fundamentally want? What is the nature of the

miasma flowing from our common life that makes for this war that causes national life to be an aggressive unit? Bishop Stubbs distinguished between wars of modern states which were wars for "interests" and the fightings of medieval princes which were wars for "rights." And Bergson makes a similar distinction when he speaks of "guerres accidentelles" and "guerres essentielles":

> De ces dernières sont les guerres d'aujourd'hui. On cherche de moins en moins à conquérir pour conquérir. On ne se bat plus par amour-propre blessé, pour le prestige, pour la gloire. On se bat pour n'être pas affamé, dit-on — en réalité pour se maintenir à un certain niveau de vie au-dessous duquel on croit qu'il ne vaudrait plus la peine de vivre.[2]

Bergson is right in seeing economic war as the root of modern nationalist wars, but there is a suggestion in his words that economic motives are conscious, that peoples go to war in pursuit of deliberate economic objective. This is only partly true. Much more important is the irrational urge to break through frustrations that are imposed by the economic failures of peace. Carl Jung, the eminent psychologist, wrote: "From this catastrophe [the World War] humanity may possibly draw the conclusion that only one side of fate can be mastered by rational intentions." In other words, war is a largely unconscious effort to get away from something, rather than to get something, but like all unconscious processes it has a logic of its own and we find that war does give people the kind of relief that any break out often gives. "Now I feel better," said Bismarck when he had smashed a precious vase in the royal palace. Modern wars are economic wars, not in the sense that they begin with conscious economic objectives, but in that peoples are driven by economic pressure to certain courses which are partly an internal relief and partly a provocation to other

[2] *Les Deux sources de la morale et de la religion,* chap. 4, p. 309.

peoples. " La dernière guerre," summarizes M. Bergson, " avec celle qu'on entrevoit pour l'avenir, si par malheur nous devons avoir encore des guerres, est liée au caractère industriel de notre civilization."

M. Bergson cannot be accused of a materialist interpretation of human facts; nor does the elucidation of war in terms of economic rivalry imply it. For one thing, it is not to say that man is universally moved by economic motives. Rather it is that this civilization being particularly one of economic complexity is more determined by economic considerations. And these draw attention to themselves in exact proportion as the economic basis of society works badly, very much as a dyspeptic sees life in terms of the stomach. And further, to stress the economic basis of modern war is not a materialistic interpretation, because the economic deadlock rests as much upon a perverted idealism and moralism as upon its physical elements. But even if the material factors were the weightiest, Christians could sooner come to an understanding with Marxism and its materialist interpretations than with rational idealism that sees men's actions in terms of theories, ideas, conscious aims and calculations. Men are not, as is often said, " incurably romantic." They are, as Christians should know, " incurably self-deceptive " except when grace has touched them. And they will always be giving romantic reasons for conduct that springs from irrational, lowly, interested, and even sordid motives.

The key to the tragic situation of a period marked by great peace activities and glaring preparation for war must lie in the aggressive nature of a human activity which is mistakenly regarded as pacific. It is not difficult to see that the insistent competition to sell without a corresponding competition to buy is at the root of an economic rivalry in which not only do some overreach others, but succeed only

by making others fail. It is not merely increased prosperity but survival that is at issue. It is a grim struggle for one of the conditions of livelihood. It is not for goods, except to a minor extent. It is for employment as a condition of income. The roots of this rivalry are within each nation and it manages to dodge the worst effects by working for the foreigner. But an outside world ready to take goods to a greater extent than it sells, eventually develops the same need to export its unemployment problem. The world today is the field of a scramble to export as much and to import as little as possible. In preindustrial days men fought to get something it was easier to take than to make; now they fight because it is easier to make than to take. For society gives them income for the amount of their employment or trouble. Each seeks to give goods and to take work from the others. Milk poured down the drain at home, machinery exported on credit or on investment that is lost, shells bursting on a foreign soil, are all processes of an economic insanity that seeks maximum employment with minimum return. And it is the most tragic aspect of modern war that it fulfils most perfectly the first condition required to brace up the industrial system of today, namely a rapid destruction of the results of production. It has been cruelly and truly said: " Only in that bloody market are there no tariff barriers, but only prompt payment in kind. Once a modern economy attains its logical end in this supreme sabotage, things appear to go better, prisons are emptied, suicides diminish, unemployment vanishes, and everyone is, if not happy, at least interested or excited." [3]

It is the absence of an economic mechanism for reciprocal trade in goods and services that prevents satisfaction of

[3] " The Politics of Peace," by Gens, *New English Weekly*, April 23, 1936.

the claims of dissatisfied nations. Reciprocal trade implies that each nation can buy its own consumable production, and therefore distribute to its own people that part it keeps plus the equivalent from abroad of that part it exports. What makes this impossible is the same cause that impels organized destruction of foodstuffs and goods, governments not only encouraging such measures but penalizing those who produce too much. It is insufficient home income; income is insufficient because it is tied to employment. Under such conditions people will fight for more of the work that gives them paper claims on goods, while goods are being poured down the sink. The first condition of removing the tension which puts national interests in conflict with one another is a recognition that employment shall no longer be tied to export not matched by imports — that is just waste of effort. Some tendencies in reversing this vicious assumption, under the idea of economic self-dependence, are clearly in the right direction, and in that sense " economic nationalism " is a force for peace while much economic internationalism is a provocation to war. But this condition cannot be properly fulfilled until income is dissociated from employment, and made to reflect a nation's production instead of its effort. International politics could then become true questions of the relationship between states instead of relationalized impulses to escape from internal economic dilemmas.

4. THE FAILURE OF PEACE

Christians have the responsibility of recognizing concrete factors in human politics. The Christian religion is historical, attaching significance to concrete events, and not exclusively to ideals and theories. God moves in the world through historical happenings as well as through the aims and thoughts of men. This divine action in history has the

nature of judgment. It is often a condemning judgment, as when one evil is chastised by another in the form of an inevitable consequence or reaction. To recognize this is the basis of Christian hope as distinct from facile optimism. From their readiness to face the worst in man and nevertheless to maintain hope, Christians should be ready to detect, behind apparent national and racial ideas and myths, forces of a very commonplace, self-interested and often sordid nature. And especially should a Christian understanding of man and the tricks of his soul lead to a discernment of the self-deception which lurks in the habits of political, economic, and national movements to disguise themselves in the *imponderabilia* of national honor, historic missions, honest finance, and so on.

It is necessary to distinguish two entirely different kinds of " international " problem. The first kind is common, universal, existing in many places. It sets the parties at loggerheads with one another like six men each with a stomach-ache becoming irritable with the others for not making his life easier. The second kind is collective, in the sense of its lying in the deliberate attitude of groups and nations to one another. The first is common in its origin and collective in its results, the second is collective in its origin and frequently common in its results. The actual world problem today is of the first kind, and all efforts to solve it on the assumption that it is of the second is to make a mythology of internationalism. To see it as a common problem, rather than as an international one, is the one truly hopeful attitude, for it means that a solution can begin " somewhere."

We have now to see that the war problem is not, as it were, an added difficulty superimposed on top of the social and economic problems of the nations, and is certainly not the cause of them. On the contrary it is created by the

unconscious attempt of peoples to escape from the failures of peace. Those failures are not, as in the past, imperfections which nations might hope to remedy by acquisition. They are contradictions and dilemmas inherent in the social disorder of modern society, and this disorder is closely related to the secularization of modern life. Owing to the unnaturalness of social living in a secularized era, war has become no longer an enterprise, but an urge to fulfil valid satisfactions that peace conditions do not fulfil. These satisfactions may be grouped under three headings:

(a) *The economic factors* described above are not the only ones, but they are the most insistent at the moment. There is no need to pretend that all wars are economic in their origin. But the present international deadlock is one in which the economic malady of secularist civilization is arousing psychic predispositions to war, and arousing them in opposition to very deliberate desires for peace. In Section 3, above, it has been shown that nations cannot exchange reciprocally because they now cannot distribute fully internally. This internal inability is due to a disorder in the relations of money, work, production and consumption, a disorder which could be traced to the development of organized activities in a secularized society with no embodied conception of the purpose of life. Here it must suffice to indicate some more general features of this disorder which pushes towards war.

It is an amazing fact, which ought to have raised profound questionings, that nations achieve a prosperity unknown in peace time when preparing munitions of war that do not enter into the commercial market. Recently two members of Parliament pleaded in the House of Commons that if Woolwich Arsenal were to be moved it might be set up in their respective constituencies for the sake of the work it would give. The British government has found

that the more unsuccessful were its efforts to promote disarmament the more satisfactory became the country's economic condition. Sir Samuel Hoare offered the National Union of Manufacturers as a Christmas message of hope in 1936, the promise that armament industries were being organized to supply the world when Britain had completed her own preparations. German munitions are said to have been sold to Russia. M. Blum declared (January, 1937): "The manufacture of arms today takes such an important place in national industries that it would probably be impossible merely to order a stoppage of arms manufacture without exposing oneself to grave internal crisis." Mussolini, as reported by Pertinax, said to the French Ambassador: "Even if you were to hand me Abyssinia on a silver plate, I should not accept it; for I am resolved to take it by force." These facts and statements all say one thing, namely, that modern communities cannot distribute the wealth produced by them and partly exchanged with that of the foreigner, except by the distribution of incomes through nonproductive enterprises. In a natural economy, where incomes reflected production, the call to make arms would be an obvious tax upon the productive resources and therefore upon the consumption of the community. Where war preparation means better livelihood than peace production, it is the wickedness of peace rather than of war that strikes the realist mind. While in certain restricted areas it certainly may be a choice between producing "butter or guns," in the large states generally it is much more certainly the case that unless we make guns we cannot buy butter which is produced by the remaining resources so plentifully that its raw material is being daily wasted and curtailed. So artificial economic deprivation due to no productive defect but only to inability to earn money for the things wasted has a direct effect in producing warfare and

stimulating facilities of war for the sake of work and income.

(b) *In the political sphere* these factors are at work more indirectly but with results more obvious. The anachronism of national impoverishment is one of the main influences in provoking those aggressive nationalisms and militant class theories which are the most ostensible dangers to peace today. Countries most obviously the field of a mythical and aggressive nationalism are those who have succeeded least in the scramble for economic security. The standards of living in Japan and Italy have been very low for a long time. In Spain economic impoverishment provoked revolution on a class basis and its inevitable class reaction. Germany is the nation most seriously involved in a policy endangering the peace, though her denial of any aggressive intent is perfectly genuine. This rich country, with a place of prestige and importance in Europe, was made the victim of an unscrupulous commercial deal after the last war.

The National-Socialist revolution was largely a mass refusal to be any longer the *corpus vile* for international commercial rapacity. In the commercial arena where she felt acute inferiority the sense of national significance was frustrated. The elements of popular consciousness were therefore shifted from economics to politics and race. Upon Reich and race a new sense of being alive for something was built, while behind the smoke screen of nationalist propaganda the large industrial interests consolidated control of the state. There are then three main elements that make Germany the most glaring source of a war explosion. First, a strong political and racial idolatry, reviving as a compensation for economic misery, and demanding political responsibilities on a par with those of other powers. Hence the ache for colonies which will also provide many

jobs for governors, defensive armies, administrators, and civil servants. There is a marked difference between Herr Hitler's realization in *Mein Kampf* that colonies are an economic liability and his later demands for them on " economic " grounds. Second, there is in Germany a policy of economic recovery which, suffering from the same contradiction between the policy of finance and industry as the rest of the world, has to be an expanding economy. Hence Germany's finger in Spain, her eyes upon North Africa and Czechoslovakia as fields for control, and a good big hate against Bolshevism to give these " vital interests " a moral and spiritual complexion. Third, the loss of an emotional life founded on a rational environment and natural work, which leaves the mass of people without any real emotional interest and a swollen, exaggerated patriotism as the cheapest substitute. From this condition it is not far to the deception that war is a good in itself, the only bulwark against degeneration, and other militarist slogans that canalize popular emotions (see General Ludendorff, *The Nation at War,* and Major F. Yeats-Brown, *The Dogs of War*).

The German situation is only the most acute example of the widespread thwarting of self expression along normal civilized lines, from which all nations suffer to varying degrees. Everywhere there is the effort to recover a political purpose for the state as a remedy for the diffused restiveness against a civilization built so largely upon contractual, commercial, and bargaining relationships.[4] In a period of eco-

[4] Cf. Nietzsche's insight half a century ago: " I cannot help seeing in the prevailing international movements of the present day, and the simultaneous promulgation of universal suffrage, the effects of the *fear of war* above everything else; yea, I behold behind these movements those truly international homeless money-hermits as the really alarmed; who, with their natural lack of the state-instinct, have learnt to abuse politics as a means of the exchange, and state and society as an apparatus for their own enrichment. Against the deviation of the state tendency into a money tendency, to be feared from this side, the only remedy is war and once

nomic contradictions and disintegration a strong nationalist ideal recovers some sense of status for the population. And so long as the internal life of the nation is disordered a unifying political purpose is most easily created by external expansion and military enterprise. " War is politics κατ' ἐξοχήν " wrote Treitschke. " War is the continuation of politics by other means," wrote von Clausewitz. These are dicta of believers in war as a good. But the same truth was detected by T. H. Green: " War is the attribute of the imperfect state." So long as political purposes cannot be evoked in terms of positive social aims owing to conflicting elements in the structure of society, so long will political purposes and enthusiasm have to be generated by external fears, hates, and hopes.

(c) *The psychic satisfactions* provided by warfare as compared with many forms of peace constitute a further element in the tragedy of war. Peace movements without and within the Christian churches have not faced this factor with the seriousness it demands, and by this negligence Christian pacifism and internationalism have been false to the Christian claim to redeem human nature in its totality. When war is more " interesting " than peace, merely to encourage the suppression of war without insuring that the psychic needs it meets can be satisfied in a more " interesting " peace, is to accentuate an interior conflict in human beings that will merely transfer the war situation to some more domestic sphere than the international. It is to expect a moral regeneration in an abstract section of the per-

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again war. . . . If I conceive of the enormous dissemination of liberal optimism as the result of modern financial affairs fallen into strange hands, and if I imagine all evils of social conditions together with the necessary decay of the arts to have either germinated from that root or grown together with it, one will have to pardon my occasionally chanting a paean on war."

son, and this is just the impossibility which Christian redemption recognizes and overcomes.

It is a peculiar tragic element in the war situation of the present moment that along with a growing revulsion from war as it more and more affects whole populations with deadlier destructiveness, there is a historically unique flatness, *ennui,* and *malaise* in the peace conditions of a decaying commercialist culture that sends men to the military and political sides of a war " situation " as providing a heightened sense of being alive. It has often been observed that the destructive and creative impulses in man are closely allied, and are truly to be contrasted not with each other, but together contrasted with the merely preservative, conservative attitude which is content merely to " hang on " supinely to stable elements in society which are hoped to " last my time." [5] Therefore when society is so unnatural and perverted in the order of its activities that under peace conditions the impulse to create what is worth while is frustrated, then men are impelled towards militant ideals as the only alternative to death by inanition. These two deadly alternatives are before Europe today. In one set of communities, with their totalitarian states and demonic creeds " the death urge " takes the form of a pseudo-heroism of self-destruction under the conscious desire for social rehabilitation by military exploits. In the relatively democratic states of liberal capitalism no one really believes in the future of that system, not even its beneficiaries. In a passive, self-seeking, and individualist way the people hope it will last their time, but the deepest and most genuine feeling is " après moi le déluge." This attitude will enable people to go on only so long as nothing fundamental hap-

[5] Cf. E. Glover, *War, Sadism, and Pacifism:* " A large part of the energy that drives a peace organization has precisely the same source as the energy that lets loose war."

pens. The mass of people may regard their social order as a lesser evil than that of the militant dictatorships, but it has no spirit that works for the future. It cannot arouse energies that can re-create a community, such as the totalitarian states do in such a dangerous way, and it is likely that they will fall a victim to the superior and blind energies of their opponents unless they take upon themselves a socially creative mission.

Such a mission, *if it is* to rescue us from war destruction, will have not only to offer opportunities for those who now have no function in society or only a trivial job; it will also have to engender a movement for social reconstruction of such a compelling nature that the talents now used in military affairs will be evoked for useful and hopeful purposes.

The technician's skill is now employed in war equipment on such a scale that its satisfying absorption into normal peace occupations is impossible so long as economic and scientific activities are hindered by purely financial reasons. The technician's ability, which demands expression in some real task, is a powerful factor in holding on to warfare when peace fails to provide it. "You had a war, daddy; why should not I have one?" was said by a young airman to his father. This technician's impulse cannot be confined to perfecting instruments of war and their management merely as a safeguard in case they may be wanted. Human nature will not stand it and will want to express its skill with its instruments in the way for which they are designed. And considering not only the extent of unemployment, but also the number of fatuous and unreal jobs in shops, offices, and bureaucratic establishments, along with the enervating effects of hypertrophied urbanization, the alternative offered to civilized man is often one between warfare or meaningless existence.

War and preparedness for it are so much of an institu-

tion, an integral part of the structure of civilized life, that to expect its abolition without a radical transformation of the configuration of society in peace, is fantastically to attribute to the human being the absolute freedom of the angels. Besides demanding technical and organizational skill, the war institution also fills certain voids made wider by modern rationalistic and democratic flatness, through its administrative hierarchy, its elaborate rituals and its codes of etiquette and behavior. The preparation for war, the pageantry, the organization, and other "imponderable" elements that enter into the military atmosphere are a great breath of life in a world corrupted by the squalor of frustrated economic relationships. And the political objects apart, the military world is one of the few refuges of status for ordinary men in a civilization otherwise almost purely contractual and bargaining. The art of war is one of the few robust survivals of the rapidly disappearing "professions." And it does induce a relative sense of responsibility for society, while peace-time service in the industrialist era has largely induced the motive of scrambling for survival and security. Peace itself cannot be given a romantic appeal; the activities offered by peace ideals are too cerebral to make them compel the allegiance of ordinary men. Moreover, the pursuit of militant objectives offers a contrast to the mediocrity and meaninglessness of everyday existence, with its habitual action in work and recreation — a contrast which reaches its greatest intensity in the period of decaying industrialism. In spite of its evils war provides a super-individual aim for men, a sense of partaking in a communal enterprise, a heightened consciousness of being alive, gifts which peace conditions deny to so many. When war can appear as stimulating the soul, while the state of peace is felt to atrophy it, radical peace effort consists in finding for peace conditions, not only what William James

called "the moral equivalent of war," but also its economic, social, and psychic equivalent.

5. CHRISTIAN RESOURCES

The full resources of the Christian religion in its impact upon society are used only when the church draws upon them for a double task. The first is to proclaim the universal Christian standards of conduct as the truly human ones and to diagnose the condition of society in the light of Christian knowledge of man. The second is to discern the finger of God in what is unique and decisive in each historical moment and to offer power to man to act rightly in that moment. The Christian significance of the present war situation is not reached when it is interpreted merely in terms of principles and violations of them that are part of the propensities of man throughout the period of human history when war has been a recurrent phenomenon. In every situation there are elements that belong to human nature at all times, but the relationship of these factors to one another and their results in the objective world are affected by the unique, unprecedented, and unrepeatable constellation of historical facts at the time. The full impact of the Christian mind upon the world is made when, in addition to announcing permanent truths, it exercises that prophecy which consists in tracing the hand of God in the actual moment of history.

The objectively unique features of the actual situation, as it affects the Christian handling of the problem, have been dealt with above and may be briefly summarized as follows:

There is the fact that modern forms of warfare have alienated much of the emotional and moral support that warfare could enlist in the past, and have created an ambivalent emotional attitude towards it. This produces a

peculiarly tragic situation. Emotional revulsion to war grows *pari passu* with emotional discomfort in peace. Actual hostilities show increasing signs of requiring artificial and hysterical forms of justification. The rights and wrongs of particular acts of warfare leap less and less immediately to the unsophisticated consciousness of men. There is a reality in the objection that much of what could be said for " taking the sword " as an instrument of justice becomes unreal in modern conditions of mass massacre. The distinction between offensive and defensive wars grows daily more incapable of definition. The existence of the bombing airplane has probably been the greatest factor in preventing hostilities between the large states in a genuinely international contest during the last six years.

In opposition to these forces are the facts enumerated in the previous section of this paper. In spite of the growth of moral and emotional hostility to warfare on an unprecedented scale, the failure of organized social living to meet the natural needs of men makes warfare an imminent possibility. This possibility derives today not from the conflicts in man which are always present in him, but from certain conflicts in the structure of society that belong to the modern period alone.

In this unique condition the resources of the Christian faith have an outstanding opportunity. In the first place Christians can derive a real though humbling encouragement from the knowledge that this conflict of social purposes has become acute in proportion as life has become secularized. While public life ceased to be guided by convictions of the spiritual and supra-temporal nature and purpose of man, the elements of secular order have not remained confidently and successfully secular, unhampered by supra-mundane complications. They have ceased to be true to their own secular function. The natural social

order minus supernatural truth has become unnatural. It is this unnaturalness of present-day secular existence that causes the economic, social, and psychic dilemmas which drive peoples into militant attitudes. The social problem is therefore intimately related to the central religious problem of our time.

The situation is the climax of the secularization of life. The banishment of religion from a position in which it is the key of life, either by segregating the spiritual from the natural and social aspects of existence, or by obliterating the tension between them in making religion a mere function of social aims, produces a contradiction in social life itself. After efforts to heal the contradiction by attempts to interpret human life in terms of one of its functions, such as the economic man, the state, the race, or some other biological element, society is in a strict sense in a state of crisis. This means more than the existence of evils and pain; it means a momentum in which humanity is driven by its own internal conflicts into external relations which it would hate as a deliberate choice and accepts only as relief. The spiritual and economic aspects of this crisis are closely parallel. Physically we have a vast surplus of productive energy owing to the achievements of applied science. Spiritually we dare not accept that gift, and therefore do not demand the simple social and economic arrangements that would place it at our disposal. Physically man's debt to nature for livelihood and culture has been reduced colossally by the use of natural instead of human energy. Society is doing its best to counteract this gift by an increase in unproductive tasks — redundant jobs, useless and uglifying public works, more activity for each result, and most successful of all — war equipment that is out of date as soon as ready if not destroyed in hostilities. And, financially, all this is registered as a growing mountain of

debt. We could live on easy terms with nature; we choose to live hardly, and in strict logic we choose to die. The money-lenders thrive on this spiritual and social masochism and are faced with the problem of increasing the demand for borrowing while preventing the ultimate result of the only method now open on a large scale, the destruction of credit-worthy communities. So while they are internationalists and would rather have world peace and cooperation, the scale on which their unnecessary service is now required is part of the internal contradiction in the life of nations which compels them to spend their substance in waste and destruction.

We do not now build pyramids for our kings or cathedrals for our gods with the surplus productive resources that are so much more plentiful for us than they were for Egypt or medieval Europe. These would not be exhaustive enough. We cannot even waste enough energy in our hypertrophied industrial and commercial processes. So we make armaments on a highly expensive scale. Their obsolescence is so rapid that the fear of losing a race in bankruptcy in the event of hostilities is holding governments in a galling check against war-making. International political attitudes are not the cause of this waste; they are the moral rationalizations of its meaninglessness. The enormous source of human energy freed from the necessity of providing the physical means of life is now used up in providing the physical means of death.

There is, then, deep down in this situation a pseudo-moralistic attitude which is in opposition to a truly religious outlook. Instead of faith in the power of God to offer gifts and to save men in any situation, instead of conviction that religion will always provide men with tasks that call forth the exercise of moral and spiritual responsibility, we of this generation prefer to save ourselves, as we think, by

artificially twisting the actual economic and social situation so that the ways in which man has for ages used his moral and spiritual efforts in society will be maintained. We dare not allow the yoke of economic effort and the social limits it has imposed to be lightened, as the physical basis of our age requires. The result would be that human responsibility would be turned to the more spontaneously personal field and that of spiritual achievement, as the sphere of its exercise. The demonic pseudo-heroism of the modern soul finds its artificially magnified effort to live at all an *alibi* for shirking the problems of its personal and spiritual being, for dealing with which three centuries of secularization has weakened it. It culminates in a war situation which provides splendid opportunity for further moralist gymnastics in pacifist and political efforts to counteract its effects. We are ready to insist upon living hard, or even to die and to kill, and to protest against it all, in order to dispense with the grace of God.

All this means that world peace is so easy to achieve. We fail because it is so easy. It is so difficult to us of the modern secularized world because it is so easy. Man is a spiritual being and requires moral and spiritual responsibility. Unless therefore he believes in God and is ready to trust that he will in any situation be shown how to exercise it, he will try to remake conditions in which he has found his pride of life. But salvation by works without faith is death.

There is no solution of the war problem; there is only a solution of the problem of social living. The modern world is trembling on the brink of peace and security. Collective productive skill has brought forth more than enough for all — and for most to be generous. Modern wars are fought not to get something that is vital and cannot be obtained otherwise; they are prepared for and fought in

order that men may retain the difficulties they are used to handling and obtain the economic rewards society only gives them on that condition, as well as the social and psychic satisfactions achieved in so doing. Peace is round the corner, but we want to go round the world for it.

Mankind today needs deliverance from the fear of peace. That deliverance requires such a re-ordering of social living within the national community that will earn the material security modern science has put into its hand. That security is refused for lack of religious faith. Peace and prosperity are now incompatible in the unnatural order of this secularized world. The word of deliverance from this dilemma is that the desire for both peace and prosperity can be achieved together. It can be uttered by the Church in terms of the spiritual purpose of man, which, when used to re-order the conflicting activities of society to that end, can restore society to its natural condition. That will not be a perfect or utopian world, but one freed from its most baffling structural conflicts, and therefore one in which the problems of man will be within the sphere of the moral and social will.

There is a large hope of peace in the present situation, just because, as this paper has labored to show, external problems of nations are the result of efforts to solve their internal ones in a delusive way. The political and economic aspects of those problems are sociological extensions of the spiritual one described by St. James: " Whence come wars and whence come fightings among you? Come they not hence, even of your pleasures that war in your members? Ye lust and have not; ye kill and covet and cannot obtain; ye fight and war: ye have not because ye ask not. Ye ask and receive not because ye ask amiss. . . ." Strife between nations as between persons is the end-product of internal disorders. Because the conflicts within the com-

munities of our civilization are unnatural ones, due to no physical limitation which man has to break down or give in to with renunciation, the hope of peace is real and practical. Its fulfilment requires no fully regenerate race of men: only a readiness to accept what is offered in this age.

The tragedy of war and the hope of peace lie very near to one another, on opposite sides of a knife-edge. On which side the world will fall may well depend upon even the apparently feeble breath of the Christian church. But in fact it is not so feeble, for the forces in the situation itself are those which the Christian mind alone has been formed to understand. It is, however, vitally necessary that the voice of the church be sounded with the note of deliverance which this paper has tried to indicate. Peoples are not being " drawn into " war; they may be driven to it as a means of bursting through frustrations that pervert the peaceful living of an unnatural society. The church must avoid, above all, being content merely to forbid the results in external relations of these internal conflicts. A pacifism that touches the war situation only when hostilities are imminent, a collective war against a breaker of the peace, an internationalism which offers a solution of contradictions by spreading them out over a larger area — none of these can be the effective word of the Christian message of deliverance. It has been truly said: " While war may conceivably be a great enough evil to destroy this civilization, a greater evil would be the unchecked operation in a helpless world of those causes of which war is an effect." To stop war by suppressing the external " horizontal " conflicts of peoples, instead of delivering them from these by a resolution of their internal " vertical " conflicts, will be to intensify the social and spiritual tragedy of secularized man.

While Christians can strongly influence the total situa-

tion by the message of deliverance, in the way this paper has attempted to indicate, there follow two specific ways in which it can be applied in the relation of the Christian body to its own national group. The attitude here defined is the only real basis of international forgiveness. Wars begin at home, everywhere. To see this and to declare it is the responsibility of the church as the conscience of the community. That humbling self-understanding is the only real foundation for mutual understanding. Nations will then be rebuked by their own Christian community when they attribute deliberate international attitudes to others while allowing to themselves the moral solace of being compelled by circumstances. If Britain is told that France *wants* or Germany *demands* or America *decides,* the Christian awareness in Britain will know the forces behind such apparent decisiveness and will know that they operate in Britain too. And when British politics speaks of being *drawn into* international complications unwillingly the same Christian mind will be ready to declare a similar self-deception there. In fact to expose the perpetual self-deception in our own national community in peace time conditions is a task of the Christian mind which is necessary if it is to be listened to when it becomes necessary also to denounce the wholesale lying that marks the waging of hostilities. The church with this insight can both convict of sin *and* forgive other nations and its own alike.

Finally, the approach to the war situation here outlined sees that there is no serious international problem apart from the war problem. It rejects all forms of political " monism " that assume peaceful living only possible when there is one political consciousness. War is an enemy of man, not his original condition out of which he has to evolve into some fantastic world state. This underlines a further practical consequence of our diagnosis, namely the

Christian message about a world order. All that has been said above points to the chastening and stimulating truth that the resolution of the war situation can begin anywhere — that is for us, here and now. To insist that a problem cannot begin to be solved here and now and must wait until the whole world does the same is an evasive fantasy. The approach here made holds uniquely the hope of peace based upon realities, for in its light one nation can disinfect itself from the common poison and thereby immediately lighten the tension everywhere.

On this basis only can be refashioned the Christian philosophy of a world order, in which such an order is seen as a congress of communities healthy in themselves.

THE CHURCH OF CHRIST AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER

by

WILHELM MENN

THE CHURCH OF CHRIST AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER

In view of the increasingly confused and critical situation in the world of nations and their mutual relations a certain question has come to the fore, both inside and outside the Christian churches, a question, indeed, which is being asked on every hand with passionate urgency. It is this: Is it not a fact that the intervention of the church is necessary precisely in this sphere? Are not the churches able and bound to indicate or to create a possible way out of the present impasse, to perceive or to make actual new possibilities in the very midst of all our contemporary impossibilities?

The state of affairs today recalls in most alarming fashion the immediately pre-war period, in which out of a common fear of a catastrophic world war there was born the idea of an international arbitration conference, as a possible means of avoiding ultimate disaster. At that time Christians in every kind of church and in all the countries of Europe regarded the endeavors of the politicians as an impeachment of and a summons to Christendom. What had they already done, what could they do, even at the eleventh hour, to help the statesmen to use the combined influence of the church to prevent the world catastrophe which could, nay, must, follow a clash between the highly armed great European powers? This evoked the effort which eventually led to the foundation of the " World Alliance for promoting International Friendship through the Churches " as the permanent instrument of the churches' work for peace.

But the present situation seems to appeal even more

clearly to the conscious responsibility of the Christian churches. Since that time we have seen what in a " bourgeois " age could still remain hidden, namely, that the critical difficulty and the deepest need of the international situation is spiritual through and through. At the dissolution of the medieval *corpus Christianum,* which had been symbolically represented in the specific constitution of the Holy Roman Empire, there developed in its place an international law which rested throughout on the basis of the Christian faith. " Holy Alliances " supported the fiction of a Christian unity of nations at a time when this very international law, drifting imperceptibly away from its foundation, had begun to yield to the universal secularization of the age. Today it is manifest that such a basis in Christian faith scarcely exists any longer, not even as a determinative spiritual foundation for the Western peoples — to say nothing of the vast extension of international relations and problems over the whole non-Christian world! But this means that there is no longer any common metaphysical basis on which, in the world of nations, an order can be based. Rather the danger is daily increasing that political differences may all become immeasurably more acute in a division of the nations into sharply distinguished ideological groups. But if that is so, whom can it more concern, who can be more disturbed, who can consciously be called to greater responsibility than the Christian churches? Even those who stand outside the churches seem to have a remarkably acute sense that if anyone has responsibility for the destiny of the whole world, then it must be the Christian churches. It is even more remarkable that those who heedlessly refuse to cooperate with the Christian churches have often enough looked to them not only with uncommonly high demands, but also with unusually extravagant hopes. Yet this does not provide the

churches with an excuse for refusing to take their attitude into serious account.

However, a reminder of the peace work of the churches just before the war is sufficient to keep us to the strictest sobriety as to the expectations and hopes that are legitimate here. The churches were not able to prevent the war with the means at their disposal at that time. It must never be forgotten that the session at which the World Alliance was constituted took place on August 2, 1914, after years of preparatory labor, in a country that on the previous day had declared war. "Midst the thunder of cannon the churches work for peace" is an expression which may be regarded as symbolic not only of that day, but also of our own.

Just as the churches were unable to prevent the outbreak of war, so also they have been unable — and this was perhaps even more their responsibility — to give to the ensuing peace a form worthy of the name, so that out of it a true and lasting international order could be developed. There has been no lack of pronouncements and exhortations since the war on the part of the churches, all of them concerned for peace. They, in common with the non-ecclesiastical peace organizations, have let none of the real or presumed threats to peace pass without demonstrating their zeal for peace; but this has not prevented this "age of peace" from being full of strife, or from becoming increasingly a period of rearmament. Nor, out of a piece of intergovernmental machinery that was hailed with such high hopes, has a real League of Nations been developed; in spite of all the prayers for its preservation, anxiety for its existence has not ceased at all. Thus the outcome of the churches' previous activities is most depressing.

But perhaps such activity can be strengthened? Perhaps the World Alliance lacked the authority necessary for ef-

fective ecclesiastical intervention? To it was remitted the main responsibility for international church activity, and this was only supported from time to time by the vote of this or that Christian association or church assembly. Perhaps in the end the churches must come to think of establishing an organization that can embody with sufficient authority the voice of the Christian conscience as it declares itself in the churches. Perhaps such an organization should seek new and more practicable means of action so that it need not simply accompany the course of events with declarations, but really influence it. Even if the history of the last thirty years had failed to encourage great hopes of a successful intervention of the churches in the international order with all its strained and tangled relationships, such questions would be left and would require the attention of the churches. For many people, Christian and non-Christian, these questions are very grave, since outside the churches there is no real possibility of any answer at all.

Actually, the churches start from preliminary conditions which do not exist for the nations, as such. The churches have a common ground which can make their meeting profitable, in spite of all political, national, and racial differences, one indeed which brings them from the outset into a positive relationship. Thus, what binds them together is more than a common fear of another catastrophic world war, which is too negative to create a genuine bond, more even than a common aspiration for a durable international order, which loses its binding power in proportion as each nation has its own conception of such an order, more or less violently rejected by the others.

That which unites the churches is expressed in their creed " I believe in one holy, catholic Christian church, the communion of saints." This means: they confess themselves members of a community which is already in exist-

ence, not one which still has to be formed. They claim to be called churches only in so far as the church exists and they are members of it. This church is a reality which is apprehended by faith, namely, the community, created by the Holy Spirit, of justified sinners who have become God's own people. This community has a government, for its Lord is the living Christ. It is not constituted by a program, or by statutes, but in and through a personal relationship. Its membership is true membership. It is not an organization, but an organism. The New Testament calls it the Body of Christ, of which Christ is the head and of which all who are bound to it in faith are members.

This community has not been made by human effort. But where hope in this "covenant" has been awakened something happens which man cannot achieve by himself, because God has revealed himself to man as Creator and Redeemer and has promised his future victory. "When the fullness of the time was come," God made his new covenant with man in Christ, which immediately assumed historical form and a continuously effective embodiment in the church of Christ. How completely this event was God's act, how little it can be understood as human endeavor, as the foundation, as it were, of a new religious community, comes out clearly and impressively in the story of Pentecost.

It is this, indeed, which makes the church impregnable: that at its beginning it was not made by human schemes or decisions or desire for power, but by God's revealing and redemptive work. That which did not arise by the will or power of man does not share the inevitable transitoriness of all human institutions. It cannot founder on the failure of man's will or power: "God is able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham." It cannot be overthrown by any hostile will, not even if it command the

whole power of humankind: " the gates of hell shall not prevail against it."

Is it not an immeasurable advantage to us in our deliberations if, instead of starting from a negation, namely, the division, the opposition, the active, and the latent hostility of the international world, with all the dangerous possibilities and disturbing impossibilities that they imply, we may dare to start from a positive position, namely, from an already existing community which, in spite of all, does transcend our national distinctions?

Even at a time when statesmen could find no approach to one another, when suspicion and fear destroyed all trust between responsible political leaders and officials of the nations, even between nations themselves, even at such a time men of all races and nations have met one another as members of the church of Christ. And this took place although they did not try to conceal the things which had come between the nations, but, on the contrary, strove to speak openly about them, giving them their full weight. They have not been content to trade with one another for their own advantage, for even merchants all over the world have done that, in spite of all national and political differences. They have not only — like scholars and other specialists — been able to learn from one another, despite all the tension in the political sphere. They have done that in which man most unreservedly surrenders himself: they have prayed with one another, and in praying thus they have experienced — as they have demonstrated it — the brotherhood which is theirs in a common divine sonship. They are thus able to prove that this positive position is a reality which has been tested. The one church of Christ is a God-given, historical reality. That is the unshakable ground from which, and from which alone, we must begin our discussion of the church and the international sphere, the

questions it involves, the hopes it may engender, and the tasks which may have to be undertaken as a result.

With good reason we have accustomed ourselves more and more to distinguish, even in words, between the relationships that are given within the church of Christ, transcending all national differences, between the encounters that here take place, and all other international relationships. The former we characterize as *ecumenical* and consider that this word, in distinction from the term " international," in a certain way conveys, to him that hath ears to hear, its proper and specific meaning. This is not only because it belongs to the vocabulary of the Greek New Testament. But far more because, while the concept " international " itself testifies to differences that are for it fundamental, and so contains an element of negation, the word " oecumene " characterizes the world as a unity, even if that unity, namely, the unity of the inhabited earth, has in itself a very limited content. We do not wish to play with words, but we rejoice in this possibility of describing interchurch relationships in this perfectly unique way. But in the last resort this possibility is based upon what has already been said about the reality of the one, holy, catholic church.

But the facts here adduced, which we must more and more keep in our minds, to which we attach an even greater importance because we are conscious of their uniqueness, are by no means unequivocal, and there are other facts which come readily enough to the mind, which make them seem very questionable. We must ask in all sincerity whether we have the right to proclaim the suggested distinction between " ecumenical " and " international " with the pride of people who possess not only something which is peculiarly their own, but also something which is infinitely more valuable. In spite of all that ecumenical work

has shown us of the " glory " of the churches, does not the ecumenical community itself exhibit all the difficulties which so disturb us as we think of the international world? Does it not share with that world the *lack of real unity?* If for once we depart from the language of the creeds, are not these differences so often emphasized merely differences of degree?

In spite of all that has happened there still is a League of Nations, whether certain important nations who affect world politics are members of it or not, however modest its executive power may be, or however much its existence may be called in question. The League of Nations has no true parallel in the life of the churches, in spite of the plethora of organizations and conferences to which one can point as examples of the ecumenical movement. Whether it is " The Ecumenical Council for Life and Work " or " The Continuation Committee of the World Conference on Faith and Order," all that we have are nonbinding agreements, which place no clear obligation on the constituent churches in relation either to one another or to the whole. Indeed, the greatest single church in Christendom, the Church of Rome, has so far shut herself off from this effort which binds us to nothing, and her aloofness acts as a complete denial of all the claims to the admiration of the world which could be advanced on behalf of the ecumenical movement. Within these actually constituted ecumenical organizations, always united even if only loosely, we find individual churches and groups of churches which are conscious of being divided from others by most serious differences, churches which do not possess the inner freedom to celebrate the Lord's Supper together, and so to become more certain of their brotherhood than in any other way. Individual churches, even in the persons of their most devout members, do not hesitate to ask whether the church of

the other confession rightly bears the name of Christian. Indeed, a not inconsiderable part of the work of the ecumenical movement has been and still is concerned with bringing out clearly the differences between churches of different creeds, i.e. differences in their understanding of the ostensibly unifying factor, viz. their common relation to the one Lord, where these differences had become blurred and indistinct.[1]

Another fact of particular importance and gravity for our deliberations is that feelings of national hostility and bitterness are by no means powerless in the ecumenical sphere, that a common belief in the Holy Spirit cannot prevent a radical difference of political judgment, not even in questions such as could be unanimously solved among secular moralists without difficulty on the basis of a common humanitarianism. But if this is so — and it cannot be denied and can hardly be excused — then the inevitable questions arise, wherein does the peculiar and positive nature of the ecumenical movement lie, and what special guidance can be expected of it, since it shares with the international world so much that is negative? We now refer to the *twofold nature of the Church of Christ,* of that which, with insufficient understanding, has been called its visible and its invisible character, its eternal and its historic nature, its significance for faith and its condition in the world of appearances, its theological and its sociological reality. It is plain that the church on earth is not a realization of the true and perfect community. It is that as little as individual believers exhibit the reality of men saved by Christ. The church is a human community, and no delimitation of it from the rest of the world, be it ever so sharp, can obscure the plain fact that church members

[1] See especially the work of Dr. Visser 't Hooft, "The Church and the Churches," in *The Church and Its Function in Society.*

are the same men who, as statesmen and citizens, as magnates and workers, cause so much evil and foolishness and make so much distress both for themselves and for others. For our purpose this means that the distinction between the ecumenical and the international does not destroy their sociological similarity. We have to endure the fact that those who stay outside the church see our distinctions as ungrounded and really trivial, and judge both realities by the same standards. When participation in international affairs appears dangerous and ignominious, this reproach will meet us: when it is considered a sign of true humanity, we cannot avoid praise based on this ground. But we cannot renounce the distinction without being untruthful. By it alone can we give expression to that which accurately describes our community. The church of Christ on earth is an eschatologico-spiritual reality. The assertion that it is a true and perfect community is true, in spite of all appearances, in so far as that statement declares what God does and has done both to and in it. The Holy Spirit "calls, gathers and enlightens the whole of Christendom on earth. He sanctifies it and keeps it in the one true faith." That is present truth to the believer, but only to him; to him who mindeth not the things of men, but the things of God. Faith awaits the day when God shall destroy the power of evil and therewith our subjection to the flesh, when he will perfect his church and give it its full share in the victory of Christ. Then out of the church of Christ on earth shall come the church triumphant, one flock under one shepherd.

In this faith and in the hope which it begets, the church stands in the world; in the world and yet not of it. It stands also in the international world. As human, the church is inseparably bound up with it, and yet is not consumed by it, but is placed in it as a living witness to a reality

that transcends it. From this twofold, yet unitary, fact we can answer the question as to our specific importance for the shaping of international relationships.

And it first of all follows that *the church is not in a position to consider or to declare itself as not concerned* with the questions of international relationships. The church has entered the life of nations and become a constituent part of their history. It is the church of men; and there are no men save those bound to and formed by nations. The church must therefore speak the language of the nations, and this it does, even when it retains for its worship the solemn tongue of a defunct people. Who would deny that the entrance of the church into the lives of the nations is of importance for its own understanding of itself, for the understanding of its gospel? Everywhere national boundaries have become the boundaries of individual churches.

In this way the church has a share in all that affects the individual nation. It rejoices in the good which the Creator of men gives in belonging to a people, in the natural and historical community of like blood and speech and destiny. It suffers in all the burdens which the nation is called upon to bear, and in all the distress which the people makes for itself.

There are certainly differences of degree as between individual churches in the matter of their connection with and subordination to the state. We can find the widest range of possibilities, from national church on the one side, such as especially the orthodox and reformed churches of the Continent, to the international Church of Rome on the other. But the World War has shown beyond dispute that the church can never, in any circumstances, contract out of the national destiny. (That does not affect the question whether the church showed itself during the war to be equal to the task which the national destiny set her in the

way God demanded of her.) Yet in this very way the church is involved in international relationships. National friendships and national enmities are among those things which it experiences as part of its own life. The church knows, as does the nation, what a blessing there is in a securely established order of relations between peoples; it knows what is implied in the development of economic and cultural exchange with other nations; it knows what mischief arises from an insecure and disturbed state of the national life, and it itself suffers in all that must then be endured. The church feels this the more deeply indeed, because it knows that the disturbance of the order, however much it may be a matter of destiny, always involves guilt, because it knows that it, the church of sinful men, is also guilty. This grateful rejoicing in the good gift of God in the form of a proper order between nations, and the guilty compassion with all the distresses of a disturbed order, is a description of the ways and the means by which the church of Christ experiences the formation of the international order.

But that is not all. The church's gratitude for a rightful order in the relationships of nations acquires a peculiar quality and a special depth in that it sees demanded and guaranteed thereby the nurture of the specifically ecumenical community. On the basis of such an assured order, the fraternal exchanges of her members, both individual churches and individual Christians, can take place without hindrance from within or without. A natural trust also facilitates the common striving for the right understanding of divine truth and the attainment of that inward relationship which ought to obtain between members of Christ's church. The increasing tensions of the international world must needs be felt again, even more acutely, in the church, the more its own consciousness of

unity is developed. Were the peaceful order to be seriously disturbed again, the churches would find themselves the more deeply affected by this, the richer and finer were the relations obtaining within the ecumenical movement. Another international war would burden the church no less than the World War. The church would be better prepared to meet the temptations peculiar to such a situation, and would, by God's help, successfully withstand them. But the church would have to suffer for it far more heavily, both outwardly and inwardly: outwardly, at the point where its "international" relations might excite mistrust and suspicion among the national political leaders; and inwardly, at the point where ecumenical cooperation had already become an indispensable part of the life of the individual churches, sustained by the love of the congregations, where cooperation had sprung not from any desire to be in the ecclesiastical fashion, but from a clear recognition of a divine gift and a divine call. Christ's church is thus at her own task when she directs her attention to the formation of natural relationships. That becomes fully clear when we remember what calamitous effects the destruction of the international order in the World War once had on a great common undertaking of the Christian church, the work of Christian missions in heathen lands.

It could be objected that such considerations lose their weight by reference to a plain and incontrovertible fact of history. Did not the church live for centuries completely occupied with individual churches, without feeling any necessity of fostering her ecumenical community, without any inquiry as to sister churches, consumed, indeed, by a fruitless strife between churches which all belonged to the one "Body of Christ"? And has not the church of Christ been for almost as long content with her work inside na-

tional boundaries, without coming to think that she had a world task? It could on this basis be argued that what we are ultimately dealing with are *temporally conditioned appearances,* with the by-products of the extension and intensification of international relations, as the modern economic and technical age, with its increased transport facilities, generates them, as it begets also the consciousness of world citizenship, which sprang out of the Enlightenment. Nothing would be more natural than that a new situation — a situation which spiritually, as well as politically, seems to be in the full tide of its development — should compel the church, destined always to march in the rearguard of history, to revise her methods, in this case to begin to exercise her ecumenical and missionary endeavors. That would not, indeed, solve the question of order in the international sphere for the church, since it remains also within the boundaries of particular nations, but the question would lose its especial sting and the church's position both within and without would be considerably eased.

Objections of this kind must be taken the more seriously because, under the influence of secular ideologies, a point of view is gaining ground within the Christian church which meets these objections and, indeed, gives them ecclesiastical importance. This begins with the incontestable fact that we have already noticed, that the intrusion of the Christian gospel into international affairs brings its own significant understanding of things under the influence of national characteristics. Thus, it is claimed, it is the will of God that the church should become fully one with the nation, as that which is the God-given unit of all historical life. Thus, alone can God's redemptive purpose come to full fruition, for only in this way can the twofold manifestation of God in creation and redemption become fully active. The nation-church, as the Christian embodiment

of the type of national religion, thus becomes the normal form of Christ's church upon earth.

It is superfluous to add that these considerations make the one, holy, catholic Christian church a purely eschatological entity. It is robbed of all historical form and significance. Even the missionary task of the church is called in question. The case for an ecumenical community becomes not merely a political, but even an ecclesiastical danger, for it provides a constant temptation both to pay but little attention to the first and primary revelation of God given in the existence of the particular nation, but also to close up the streams of divine life which flow therefrom.

This is not the place to consider the implications of these premises for our subject. It is our concern most forcibly to witness both to our recognition of the deep guilt of the church in its neglect of its ecumenical and missionary tasks in certain periods of its history, and to the new understanding of the gospel which we have been granted, which make these tasks our inescapable duty. We cannot turn the second article of the Apostles' Creed into a mere appendage of the first; rather, we see in it not only the verbal, but the real center of the faith, to which the church must ever bear witness. Nor can we delete the third article, but must hold fast to this, that the one church, created and governed by the same Spirit, corresponds to the one Lord, " his body, the fulness of him that filleth all in all." Christ is not divided. He is one, even for the whole of history — and that means his church on earth. We are bound in faith to this one Lord, and our belief is denied unless it find expression in the community of his whole church on earth, however pitiable and defective that church may seem to be. For this reason the Church of Rome, though it has kept aloof from the ecumenical movement by not responding to the invi-

tation to join in its conferences, has never ceased to pray for the reunion of the churches, nor to work for it in its own way. No church which thinks of itself in accordance with the New Testament could ever dare to consider the ecumenical movement a mere episode. International developments might threaten and injure such activity, but could never destroy it altogether.

It is certainly much more important that if, because of such necessities, the church does give its attention to international problems, it should *never lose consciousness of its own specific assumptions.* These alone determine both the type of its interest and the task that it has to do. Nothing else must be determinative. It has always been fatal for the church to allow misunderstandings as to the motive and purpose of its work to arise, or for it guiltily to provoke them.

In so far as *internationalism and (especially) pacifism are directed toward utilitarianism and materialism,* the church cannot be too clearly distinguished from them. Certainly the wanton destruction of material resources and the corresponding fall in the standard of living which follow a modern war must appal everyone who is sensitive to them, not last nor least the large populations of the great powers. The absence of a reliable international order has caused a restriction of trade which everyone must regret, causing, as it does for all the participants, a lowering of the standard of living. The church cannot be insensitive to this. For it, indeed, the fruits of the earth are God's gifts, meant to "rejoice man's heart," to preserve his life, and to supply his need. To destroy or wantonly to squander them is in its sight both foolish and sinful. Men and nations alike will have to give an account of their stewardship of God's gifts.

Yet, when everyone forgets, the church must still remem-

ber that man "shall not live by bread alone." Indeed, bread is only the gift of God for him who receives it as a sign of that which is more than bread, as a sign of the goodness of God, from whom the "bread of life" comes. But is it necessary for the church, advancing its opinion in the light of God's word, to question the material progress of this newer age, which in large measure depends on the expansion and intensification of international trade and has already to some extent benefited all classes of civilized peoples? As though doubts as to the purpose and benefit of these material improvements had not occurred, in the very midst of this most stormy advance, just to those people who did not share this point of view of the church! It can happen that material prosperity is purchased at too great a moral and spiritual cost, and that a return to a simpler standard of living need not in all respects and under all circumstances be considered in itself a misfortune. We are well aware that this raises questions which cannot receive adequate treatment here. But in this connection these considerations have no other significance than that they help to emphasize the warning, which ought not to be necessary, against the church's accepting a utilitarian-materialist foundation for the establishment of the international order.

A like warning is also necessary in regard to the sanction given to interests of a quite different nature, *the idealistic-humanitarian*. Only here it is not so easy to obtain a common judgment from the side of the church.

It is naturally impossible in passing to discuss or to answer the question of the interrelations of Christianity and idealism. Yet, in view of our problems, a clarification is urgently needed, because, in the work of fostering international friendship, cooperation between Christian and idealist-humanitarian groups has been achieved over large areas and as something quite natural. In pacifist move-

ments in particular it seems a hopeless task to distinguish Christian from idealist motives. Perhaps at no other point can we see so clearly as here the fact that the last two centuries have brought about, on the one hand, a half-conscious, half-unconscious secularization of Christianity by the reception of idealist and humanitarian elements, and, on the other, a widespread conscious or unconscious adoption and assimilation of Christian conceptions by humanitarian idealism.

This can be elucidated by the role which the idea of "mankind" plays in laying the foundation of an international order on the basis of positive peaceful relations between nations. It is clear that for this purpose the simple anthropological or sociological fact of physiological and psychical unity as over against other units is insufficient of itself. It requires the whole world of human society as an empirical reality before it acquires a significance which permits or rather compels the attempt to treat, in the interests of a higher unity, even such potent facts as the difference between peoples in matters of race, culture, and interests as facts of a secondary order. This significance finds its fulfillment when "mankind" is treated as going back to a common origin, or as embodying the same idea. But even where the system leaves no room for a Creator-God, these conceptions are a heritage of the Christian belief in creation. The equality of "all that bears a human form" has meaning only there. Above all, when the humanitarian socialist proclaims such equality, the idealist ground and the Christian background of his gospel find simultaneous expression, in spite of all his opposition to Christian belief as such.

Now the secularization of the church manifests itself when these opinions are felt and described as Christian in essence, without the chasm being seen which yawns here,

and which must cause what seems to be an identity of outlook to be seriously questioned.

The world, and therefore mankind also, are not given as creatures, but as mere fact, as an object of our knowing and willing. That they are creatures is known only by faith. The revelation of the Creator is required. Where the Creator and his revelation are denied, there the assertion of mankind's common origin acquires a new and essentially different meaning. But above all, where the Creator is revealed, there is also revealed the fact that the creation is not what it was as it left his hands. The close connection in which the biblical account of creation and the story of the fall stand to one another is irremovable. The same faith, which knows the Creator, recognizes also the corruption which has come upon God's creation through the disobedience of the creature. If there was a created unity of the human species, this unity has been destroyed, and so destroyed that no good will and no human commands can restore it. Who speaks of " mankind " must know that he can only speak of it as that which has been irretrievably lost, viz. the unity of its divine origin. The division of mankind is given; not its unity. But the Christian recognizes that this is the result of sin. Division can be overcome only when and where sin itself is conquered.

The impossibility of this idealist conception for the Christian becomes most fully clear when it clothes itself in the garments of the gospel of unity in divine sonship. If it is true that the character of mankind as created by God is not a naturally given fact, but is known only to faith, it is still more true of the character of divine sonship attributed to man. Divine sonship remains a miracle of Christ's mercy, and only believers have part in it. It is absurd to say that for the Christian all men are God's children and then to base the unity of mankind on that. What is true is that

all men are lost and fallen children of God, and that of his grace God offers sonship to them all. Herein is the unity of mankind; in the common loss of our origin through sin; in one common forgiveness by the love of God in Christ, and so in our common hope of the full restoration of the shattered unity when God shall have finished his work of salvation.

We must recognize with all thankfulness for the possibilities of a good order that are coming to light what the world already has of natural unity and what may further be developed as history unfolds. Yet we must recognize it in all its questionableness, for we dare not usurp that one true unity given to faith alone. How little this unity, even where in the church of Christ alone it is manifested historically, is able to overcome all natural divisions — for even in the church sin still clings to us and makes us idle — all that we have already said testifies.

Enough. The idealist conception cannot be shared by the church, as if mankind were already a unity, and all that was necessary was to bring this fact to consciousness and to remove the hindrances to its practical working out in an inclusive human order. Much rather must it be recognized and shown in the church, in all sobriety, that the unity of man reveals itself essentially in negations, and that the matter is through and through God's concern. Such a unity is not at man's disposal. But God creates it, as he wakens belief in the gospel; and in this faith man can both experience and serve it.

The idealist position must always lead to disappointment, indeed to despair of men and of mankind. For those who maintain this point of view must continually recognize the fact that the powers of disruption destroy all well-meant efforts to achieve unity, and that every unity created by man breaks in pieces on the natural strength of com-

munities that are bound by history and by blood. The church knows men, for God has opened its eyes. Humanly, the church cannot but be disillusioned. But its hope is in the living God, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.

What kind of a hope is that? It is not the utopian hope of a kingdom of everlasting peace attainable by men, in which all problems of the international order will find their solution. It will not be man who overcomes the power of selfishness and dissension. For these are stronger than he. Neither is it the faint hope of a slow but sure improvement of international relations as a result of the influence of a systematic rational plan upon the policies and the responsible statesmen of the nations. We are dealing here with what is more and other than reason and deficiency of insight, viz. with the strongest emotional forces there can possibly be.

Even if a man cannot accept the eschatology of the New Testament he must recognize that Christ envisages the end of national histories not in any progressive international order, but in " wars and rumors of wars." Such a one must put himself quite consciously at a great distance from Christ in describing hopes of " the progressive " kind as Christian.

Then, is there a Christian hope of history, besides that one unshakable hope of the end of history, when there shall be " one flock and one shepherd," viz. the finished unity of all believers under their eternal Lord? No, there is only a lively trust that God will more and more prove himself the Lord of history, and that he will declare himself to his people, i.e. to his church, when it is obedient to him. This raises the whole question of the task of the church — that church which lives amid the nations, sharing the guilt of disorder, rejoicing in all that is in good order in the life of the world, and thanking God for it.

Just because God has put the church in the world and allows it to remain there, there can be no dispute among Christians that *the church has responsibilities in the world.* Any inquiry as to the *content of that responsibility* makes it plain that there are different conceptions of the church at work in the church itself which have significance for our particular problem. But we should nevertheless be able to make a further common step forward, viz. the recognition of the fact that the commission which Christ gave to the company of his disciples and which made them responsible to " all nations " consists in the teaching of all nations and their baptism in the name of the Father, and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost. For this the church exists, for the evangelization of the world. And when the Holy Spirit came at Pentecost, then the work of the church began with the preaching of the glad tidings of the forgiveness of sins in all who believed on Jesus of Nazareth as the crucified and risen Christ. It was in consequence of the carrying out of this commission that believers " were added " to the community, and that, within the community, the brotherly love of those who had received their divine sonship together expressed itself in manifold ways in the common life together.

This remains the most solemn commission of Christ's church, and it is in the highest degree responsible for the spreading of the gospel in the world, without respect of barriers which are created by differences of race, of political destiny, or of speech and culture. This is still her promise, that where the gospel awakens faith the bonds of brotherly love will envelop her members, no matter how much selfishness and blindness to the needs of the brethren may check the full unfolding of that which membership of the body of Christ in itself implies.

It is to bring the commission of the church into danger-

ous obscurity to conceive of it as the pronouncement of a new — or an old — law. The faith of the church is not belief in a " principle of love " as the peculiar content of such a law, but it is faith in a Person and the willing acceptance of his gift to us; it is faith in Christ as the Son of God who assures us of forgiveness by the Holy Spirit. That God — incomprehensible fact — loves the sinner is a certainty attained by faith and only by faith; it is also the source from which brotherly love springs. The admonition to brotherly love only attains force and reason as a remembrance of a gift which we have received, never as the application of a principle of universal validity.

Yet is it not true that the command to love is the content of that divine law " written in the hearts " of the heathen? And is it not the concern of the Christian church to unveil the meaning of this law to all the world? Certainly it is. But how can the church of Christ ever forget that the preaching of the law can never achieve any other result than the recognition of the lost condition of man, who is condemned to remain a transgressor, or of the self-deception of him who takes his ideals as fulfillments — while he daily makes new compromises — so as to maintain before himself and others at least the appearance of a manhood perfected by its own strength. Christ's church is upbraided quite justifiably that she has now for nearly two thousand years preached the law of love, and that one can see in the very state of the world, particularly in the disorder and the enmity between nations, how fruitless her work has been. And in fact, in so far as the church of Christ has so preached, she has worked in vain, and the continuation of such activities for further millennia will not alter the condition of things. What has been effectual in the work of the church, and notably in the reshaping of human relationships, is not the proclamation of ethical

principles, but the gospel that the deadly reign of the law has come to an end in him who completely fulfilled it. This is still the gospel which the world needs above all else.

Even racial and cultural cleavages are plainly and decisively healed by this gospel. At any rate so it was in Paul's experience of the sharp contrast between Jew and Greek, between those who greeted one another with open hostility and scorn, between those who had the promise and yet were " children of wrath " and those who were without God in the world. Paul taught that Christ was their peace, and that through him the way to the Father in one Spirit was opened to both of them, while at the same time they remained different. But that happened because " the law which was given in commandments " was done away, and therewith the seeds of enmity. The cross of Christ has revealed what man is, even when he claims to live on the heights of the moral ideal and so lays claim to the good will of God. But no man has a claim before God; no man, no culture, no race, no " religion " has any precedence over another. All are taught that their guilt has been removed by the sacrifice of the One, and that the Father's heart turns to them of his grace alone. Thus " strangers and foreigners " become " fellow citizens of the household of God," not through a common recognition of a principle, i.e. a new law, but by their being recognized as alike children redeemed by Christ, who once were lost. What really binds redeemed mankind together is not a humanity ennobled by its own powers, but the redeeming work of Christ and the gracious Word of God. This is the church's proclamation, and she can trust in the power of the Holy Spirit who kindles faith that the peace created by Christ will find living expression in his church, that the barriers which now divide the nations will evermore disappear before the face of the Lord. " Here," but only here, is neither

Jew nor Greek, *here* is neither bond nor free, *here* is neither male nor female: for yet are all one in Christ Jesus.

Has the church, then, no interest in the way in which the order of the world historically develops? It is in the highest degree interested, for it is in this world that it has to fulfil its highest task, the proclamation of God's good news. Then is it not responsible for securing the right order for the world? Not at all. For if by " right order " is meant the perfect order of God's kingdom, then it is not in her power to achieve it. But ought not, at least, that order to obtain among men and even among nations that does obtain in the church? Certainly, but this order is not a law and cannot be created by law and force. And yet, outside the church of Christ there can be no other order than one founded on force and law. God has, indeed, established authorities so that there shall be such an order, and so that it can be maintained and perpetually renewed. The order is there to keep mankind from falling into chaos; it bears the sword, because without it the powers of disorder and destruction could not be suppressed.

Even between nations only the law can establish order. When the church assents to the law of the state — and it does so in demanding obedience to the authorities from its members — how can it avoid assenting to every effort which is made to regulate by law the relations between nations and so to remove arbitrariness? But it is just this state of affairs, in which the relationships of the nations are not dominated by arbitrariness, but regulated by law, to which we refer in speaking of an " international order." And in this sense it is always an " external " order.

But even as we thus give content to the idea of " international order " we can hear the objection that our account of the situation has been far too legally formulated to permit of a proper appreciation of the very thing which lies

most heavily on the conscience of the church. The real tragedy is this, that " disorder " does not remain confined within the limits of the legal side of international relationships, that it not only disturbs or breaks the relationships of those who have been entrusted with the official representation of the nations, the responsible statesmen and diplomats, but that it affects the nation as a whole, hindering and restricting economic and cultural exchange, affecting, and even in some cases completely destroying, personal relationships of a social and friendly kind; in short, threatening the whole life of the nation wherever it is in living contact with the life of other nations, so that men are made foes, who of themselves neither would nor could be enemies.

The too narrow conception of what we call international order and disorder becomes particularly clear in a matter which has continually engaged the attention of the church since the war, the question, namely, of national minorities. One could almost say that the international problem here appears within the national frontiers in the form " how can different cultural groups live together in the same state? " There are here no diplomatic relations to be broken off, but order and disorder deeply affect the everyday life, particularly of those who live near the cultural frontier, or are of the " dispersion." In such circumstances how very complicated the international order (in our basic sense of the word) can become, when the minority has to find its natural cultural support in the national majority of another power or state. Has not our whole problem become international rather than interstate? And from this point of view is not a legal-constitutional approach unacceptably narrow?

We believe not. It could only be so if we considered that the legal order of interstate relationships could be estab-

lished without reference to these conditions; indeed, without reference to the whole range of those personal relationships that have been questioned. Yet nothing is more self-evident than that states are in this, as in all matters, servants of the whole national life, protecting it from without, and securing it from within. But this gives the state its peculiar task and an authority given to no other, to establish order by means of law. Be the manifold relations between states of what kind they may, each nation must preserve its own order to maintain its existence. That is so within the state and it is so outside its border. As surely as order can arise independently of the legislative activity of the state, so surely does it need that activity from the very moment it does arise. The state cannot establish it in isolation, not even the loose relationships which characterize material exchanges, but it can demand or prevent it. The state is the final court. For this reason the problem of international order is bound up in fact with that of establishing right laws between states. The church cannot possibly forget that the establishment of international law must proceed from quite other premises than that of the order of an individual state. There is no authority in the international realm to enact the law, either on the basis of national tradition, or in execution of the decisions of a representative government, or in the manner of dictator. When empires united different and possibly previously hostile peoples under one common law, they established not international but national order, even if it had widespread authority. At best they provided only partial solutions of the problem, which in turn themselves threatened the whole international order. Beside this, there appeared again and again in the international world a law developed by means of treaties between individual states. The most recent attempts to achieve an all-inclusive

order based on law by means of a representative international assembly have not attained their goal, in so far as the League of Nations and the organizations it has established have not been able to obtain the universality for which they must strive. In addition, the league has no power to guarantee the acceptance of the laws it enacts. Nor has any empire so far arisen to become a world state, and so provide a complete solution of the problem.

A further decisive and most important difference between the national and the international orders lies in the fact that every piece of national legislation can assume an antecedent knowledge of the content of national law. However defective the ethnical "nomos" (*Volksnomos*) may be in the light of ultimate ethical standards, it provides an irreplaceably valuable basis for national legislation. It even makes it possible in the course of peaceful developments to adapt the particular formulations of national law to the changing demands of history — save in times of special crisis, when the continuity of law may be broken. We must not, then, forget that there are international as well as national revolutions and that they always imply a disturbance of the "order" and seldom conclude without acts of violence.

There is nothing in the international realm to correspond to the fact of a "popular law and custom." At one time the Christian idea of "natural law" filled its place. What has survived of this idea in a secularized residue is clearly no longer able to perform the required service. Nevertheless, attempts are always being made to offer the world a system of valid principles of order left over from the Christian natural law, as the special contribution of Christ's church to the solution of the problems of international order.

We do not intend to go further into the details of the

question which is discussed particularly in Dr. Oldham's *The Church and Its Function in Society* and in the volume of essays on *Christian Faith and the Common Life*. For it is at this point that the differences in the understanding of faith within the church become evident. This shows itself in the fact that on the one side there is strenuous opposition to what is on the other side the starting-point of all Christian thinking about the possibility given to the church of intervening so as to create a " Christian " order in every realm of human life, the conviction, viz., that God has once and for all made known his will to men in certain moral principles accessible even to natural man, and that he has therewith given them the proper bases for the ordering of all their life.

In our context it may suffice to point out that universal principles require a new interpretation and a new application in every particular instance and in every new historical situation. And if that applies to the national sphere, how much more must it apply to the international, with its *dynamic* condition more critical than ever! The dynamic of history, which finds both basis and expression in the rise and fall of nations and in changes of spiritual temper and of culture, cannot be converted even by the church into a static condition permitting the continuous development of current orders. Orders of today become the disorders of tomorrow, if the attempt is made to maintain them unaltered in an altered situation. There is no prospect of the world coming any nearer to the solution of the problem, the urgency of which increases every day. And in such a situation what can be the especial mission of the church? Does it not consist in the church keeping itself clear from any such unpromising undertaking, so as not to risk the loss of what " prestige " she has left?

Certainly not. The church can do no other than give

the most emphatic support to the demand for order. It is no mere accident that those who first applied the idea of law to international relations were Christians (Cf. Alexeiev: *Christianity, Law, and International Relations,* and also its bibliography). God is revealed to the church as the God of order. This will of God's to order can be no less than universal. For its purpose is to preserve his creation. The power which defends the law serves that purpose. The international task of the church begins in the fact that it wakens and maintains in those who receive its word, the consciousness of and the will to accept responsibility for the preservation of the re-formation of the order in the international world. That is not done by " peace sermons " of any kind whatever, nor by any " fear " of war, which only amounts to fear of men, but it demands untiring labor to attain true insight into the greatness of the positive task confronting us here.[2]

But it is more important for the church than for anyone else to speak of this task with due sobriety. That is not only because of the knowledge that the order so strenuously obtained can be none other than " external " and is far from being the order of God's kingdom, or a " Christian " order. It is additionally so because of the kind of law that can alone obtain between sovereign states, even when they establish " leagues." It is the law of free treaty, so long as no world state is able to settle and to enforce it by its own legislation. The establishing of an international order correspondingly supposes a readiness to conclude treaties and a reverence for them. It is self-evident that only those can be called treaties where the partners act in complete independence and without any pressure from external and

[2] It will be clear from the context that the " war problem " seems to the author to be entirely subordinate to that of international Order. He was the more readily able to omit any detailed treatment in view of the contributions of Piper and Raven.

overpowering circumstances. The readiness to conclude treaties thus becomes a demand of the church, and its educational work must be directed to the creation of the inner conditions for this readiness in the circles which it reaches.

This does not mean, however, that naïve belief in a " league of nations " which is so often recommended, even in church circles. The fact that in the League of Nations which was created at the close of the World War those presuppositions (which have just been emphasized) of the complete legal equality and freedom of all the partners concerned did not exist — that from the very outset it was obliged to serve as the instrument of some of the great powers, has been generally recognized as the root cause of its inner weakness, and ought to have been perceived by the churches long ago. Even one who considers a comprehensive organization of the nations based upon law and aiming at the creation of a new system of law as the ideal at which we ought to aim may, according to the historical situation, possibly regard a partial agreement, even if it only affects a few nations, as more valuable than a far more inclusive one for which the inward presuppositions have either ceased to exist, or have never existed at all. The church can certainly wish for nothing more than that the will for order should become effective all along the line: and so far as the idea of a " League of Nations " is simply intended to express this will for comprehensive order, it will naturally be affirmed by the church's every attempt to realize that order, and in this the church may be exposed to criticism; and we must greatly deplore the fact that the first attempt of this kind has been so evidently compromised by the fact that the churches are forced to exercise great caution when it is suggested that new efforts to establish a comprehensive international order should be connected with this particular organization.

But does not the question recur here which confronted

us when we spoke of the changeableness of the law? Is there not a norm to which the content of historical law conforms? Should not the law so established also be measured by the norm of justice? For only on this basis can it provide a durable order in all the changes of history. Only on this basis will the nations give their inner consent to the treaties which should bind them; only on this basis will they be ready to abide by their treaties. But what justice is, that must be determined anew in each individual case.

Just here the church is able to perform an important and decisive service. It cannot so establish that ethos in which the question of justice is able to be formulated, felt, and, as imperfectly as ever, humanly answered, that, when it may have seemed to be vanished for ever, it may return for all men and not only for the world of Western Christian culture. At best, the church can only make a way for the common acknowledgment of law, and for its Christian understanding, among those who have been apprehended by its gospel. But it can thus perform an immediate service for the solution of our problem. This it does as men grow up who not only learn in their surrender to God, the Lord of nations and of history, new principles of conduct, but receive from him a new insight into the realities of things and a new sensitiveness to his commands; men who know something of the fact that even their "neighbor," even boundaries are set thereby, which cannot be crossed or ignored without sin.

We have already said that it is not for the state to create relations between the nations. In point of fact its one business is to order them aright. How very much depends upon the individual who first of all, as the representative of his own nation, meets the first member of a foreign nation, and also how much depends upon the individual in the ensuing development of such relations — whether the in-

dividual in question be a merchant or a traveller, or indeed, in time of war, a soldier, or in any other capacity — is not only evidenced in a very striking way in the history of missions, but may also be learnt from careful daily observations of extensive international intercourse. It is a shameful thought that Christians, when they meet people of other nations, or tell others about such meetings, through thoughtlessness and worse, have constantly helped — and still do — to preserve and, indeed, intensify the crudest prejudices and the most unjust judgments which poison the relations between nations. There is need for a new, systematic work of education within the church, in order to create at this very point new presuppositions and to influence international relations directly at the very point where they are most concrete in form.

That new view of the reality of things in the international sphere, that will for complete justice where the other nation is concerned, ought to be found first of all among those who confess Christ as their leader. They ought not to leave their Christianity at home when they cross the frontiers of their own land, but they ought to be particularly conscious of it, and of the responsibility it imposes, at that moment. (In this connection it should be noted that it should be a far more general and accepted practice than it is for Christian people to share in the worship of Christians of another nation.)

The church cannot ordain that the national destiny should be intrusted to such men. It must reckon with the possibility that they may be deemed more unsuitable than anyone else; indeed, that they may be deprived of all political influence at times when men and nations come under the demonic compulsion to " break their bonds asunder and cast away their cords from them," to make man the measure of all things and to dethrone God, or to put in his

place some national demigod who is merely the slave of the national interest. But the service of the church remains: in it men are preserved against such demonic temptation, and the church leads the fight against the forces of disruption and her men willingly take upon themselves political responsibility whenever they are allowed to assume it.

They know well that every international treaty, bilateral or collective, proceeds from very tangible and concrete interests where compromise, willed and assented to by all parties, forms the content of the new law, and at the same time the basis of order. But men formed by the church, because of their connection with a super-historical court, will possess that inner freedom from private desire and that sensitiveness to the needs of others which is the necessary condition of all international understanding. To such a man, and only to such, it will be of the greatest significance to know that behind him stands a whole circle of men who, in like manner, have learnt to see and to hear all things anew.

Must we enumerate the wealth of concrete tasks and possibilities that are thereby prescribed for an ecumenical church? These do not begin with declarations on international politics, with participation in international political endeavors, which are forever being hailed and praised as the church's decisive means of international action. Dr. Oldham has indicated the questionable nature of such means.[3] Quite apart from the fact that even among Christians, even among those who profess the same ethical principles and believe their unity to lie in these principles, for a thousand different reasons of a personal, social, and national kind, no unanimity of political judgment is to be found regarding particular issues, it is not the church's task to bestow order on the world, and certainly not to be

[3] See *The Church and Its Function in Society*, p. 207 ff.

its arbitrator. But by interchange between churches and nations it can make possible, and in every way demand, that way of thought which is at once of reality and of faith; which is the most important requirement for those Christians who are by profession politicians and statesmen, for the transaction of their consciously undertaken responsibilities. In this way the church can, in certain situations, and in so far as public expression does not meet with insoluble difficulties, make a contribution to the clarification of the truth. Indeed, when God grants it and there is complete agreement, the church may address a prophetic word to a world which is preparing its own destruction in the dissolution of its order.

In this connection it would be to leave out of account an important possibility of immediate service, were we not to mention what has been going on for some time now, namely, the efforts at intervention between churches which seek to give advice, mediation, and support, where national minorities are at the same time religious and ecclesiastical minorities; where, therefore, international and ecumenical relations have like effect. We have already noted the special interest that has been given by the church since the war to this point. The World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship through the Churches and Professor Adolf Keller at the European headquarters are veritable champions here, and their work is undoubtedly ecumenical in the true sense. No one knows whether times will not come in which individual churches will need even more ecumenical aid than now. But it is clear that such practical aid, so soon as it has to cross frontiers, affects the international order, and can itself become an international problem. But how much must then depend on whether such service of church to church is done in that full sense of responsibility which seems to be a Christian duty, in a full

appreciation of the facts of the situation, with a will to be unswervingly loyal to the truth, in a clear knowledge of the danger of "assuming another's office," viz. the state's, and yet in a deep assurance that the brotherly intercourse of church with church and its practical maintenance is not only an inescapable commission, but a service for God to the international order itself!

Is that all too modest? Must the catastrophic threat of war remain? Must not the church cry out to the world more loudly than ever before, "No more war!"? And if it did, what would it do more than others? Behind the demand that the church must call more loudly than heretofore does there not lie a misunderstanding of her peculiar commission and, moreover, the quite unreal fiction that the church is still the voice of the "Christian peoples," as if there were still a Christian world or a "Christian West"? A realistic understanding of the world in which the church finds itself, by its own fault or not, drives the church back to its central task of witnessing to its divinely given truth; the truth that God alone is Lord, that his holy will is at work, even in this our world, in judgment and in grace, and that he is establishing his eternal and unmovable kingdom that he may one day reveal it. For that hour we wait, not idly, not turned from the world and its needs, but in responsibility before our Lord and, therefore, in love to our brethren. It would be a tremendous gift for the world if it could see this church of the one gospel, this militant and hoping church, fully and completely one. Even then such a church would not of itself be the saving of the world, but the peoples would more readily than now listen to its voice, and when God bestowed his grace would receive its word as God's Word, to their salvation and to their temporal as to their eternal peace.

WAR AND CHRISTIAN PEACEMAKING

by

OTTO PIPER

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1. THE SITUATION

At a moment when the whole of mankind sighs under the fear of the " next war," it is of the greatest importance that the church should take a clear and unambiguous stand in the issue of peace and war. But what is needed above all is a specifically Christian attitude towards this problem, rather than political radicalism. For it is still true in our days that without Christ we can do nothing.

The Lord did not give a special commandment or instruction with regard to war; and it seems that the apostles did not regard it as an urgent problem. But this fact must not be interpreted as a proof that war is no Christian problem at all. Christ's method was not to give an elaborated casuistic system of morals as the Pharisees did. He rather pointed to the love which the Heavenly Father shows to us, and he left it to his followers to discover gradually all the implications of this divine love, and to apply this knowledge to their own conduct.

Yet, as for so many other problems of conduct, Christianity has not yet attained to a satisfactory or general solution of that of war. We only notice various attempts of individual groups of Christians to solve this wide and complicated issue.

In such a situation, where clarity of moral judgment grows in proportion to experience, nobody has a right to anathematize a brother whose views are opposite to his. All we can do is to re-examine the problem in the light of Christian experience, and to connect it, in the closest pos-

sible way, with the central truths of our faith. For this purpose we have to investigate: (1) the nature and the origin of war, and (2) the grounds of the failure of secular pacifism, so far. We have then (3) to attempt to find out what the specifically Christian understanding of war is, and finally (4) we have to ask ourselves what attitude we have to take towards it.

2. THE NATURE OF WAR

(a) *The Roots of War.* War differs from any other form of conflict by the fact that it is waged between bodies politic, and it is, therefore, in the political sphere that we must search for its causes.

It is the will for power and dominion which accounts chiefly for the outbreak of a war, and all the other alleged causes play but a subsidiary role. The willingness of a nation to embark on the venture of war can be increased by her economic difficulties. Warlike spirit in the ruling class, and in a large section of the population, makes it easier for the ruler to induce a nation to warfare. Political pride, national self-respect and prejudices play their parts. But none of these factors will ever by itself lead to war.

(b) *War Inherent in Political Life.* There is a necessity inherent in political life which in certain situations makes war inevitable. Modern sociologists and writers on ethics are sometimes inclined to overlook the fundamental difference of structure between the body politic and society. There is an innate tendency in man to form groups and to cooperate with his fellow men for physical and mental well-being. This tendency is encouraged by the natural kinship which exists in families, clans, and nations. This social tendency lies at the root of civilization, trade, organized religion, but it does not lead by itself to the formation of bodies politic. The social group is kept together by

common interests and certain central controls, such as customs, and the granting or refusing of social esteem and of mutual help. There are, moreover, differences of capacity, resources, and achievements between the different members of a group, and thus some people are more influential than their fellow men. So far as the rest of the group is willing to recognize this natural superiority, these influential people are invested with authority. Hence originates the hierarchical structure of society.

Apart from the social will to common life and cooperation, there is innate in man the will for dominion and power. This will for power accounts for the antagonisms in society. It leads to envy, rivalry, and competition, to the formation of factions and parties, and to the strife for monopolies of all kinds. It works, however, in two different directions. With some people it tends towards dominion in one of the different departments of social life (economics, civilization, society life, etc.), with others towards dominion over the group as such, independent of its special activities and achievements. It is by this second tendency that the political organization of the group is originated. The body politic presupposes the existence of social life and social groups. There is no tendency in economic life or civilization, as such, to develop towards political organization. But their development offers opportunities for the extension of political power over wider groups and areas; this is the reason why empires are founded and brought into existence only when civilization, trade, and traffic are extended. Notwithstanding world trade and universal civilization, there could be no empire were it not that the political ruler (or the ruling class) used these developments for the pursuit of his aims. The ruling group finds itself compelled to limit the extent of its own power. This self-limitation takes place in two ways: the

ruling group respects and safeguards the laws of the body to the extent to which they do not impair its own interests, and it promotes the well-being of the members of the nation to the extent to which they are in harmony with its own. In the course of events a very close amalgamation can take place between the will of the ruler and the body politic. The ruler can identify himself so entirely with the goods and ideals which the group stands for or embodies, that his own will for dominion becomes a will to make his nation triumph for the sake of its values. From the other end the body politic can develop in itself a kind of collective political will. Thus, to a certain extent the political life of modern states represents the will of the respective nations. But although in such cases, political life is linked up with a nation's quest for ideals, we must not overlook that the body politic, *qua* such, does not strive after ideals. It is the underlying body social which brings them about and cherishes them, and the political will uses them as a pretext, or as a goal, for its political will for domination.

The will for domination accounts for the emphasis laid by the body politic on the principle of sovereignty in international life. The ruling group cannot satisfy its will for domination as long as it depends on another country or body politic. It is of the nature of rulers that what matters for them is independence rather than the extent of their power.

Modern writers frequently seem to be puzzled by the fact that nations are so unwilling to submit their vital interests to arbitration and prefer to have recourse to war instead, even in cases where it is easy to foretell that the price which has to be paid for the virtual gains of a war would be enormously in excess of the possible loss implied in arbitration. But accepting arbitration would mean accepting the decision of another body, and this would be regarded as a limitation from outside of the sovereignty of

the country. Therefore, only minor issues in international life will be submitted to arbitration. In all major issues a body politic will regard itself as its own judge. But sovereignty is a precarious good; its existence is continually threatened — at least virtually — by the coexistence of other sovereign nations. Thus distrust of the powerful neighbors is one of the basic features of political life. This distrust finds its justification in the expansive tendency of the will for power. The ruling group tends to make use of all its potential resources. Yet, since it must necessarily limit itself within the nation, a powerful group may try to find an outlet for its will outside. Thus a nation which believes itself to be more powerful than its territorial possessions and its influence in international affairs would indicate, might try to increase its influence by means of a policy which deliberately breaks international treaties or intimidates its neighbors by all kinds of threats. Finally, when the neighbors no longer show willingness to tolerate such policy, war will ensue. In other cases a nation proves her sovereignty to herself and to her neighbors by assuming the role of international policeman or guardian of international morale, and she satisfies her desire for dominion in " punitive expeditions " and in war for " freedom and independence of the small nations." In such conditions, political life leads of necessity to wars. We do not thereby mean that war is the normal relation between bodies politic, nor is the will for dominion, as such, an explicit desire to wage war. It is in its nature that it is concerned primarily with its own maintenance. The normal situation in international life is, therefore, dictated by the desire not to disturb the precarious balance of powers. But the historical development itself thwarts this tendency. For the strength of bodies politic varies considerably during the ages.

Because the root of war is not to be seen in the existence

of nations as such, nor in the fact of national sovereignty, but rather in the will to dominate, wars are never fought for ends beyond the existence of the nation involved. A nation, for example, that pretends to fight for civilization, in fact, uses her civilization as a pretext under which to impose her power upon other nations. Even the so-called " wars of religion " have not been wars merely for the victory of a religious truth. For no religion requires armed assistance for its support. The " wars of religion " of the sixteenth century, for example, were fought for the privilege of the princes to determine the religious status of their countries. Similarly, it is pure romanticism when it is said that in the " true " war, a nation fights for historical justice. It fights for what it believes to be its right, because it wants its right to prevail over other nations. D'Annunzio and Mussolini in their usual frankness called this motive " sacred egoism." The motive leading to war is a " higher one " only in so far as the existence of the body politic is superior to, and nobler than, that of the individual members of the nation.

3. THE FAILURE OF SECULAR PACIFISM

It is obvious that the burden of war is felt more painfully by the subjects of the ruling group than by this group itself and by the professional soldiers. For to these the hardships of a war are tolerable, since they are organically connected with the aims of their lives, while the rest of the population has no direct interest in warfare. It is not surprising, therefore, that with the rise of modern democracy, the people have tried to rid mankind from this " curse " of war. We call this attempt secular pacifism. By this term we mean all the efforts which aim at limiting or abolishing war by political, economic, social, or educational means, irrespective of the religious convictions held by its promoters, and in

this paper we shall set it over against Christian peacemaking, which is the endeavor to overcome the spirit of enmity by the spiritual means which Christ has placed at the disposal of his followers. The criterion whether or not a type of pacifism is secular is this: whenever it is possible for different people to join in a pacifistic action, in exactly the same way, irrespective of their religious convictions, its underlying principle cannot be Christian.

So far as we can see, secular pacifism has not only been a failure, but is always bound to fail, because it is blind to the factors which determine the outbreak of war.

(1) In the political sphere the principal measures advocated by secular pacifism are a policy of concessions, reconciliation, and limitation of armaments, conscientious objection, and the replacing of the present sovereign states by a world state. I do not think that it is impossible to ease political tensions by sensible political measures. But they do not, and cannot, remove the roots of war. Similarly, complete disarmament cannot be achieved, because, as we have shown, mutual distrust is one of the basic elements of international life. Increase of armaments certainly multiplies the opportunities of starting a war; but their reduction does not do away with the war menace.

On the other hand, no nation is ready, as Mr. Demant has stated, " to put international considerations first, if its own vital interests conflict with covenant obligations," and we may add: " no nation is willing to make sacrifices merely for the good of other nations." For such an attitude would be in contradiction to the principle of self-assertiveness which is basic to the body politic. It is possible by means of international agreements to make war less frequent, and it is good that politicians should aim at achieving this goal, but no definite end of war must be hoped for from such agreements.

Lord Lothian has rightly seen that sovereignty makes it impossible to bring about lasting peace. But his idea of a world state, which would take over the sovereign rights of all the member states, is impracticable. It overlooks the dialectic of the will for domination. This will would not have been eradicated from the hearts of men when such a world state was created, and it is certain that some of its members would soon make attempts to regain their sovereignty. This process would be accelerated by the fact that the greater the extent of a body politic, the stronger and more oppressive must be the central authority because, with a growing number of subjects, it becomes increasingly more difficult to bring about a balance between the interest of the whole and individual wishes.

It cannot be argued that, since in the course of history feuds between clans and cities have been overcome and these small political entities have joined in kingdoms and empires, there is hope that the process will go on, and lead inevitably to the formation of a world state. That historical development of concentration is not due to a decline of the will for dominion in modern mankind, but merely to the fact that smaller bodies have joined together in order to display more power over against others, or that powerful men have welded them together for the increase of their own power. But this process of unification cannot go on indefinitely because there are too many men who aspire for power, and because empires, as a result of the tension between central power and members, are bound to disintegrate after a certain time.

Since the will for dominion cannot be uprooted, certain pacifists attempt to make it ineffective by means of a refusal to take up arms. The hope is entertained that the ruling group will give up an attempt to make war, if only a sufficiently great number of people joined in such an action.

But it is not difficult to predict a development of modern warfare in which the democratic method of general conscription will be definitely abandoned, and war will be fought again by professional soldiers and volunteers only. Such a method is apt to rid the rulers both of the hampering influences of public criticism and unwillingness, and of the menace of a rebellion behind their backs, carried out by discontented soldiers.

(2) Economists and businessmen hope to overcome war by economic measures. It is probably true that modern wars do not pay, but since political-minded people do not think in terms of dividends but of political power they will always overrule the reasoning of the economist. Moreover, it is true to say that the leading men in business life are no longer so pacifistic as they used to be. Since the exploitation of four continents has come to a certain end by the industrialism of oversea countries, and since the industrial countries have erected their high tariff walls, the individual business man pleads for rearmament. For though it means virtually war, he hopes that its economic burden will not fall on his shoulders.

(3) Other pacifists base their hopes on education. They think the development of good will, mutual understanding and trust will eventually overcome the enmities of nations. Yet this argument of humanistic moralism overlooks the fact that war is not simply an " outburst of human energy," which well meaning people might divide and canalize into useful or at least less harmful ways of activity. The will for dominion wants its specific satisfaction which no other good can provide. Some try, therefore, to connect the moral change with a change of the political system. But there, too, is the same fallacy as we have found in the idea of a world state. In a federation of socialistic countries the advanced states could soon impose their wills upon the less

developed, and would use force if necessary. If, however, people succeeded in creating a real world republic on a socialistic basis, it would share the destiny of all empires. Its inner antagonisms would lead eventually to its disintegration.

In such a situation where the wills of men fail, modern people frequently seek comfort in the idea of a development which, notwithstanding man's impotence, would bring about a perfect state of things, including world peace. It is hoped that the progress of science and economics will carry away gradually the causes of war. But such naïve belief has no foundation in the facts. The progress of science provides mankind with new and powerful resources which can be used both for good and evil. The same process turns out artificial fertilizers and gunpowder, motor-cars and tanks. Thus, as a conclusion of our survey we can say: human efforts have a certain influence upon the duration of times of peace, for it is possible to keep down the will of those whose unlimited lust for power becomes the cause of war. But since all the methods of secular pacifism are unable entirely to eradicate that will from the hearts of man there can be no hope of permanent peace, as long as men are what they are. It is easy to show that, at the bottom of all secular pacifism, there lies an unjustified belief in man. This kind of misinterpretation is a rationalization necessary for people who want to believe that, by their own efforts, they are able to solve the problem of war; but it is contradicted by facts, and unmasked by Christian revelation.

4. THE CHRISTIAN INTERPRETATION OF WAR

(a) *The Motive of Warfare.* There is one fact which secular pacifism takes too easily, or fails to explain at all: how is it that so many rulers and politicians are quite ready

to acknowledge that war is a great evil, and that, nevertheless, they do not refrain from warfare? These people invariably think that the existence of their state is such a high good, that it cannot be sacrificed for the ideal of a life of peace. In this, I think they are right. The existence of political organization is absolutely necessary for society. Since the existence of the social group is the necessary condition for the development of civilization, and since civilization is the end which man, as a rational being, lives for, political organization must be accepted as a necessity.

But, as we have shown, the motive which is at the bottom of political life is the will for domination rather than the wish to maintain social life. It is by the mercy of God that such a purpose results in the coming into existence of bodies politic. God has so constituted this world that the will for domination finds itself compelled, for its own sake, to self-limitation, the results of which are the legal order of the body politic and the ruler's care for his subjects.

Yet another problem arises now, namely, why does the political ruler, who unwillingly only serves alien ends, find himself induced to strive after power? The answer is that man realizes instinctively that his life in this world is bound by the necessities which nature and history impose upon him. As a rational being he feels, on the other hand, that he should determine himself by his own will and reason. He can delude himself, temporarily, about the slavery of his existence, by flying to the country for beauty, or to philosophical speculation, or by forgetting this world, for a while, in love or drunkenness. But sooner or later he will realize that this " freedom of the spirit " cannot do away with the bondage of necessity which regulates all his activities in this world. The only outlet for his desire for freedom and independence seems to be in his relations with his fellow men: by dominating them he both frees himself

from their influence and obtains increased resources for his attacks on natural necessities. Yet as we have seen, political power itself implies a certain limitation of the ruler's freedom. War, then, is man's ultimate and most desperate attempt to give himself the feeling of freedom. By the complete disregard which is shown in war for the interests of the enemy body politic, the ruler (or the fighting nation) may, for a certain time, obtain a pleasant feeling of entire freedom. This explains the fact that wars for the endangered or lost freedom of a nation are fought with particular enthusiasm. Yet, by what great illusion is man deceived, when he hopes to break the fetters of necessity by waging war! Even, as within the body politic, the dominion of the ruling group calls forth the resentment of the subjects, and by inner necessity leads to its own overthrow, so in international life the victory of one nation gives birth to the spirit of revenge in the heart of the adversary. The independence which the fighting nation seemed to enjoy during the war reveals its illusory character on the day after the conclusion of peace.

(b) *The World and the Kingdom of God.* War itself makes manifest that, although man has been destined to be free, he has lost his freedom, and that the whole of his life is determined by necessity. All idealistic assertions identify the subjective feeling of inner freedom with that independence of total existence to which man naturally aspires, and for which he has been destined by God.

No process of natural development leads back to this freedom. The more things man knows, and the greater the works are which he is able to perform, the more he will realize how entirely he depends on natural necessities. It is only God himself who can restore man's freedom, and he does so in that holy history which he carries on in this world, and which centers in Jesus Christ. Its aim is to es-

tablish the kingdom of God in this world. Christ himself overcomes the powers of necessity, and thus restores freedom to those who follow him. Those who are not willing to recognize the basic antagonism between the world and the kingdom of God will not be able to grasp what we have to say about Christian peacemaking, but on the other hand, we do not see what hope they can entertain for establishing real peace in this world.

This world does not develop with an inherent necessity toward the kingdom of God, nor do men by nature want to enter into it. Its power is wielded over this world and transforms it; but this is done by a special activity of God himself in history. He calls people into his kingdom, and those who accept this call are enabled to share the power of the kingdom. The kingdom is not something beyond this world; Christ reigns here on earth; but it is a new sphere of conditions of life which differ fundamentally from those of the world where Christ does not yet reign.

Thus we have to distinguish between those things which we must do because we depend still on the necessities of this world, and those things which can and ought to be done because we are free. This distinction determines our attitude towards the body politic. Its existence is due to the necessities of this world, and although we have to recognize its usefulness, we cannot call it good, if by " good " we mean the standard of the kingdom.

Since political life belongs to the " realm of necessity " (the world apart from Christ), we are unable directly to apply the Christian standards of right life to the body politic and its actions. There is, of course, a great difference between good and bad politics; but we measure this value by the political ends aimed at. The good ruler will subordinate his own interests to the good of the body politic; the bad one seeks his own satisfaction. The good citizen

accepts political dominion as a necessity and obeys the authorities for the sake of the group; the bad citizen tries to get as much profit as possible out of the political order. But "good politics" do not really transcend the realm of necessity; being collective, rather than individual, self-assertion and egotism, they represent but the conscious recognition of the necessity which has brought about political organization.

The Sermon on the Mount describes the life of freedom with Christ; but one cannot govern a country according to its standards; for this involves the readiness to renounce the will for power, and would lead immediately to the dissolution of its political order. This would be against the will of God, who has not willed to take us out of this evil world but rather bids us live a life of faith within it, notwithstanding the necessities which still oppress us. Thus even a Christian ruler, beyond giving legal recognition to the church and Christian religion, will not differ essentially from a non-Christian "good ruler." Even a Christian ruler finds himself compelled to oppose "unjustified" claims of his neighbors, although this refusal may lead to war.

Thus from the Christian point of view the state or political organization is neither good nor bad; it is a necessity inherent in the life of this world, but which will be replaced, and gradually is already being replaced, by the life in God's kingdom. Since war is inevitable in political life in an evil world, its existence must be accepted as one of the conditions under which God wants us to live on this earth. War reminds us that we are sinners, that as a result of our sin we are fettered by the necessities of life and that, therefore, perfect happiness is denied to us in this world. But this is but one aspect of the problem of war, namely, that viewed from the point of our bondage. More important is the

other aspect from the point of view of our freedom in Christ.

(c) *The Agent of History.* The fact that Christians in our day are so reluctant to recognize the fundamental difference between the world and the kingdom of God, is due to a wrong view of man. Under the influence of Greek philosophy, man, either as individual, or as a social national group, or as mankind, is regarded as the sole agent of history. Thus it is thought that the meaning of social life and of history depends entirely on man's efforts and the quality of his actions.

True Christian belief implies that God, in creating a world, has imparted to it a certain amount of independence. However great may be the influence of natural and historical factors on human life, man in all ages has been free, and still is free in one respect, and in one only, viz. to consent freely to the call of God, or to consent equally freely to the bondage of necessity. But once he has made his choice for a life without God, he has lost his freedom.

The New Testament shows us that within God's creation there is temporarily a duality; a conflict is going on between those forces of nature and history which are unwilling to serve the final goal of creation on the one hand, and the personal work of divine salvation in Christ on the other hand. Thus the *militant* character of the work of Christ is the outstanding feature of the gospel. Christ is not merely the principle of goodness; he is above all, victor!

This fact is overlooked by many pacifists, although they believe they are good Christians. Yet they speak of the love of God in Christ as if it were a moral example set to mankind, rather than his activity in history. A similar fault is found underlying the idea of " orders of creation," and to a certain extent that of a " natural law." Both of them overlook the militant character of God's activity.

(d) *The Place of War in Christian Experience.* It is only now that we are in a position to pass a judgment on war. We have shown that war is tied up with political life in an indissoluble way, and thus has the character of historical necessity, and also that political life itself belongs to the world which is to be overcome by the kingdom of Christ. This complex situation explains the perplexity of the non-Christian. Sometimes war is regarded as the greatest of all evils, the scourge of mankind, and at other times it is welcomed as being the way out of greater evils, such as slavery or ignominy. This perplexity of non-Christians has had its effect upon Christian thought. This, I think, is the reason why Christians are still so far from unanimity in their judgment on war.

War becomes a Christian problem by the fact that it checks effectively our Christian freedom. Christ has enabled us so to love our fellow men as to overcome prejudices, fears, contempt, envy, and hate, which to the non-Christian are natural and insurmountable barriers to love. But we know by experience that we cannot wage war and, at the same time, love our enemies. When our country is involved in war it is natural for us to wish that it should be victorious; and yet we cannot, as Christians, say that our country has a greater claim on our love than have the enemies. This would be precisely the contrary of the universal conception of love which Christ has taught us. He bids each one of us as individuals to love the enemy, despite his attacks, and to show him our love by our actions. We should frankly admit that it is impossible for a Christian to take part in war and, at the same time, to love his enemies in such a way. In wartime, enmity comes upon us as a fate from outside. We are made enemies irrespective of personal relationships, because our countries are at war. This coercion is felt particularly strongly in modern times, when

wars are fought on a national basis, and when the whole population is legally bound to take part in them, or at least, to break off all relationships which formerly may have existed with members of the enemy nation.

It is this inescapable enmity which makes war a Christian problem, and which gives it its special place in Christian life. The element of coercion constitutes the specific character of war, and the urgency of the Christian problem of war. In all other kinds of enmity (e.g., in personal relationships, in economic and social life) its cause is to be sought in one's free will, rather than in the coercion of circumstances, or — as is the case in economic competition — the enmity affects one department of life only, and leaves ample opportunities for friendship and love among rival competitors. War, on the other hand, tends towards totality, and those limitations of its total character, as the international recognition of the Red Cross, or the Hague convention on land warfare, are dictated by the desire for the decrease of one's own losses and damages, rather than by friendship or love of the enemies.

It is of supreme importance for a fruitful discussion of the problem of war that, among Christians, its Christian aspect should serve as a starting point. It is the freedom of our love which is at stake. All other reasons that can be preferred against war have only a secondary importance for Christians.

It is true, e.g., that modern warfare is particularly cruel, and that the new technical weapons threaten both civilians and combatants. But if the emphasis is laid on cruelty, people are led to naïve attempts to " humanize " war. Yet a less cruel war would still be a compulsory enmity, and the " bloodless " way of economic warfare does not differ fundamentally from military actions. Similarly, if war is attacked as being a danger to modern civilization, the ques-

tion might be asked, whether it is not by the permanent present social and economic conditions, rather than by an incidental war, that civilization is endangered. Moreover, would it not be true to say that modern warfare is the direct outcome of the blatant selfishness and barbarity of this perverted and purposeless civilization? Still other adversaries of war point to its immoral accompaniments, such as "lying, tricking, and subterfuge." But over against this reproach, its defenders will rightly insist on the virtues shown in war, and claim that they compensate for its immoralities. We may regret that many of the virtues shown in wartime seem to be absent in peace, but we need not, therefore, ignore their existence or disparage them.

I do not think that from the Christian point of view we should regard as unsubstantial all other objections which are raised against war. But we must not base our judgment on them.

(e) *The Sin of War.* It might be objected that our interpretation of the war situation is bound to lead to resignation and quietism. This would be true if our judgment was the result of sociological speculations, rather than of an experience of our hearts. If I feel the impulse of the love of Christ in my heart, I am no longer able to accept war as an inevitable fact, but rather find myself compelled to recognize that (1) my participation in war, although it is due to the compulsion of the government, is sin, and (2) although war deprives me of my freedom in my direct dealings with the enemies of my country, I am not absolutely powerless. Christ offers me opportunities of showing my love indirectly and thus enables me to contribute effectively to the disappearance of war.

Waging war is sin; but its sinful nature can be recognized only by those who feel the love of Christ in their hearts. For they are the only people (1) to admit that they have

their share in the outbreak of the war, quite apart from any political responsibility, and (2) to recognize that, for a nation, war is a wrong way to deal with her neighbors.

(1) Although from the legal point of view, it is the government or the ruling group of a country which is responsible for the outbreak of war, the rest of the nation has its full share in their decision. A nation is a whole, and a government declares war, or accepts a declaration of war, when they think the conditions of their country make it necessary or advisable. Each of us has contributed to such a state of things. Our growing demands for social improvements, e.g., lead to tension in economic life, to increased competition, to higher tariffs; our participation in political life helps to augment the antagonism between the political parties, and strengthens their will for dominion. This inevitably leads to a less reconciliatory attitude in international life. It can be shown that, however remote from international life our activities in social life may seem to be, they have their effects upon the leading group's will to dominate, and thus contribute to the outbreak of war. The mere fact that we regard the existence of our country as the foundation upon which our hope for happiness, security, success, and legal order rest is significant; for this is the basis upon which the dominion of the ruling group is built. I may decline legal responsibility for the outbreak of war, but must accept moral responsibility. I cannot escape this responsibility by separating myself from my country. For not only will my past actions have their influence upon its future behavior as well, but also it is true that, wherever I go, I shall live in a body politic. This is not only a historical fact, I must wish that it may be so! For I cannot develop my human nature apart from society, and society in turn cannot exist without political organization.

(2) Moreover, those only who feel the love of Christ will

understand that war is sin. They know that there is no true life apart from Him, and they see that war manifests in the clearest way the inherent tendency of mankind to arrange life in its own right and without Christ. Individuals as well as groups and states are not self-sufficient entities. Everything in this world is made to contribute to the well-being of others, because it owes existence and possibility of development to them. War is not merely a refusal to recognize such an obligation, it is the deliberate attempt of a body politic to foster its own well-being one-sidedly, and at the expense of the enemy.

The recognition of the original nature of war can rest only on such a clear fact of Christian experience as the freedom of our love. Those who reject war on the ground that it is incompatible with certain moral laws, will find themselves quickly opposed by all kinds of sophisms. As long as we start from a command we move on the plane of rational argumentation, and thus the sinful dialectic of our heart easily enables us to escape the real issue. It is only when we appeal to a man's experience of love, that we can ask him to examine himself whether he is able to extend his love to enemies in wartime. Moreover, it is only from this experience of his freedom in Christ that a man can acknowledge his responsibility for war. From the point of view of the law, necessity excludes responsibility, and man is thus without blame.

War is not merely a check to our Christian freedom, it is at the same time a real harm done to our Christian life. As does every sin it infects the whole nature. Quite apart from the obvious immoral accompaniments of war, it chills in a man his love for Christ.

The evil of war affects not merely the individual soldier's life; it has the same effect upon all the non-combatants as well. It creates an atmosphere of hatred, contempt of the

enemy, and disregard for his interests, the influence of which it is almost impossible to escape. This has its harmful repercussions in national life as well. The spirit of enmity poisons everybody's heart.

Not even the church is immune against this danger. In the Christian era war is, in the first place, an attack on the unity of the church. Notwithstanding its world-wide character, it finds itself compelled to break off relations with the churches of the enemy country. In addition, the spirit of enmity among its members creeps into the church itself and blurs the purity of its teaching and practice.

5. THE DIVINE INITIATIVE

(a) *The Need for Redemption.* At first sight, our interpretation of the Christian's situation in war seems to be contradictory. If we are responsible for the outbreak of war, must it not be possible for us to overcome the menace of war? If, on the other hand, our participation in war is due to coercion, how can our activity be called sin? But this seeming inconsistency is due to the fact that as the disciples of Christ we live in two worlds. We are destined to be children of the kingdom, and already have been given its first-fruits; but we live yet in this world, and cannot escape the influence of the powers governing it. Yet there is one fundamental difference between our situation and that of a non-Christian: the necessities of this world are no longer capable of deceiving us.

Those who acquiesce in the nature of this world and argue: "What is natural is therefore right," have not yet understood what it means that Christ is victor and Lord. There is in certain trends of continental theology a far too easy distinction between the spirit of love as the standard of private life and *Sachlichkeit* and *Realpolitik,* that is to say, reckless pursuance of self-assertive ends, in public life.

The fact that in the present situation it is God's will that we are still hampered by the necessities of an unredeemed world, must not mislead us into the belief that these necessities are good. Thus we have to recognize the worldly character of political organization, although we cannot reject its claims as long as its existence is indispensable for a society which has not yet been brought entirely and totally to Christ. Hence we cannot deny that, in the given circumstances, it is legitimate for the state to use coercion, and even to command its citizens to harm and kill its enemies, and yet, we must see in such an injunction not a divine but a diabolic necessity.

On the other hand, it is for this very reason that the individual Christian cannot bring about a fundamental change in the situation. We can advocate and carry out reforms in political and international life, by which conditions that have become intolerable or senseless are rendered tolerable. But such reforms are never more than temporary palliatives, because the underlying necessity persists, and will result in a short time in similar situations. Yet there is no reason for despair. While, as individuals, we feel how utterly powerless we are, Christ is at work to bring about that complete change of human conditions which will prepare for his second coming. If only we follow him we shall, therefore, be able to find a way out of our difficulties and perplexities. But his way is not one of political action. For as long as we try to impugn war by political means we move in the political sphere, and however strong may be our influence in political, social, or economic life, we are unable to escape the inherent necessities (*Eigengesetzlichkeit*) of the body politic. For then we start from the assumption that its existence is absolutely necessary. It has always been puzzling for Christians to notice that Our Lord did not attack the things of this world in

a direct way. But this was right, because the things of this world are necessary for the present phase of existence only. This is the reason why Christ was not a politician or social reformer nor an educationalist. It is only when we follow his way of facing the problems indirectly, that we shall be able to take effective action, despite the necessities of political life, and that we can hope for a future that is really better.

This Christian hope differs fundamentally from both quietism and activism. The quietist thinks that nothing can be done, since circumstances are stronger than man. The activist holds that good will is sufficient to overcome even the greatest obstacles. A Christian recognizes that the impediments in the way to a perfect world are insurmountable for man. But he knows that God can and will overcome them, and that it is man's duty to follow his Lord in this way. The cross of Christ is a token of victory; for it reminds us of the resurrection of Our Lord. Christ has overcome the prince of this world and his allied powers. We may not yet see or feel this peace, but the victory has already been won. Nevertheless this period of history is the reign of the crucified Lord. That is to say, that his victories, in and through his followers, are won by suffering. There is no hope that crime and wars and sufferings will disappear from the world until the Lord comes again. We must, therefore, avoid the mistake of an evolutionist interpretation of the cross. There is no hope of complete peace for the world as long as history goes on. But on the other hand, there is no reason for resignation. Christ quite definitely wins his battles in history. The fact that the resistance of his adversaries increases bears testimony to their desperate position only, not to their strength. It is already possible to point to the victories of Christ in history. The tragic attitude of certain idealists who regard life as a con-

tinually renewed fight, but not with definite victory, is certainly not that of Christian hope. It is the paradox of Christian hope which is at the basis of Christian peacemaking.

(b) *Holy History.* Jesus Christ is the prince of peace, and we are peacemakers who receive the benediction of the Lord, if we allow him to carry on his work in us. The gospel is good tidings, it is the offer of a divine gift; and only by our readiness to receive it can we cooperate with Christ in his work of peacemaking. Where man is fettered entirely by the necessities of political life, the risen Lord is active to restore his lost freedom. This is done by Christ's activity in the church. By church we understand "the whole work of Christ in history"; the change which he has wrought out in the individual believers' hearts, and the organization of Christian life which has resulted. Thus in Christ all denominations and churches are one, and all believers are one in him as members of his church; yet they form the church only in as far as they are aware of, and willing to recognize, this oneness. That is to say: the individual is in Christ when he feels impelled to be the messenger of his love as manifested in historical, organized Christianity.

In and through his church, Christ displays an activity which cannot be affected or hampered by political life, and which nevertheless exercises a profound influence upon it. We do not deny that the empirical churches have frequently submitted to the influence of political powers: but this influence has never been so strong as to cause to be discarded from the life of the church the readiness to receive unreservedly the gifts of Christ. And it is by these gifts that the church remains powerful over against the necessities of political life.

The work of Christ consists in spreading the message of

his work of salvation, his death and resurrection all over the world. This is done in a historical process by means of his church. God purports to make all mankind his children by calling them into the fellowship of his church. By its activity he overcomes the spirit of enmity and rivalry, and communicates his peace to men. Thus in his worship he unifies people of different standing, age, sex, and race with various and antagonistic political views and rival economic and social interests. History shows that this church is the dynamic center of human life.

This historical function of the church explains the paradoxical fact that the heathen is bound by cogent logical reasoning to regard the body politic as invested with absolute authority, and that, nevertheless, the Christian must reject the absoluteness of the claims of the state. Such a view makes it impossible for us to speak of the divine mission of a nation, and to pretend that it is in the service of God that she has to take up arms against her neighbors. Nations have divine missions merely when appointed by God to the propagation of the gospel. In this sense, Israel has had a divine mission: so had the Roman Empire in the early days of the church, Ireland in the Dark Ages, Germany in the sixteenth century, or the Anglo-Saxon countries in modern time on the mission field. But for this purpose no warfare is required.

The existence of nations and their differences are not entirely meaningless from the Christian point of view. But nations differ from the church by the fact that the church has an eternal mission, while they are destined to disappear after a certain time. They all in their variety reveal the richness of the creative will of God, and all of them are used by God for his purposes. But the only thing the presence of which is required perpetually in history is the gospel of Christ. Moreover, since the " means of

grace " of the church are an essential element of the work of the risen Lord, no political or social group can replace the church. Thus the only way by which the peace of Christ can be brought to mankind is by actions within the church. No measure on the political field can overcome war, because war itself is the direct outcome of the principle underlying political life. On the other hand the work of peace done by the church is not useless, although it seems to ignore the political aspect of the war problem. It is not in itself political activity, but it bears its fruits in the political realm. For whatever happens in the church is done by people who are at the same time members of a body politic, and thus it has its effects upon their dealings with one another. The more the church is anxious to be nothing but Christ's church, and the more carefully it confines itself to a purely spiritual dealing with political problems, the more effectively will it bring the peace of Christ to the state.

Such an emphasis laid on the church does not exclude individual initiative, nor does it lead to political indifference. But it puts first things first, and preserves us from unchristian subjectivism. Christian peacemaking requires all the zeal and love of Christ's followers. But the success does not depend on our religious efforts, if these are measured by the amount of time and energy spent on them. It depends exclusively on the work of the risen Lord operating in us, and on the amount of our readiness to live only in him. By his incarnation he has shown that he wants to carry on his work in a historical way, and thus has placed a huge responsibility upon our shoulders. But at the same time he has imparted to us a power much superior to that of earthly necessities. The more we remember that in him we are already one, and the more we are willing to receive from him all the gifts which in the church he has placed at our disposal, and by which he has promised to sustain us in

our frailty, the more efficient will be our peacemaking. It is not merely a rhetorical saying that his followers reign with him in this world. Yet paradoxically enough, we rule the world only when we live and work in it. The more we expose ourselves to its hardships and necessities, the more triumphantly do we overcome it. The abstentionist and the hermit want to come to peace by their own efforts. Although they may feel inner mental peace, it is not the real peace of Christ, which is rather peace in a world of trouble and enmity. They may have strength to overcome their passions, but they do not reign. Their attitude is due to a lack of confidence in Christ and thus they condemn themselves to impotence and ineffectiveness.

Those on the other hand who base their whole life on the gifts of Christ are victorious even in situations where their own achievements will appear quite inadequate. Even when our love is faint and our zeal lukewarm, even if we do not see how, in a world of selfishness and hate, the message of Christ can operate, the gospel is a working power. It is by the strength of its inherent truth, which is nothing else but the activity of Christ himself, that it carries out its work successfully.

Christian peacemaking seems an absurdity. Is it not foolishness to preach the gospel of peace in situations where there is no opportunity of applying it practically, for example, in war times or in a period of increasing rearmament? It would indeed be useless if we paid it mere lip-service and did not accompany our message by certain acts which manifest that to us the peace of Christ is already a reality. We shall show now how this can be done.

This " foolishness of the cross " is the main stumbling-block to most Christians. So much are we all impressed by the appearances of this world, that we prefer methods which seem to yield immediate results. We are surprised after-

wards — as most Christian pacifists were, for example, last year after the collapse of the League of Nations — that despite our energy and our zeal, our work has been a failure.

6. CHRISTIAN PEACEMAKING

(a) *The Way of Love.* Christians ought to recognize that waging war is sin, and that in war the nature of sin, namely, the lack of consideration for our neighbor, is shown in the most brutish and unscrupulous way. But we must not for this reason think it is our principal task to decry war and its evil after-effects. It is not necessary to be a Christian to be aware of the evils of war. Our task is a positive one. We are called to be in this world the messengers of Christ's redeeming love and to bear testimony to it by our life. This involves a protest against war. The church's rejection of war should be unambiguous and visible to everybody. One reason why the church's work for peace is not evaluated sufficiently — although it operates all the time — is the fact that the message of the church shows frequently a wrong adaptation to secular mentality and terminology.

The Christian problem is not how to limit the use of violence in political life, or how to avert the atrocities of aerial warfare, but how to introduce constructive forces into the life of the body politic. The one thing this world needs more than all programs of a new international order, is the peace of Christ. Peacemaking, therefore, is our paramount duty.

The predominance of an anti-war ideology has had fatal influence upon Christian peacemaking. The reason why most types of pacifism are entirely barren is that they induce people to pledge themselves not to fight, or to oppose the outbreak of a war, rather than to work now and here for Christian peace. Moreover, as a result of the one-sided emphasis laid on military warfare, we overlook our responsibil-

ity for the fact that the attitude of our own country and our own behavior may be the main cause why another country goes to war. Furthermore, since we all have our share in the developments of political life, the problem concerns not merely those who will be called upon to take up arms, but every Christian. The problem has, of course, different aspects for men and women, children and aged people, but the issue is the same for all, namely, how can we communicate Christ's gift of peace and love to our fellow men? Finally, the problem of war must not be isolated from the other forms of enmity in private and social life. By wars the nature of social life and the devastating effects of enmity are made manifest in the most visible way. But it is the same will for dominion, and the same spirit of enmity and lack of consideration for our neighbor's good, which are at work in the conflict between generations, in economic disputes, in social prejudices, or in the rival attempts of our newspapers to influence public opinion.

Thus, our main task consists in bearing testimony to the love of Christ both by teaching it, and in the practice of Christian life. This love of Christ is not an intensification of earthly love. It differs from it rather by a reversing of the process by which we love our friends. Love of Christ is acceptance of the love which Christ has shown towards us, acceptance of the ways in which he leads us, and thus readiness to see all things and all men from Christ-ward. We cannot attain to such love when we do not forget for some time ourselves and all the things of the world, and concentrate all our thoughts on Christ and his work. Here lies the initial difficulty of Christian peacemaking. We are so deeply convinced of the " rottenness of war " that we wish to act immediately, and in our impatience forget to acquire, in silence and prayer, the necessary strength from Christ.

Love makes sacrifices for other people, but does not ex-

pect them to make a similar sacrifice. It is not a Christian attitude, therefore, to say: " World peace is so important that I am ready to sacrifice for it the power, the prestige, the wealth, and even the lives of my nation." For I have no right to sacrifice what does not properly belong to me. I cannot even argue as a Christian: " Our country must make a sacrifice for the sake of peace." All I am justified in saying as a Christian is this: " I have made a sacrifice for the sake of peace. You who pretend to be Christians, follow my example; believe me, it will be a good thing."

Similarly, nonviolence must not be identified with Christian love. For it is a means of enforcing one's will upon other people; it engenders new antagonism and hate, as long as it is not the counterfoil of a positive attitude, namely, love which serves the neighbors' interest without asking whether one's own interest will be fostered or impaired.

Christian peacemaking needs patience and devotion. There is nothing thrilling in it as there is in war. It is not surprising that people get enthusiastic about war. There is adventure and romance, greatness and liberty. All that is required for the satisfaction of a man's natural aspirations is found abundantly in warfare. The only way by which we can overcome the lure of the world, which seems so much more attractive than holy history, is by pointing to the love of Christ, who did not seek his own satisfaction, but how he might save the world. Christ is always strong enough to win him disciples; and the more we picture nothing but Christ before our contemporaries, his hidden greatness and beauty and love, the more shall we enable him to overcome the deceit of the world.

(b) *Individual Peacemaking.* What precisely does Christian peacemaking mean for each of us? It is the love of Christ which brings about in our heart that peace of

God which passes all understanding. This peace of God is a spiritual good; but we cannot say for this reason that it has no bearing upon political life. For it transforms our whole outlook in life; and since we do not live two different lives, one in religious and one in daily life, this peace must radiate into all departments of our life. But on the other hand, it is necessary to preserve the spiritual character of God's peace. Hence in the first place, we have to shift the emphasis from the political to the private sphere. It is of the greatest importance for world peace that in our individual relations in daily life we should show love, care, and consideration for our fellow men, and should work for cooperation and reconciliation. No friction, no tension must be regarded as natural or inevitable; each of them is a call by which Christ bids us manifest his power. Are we anxious to pursue our own rights and interests, or are we inspired by a desire to help others to the vision of the glorious kingdom of God? The militant pacifist cuts a very bad figure, and one which is rather repulsive to those whom he wants to convert.

But when we examine the mentality by which we read the news of the daily papers which mainly depict the results of enmity in the world, can we say that we deeply deplore this state of affairs and that we have but one great wish, namely, that his kingdom might come? Our indifference reveals both our lack of love and our lack of belief in Christ's power.

Certainly not in every case are we in a position to show our love directly; but there is no situation in which we cannot pray for those who live in, or suffer from, the will for dominion and enmity. Most conflicts could be settled easily if only we decided to bring them before God in common prayer. In prayer the peace of Christ is apprehended in the most visible way, and there is no Christian who does

not have access to prayer, and no situation in the life of Christians where prayer is impossible. If Christians did nothing else but make frequent use of the prayer of reconciliation and repentance, much would already be done for the peace of the world. The love which we have been unable to show directly to our fellow-men does its work indirectly in our prayers. For they become a part of the life of the risen Lord, and are thus made operative.

In comparison with this ordinary daily peacemaking, political pacifism is of secondary importance. It should be left to a far greater extent to those who have extensive knowledge of political life and facts. Those who happen to know members of foreign nations should try to attain to a better mutual understanding of the respective viewpoints of their nations. The more clearly the existing antagonisms are realized and the more profoundly the difficulty of political peacemaking is felt, the greater is the hope that the mutual relations of nations will be dealt with realistically and without hypocrisy.

It is on such a basis only that we shall be able to fight effectively the lies, defamations, and disparagement which poison international relations.

What should Christians do when war breaks out? The average Christian should take up arms when he is ordered to do so. All his life long he has regarded his country and its political organization as the natural basis of his own existence. He has contributed to the mentality which has created a situation in which war became inevitable. Hence it would be inconsistent and a lack of gratitude towards his country if he refused to fight for it. But it will be our Christian obligation then to feel deep shame and to repent sincerely that we have allowed things to develop in a way which has made war inevitable. For a Christian there is no reason for glorifying war or his participation in it. If we

take part in war in such a spirit, the enthusiasm of our comrades will not overwhelm us, it will only help to make more fervent our prayers for the triumph of the love of Christ.

(c) *The Prophetic Protest.* Most Christian pacifists, especially in the Anglo-Saxon countries, will regard such an advice as a betrayal of Christian principles. To me it seems to be important that a Christian's attitude towards war should be in accordance with his whole life. We cannot, as most of us do, acquiesce in the dominion of political necessities in peace time and suddenly dissociate ourselves from our country in wartime, as those suggest who have pledged themselves not to fight in any war.

The machinery of democratic systems too easily creates the impression that those in opposition are not responsible for the actions of the government. In fact, each of us has his full share in the outbreak of a war. There are but differences of degree. Those who in peace time have worked for reconciliation, justice, and understanding both in their nation and among nations, may be said to be less responsible. But those only who were absolutely sinless would be justified in declining any responsibility for the conflict in which their own nation was involved. This is the reason why general propaganda for nonparticipation in a future war seems to me inappropriate. This does not mean that the refusal to take up arms is wrong in every case. There may be individuals who at the moment of the outbreak of a war are called personally by God to stand against their nations as a prophetic protest and to refuse to take any part in the war. But it is not likely that God will call to such a work men who have not devoted their whole life in peace time to the service of God's love. Their credentials will be their willingness to accept even the severest punishments of the state. Such a refusal has a symbolic meaning. It brings home to the nation that war is a sin, and that Chris-

tians should not be enslaved by sin. But the man who has been called by God to utter such a protest must not think he is morally better than his fellow men. It is the divine call, not his perfection, which has enabled him to carry out his mission. I cannot help feeling that too many of those who are unwilling to fight in another war, have taken such a decision without careful previous self-examination. Was it their own disgust with war or the constraining love and the special call of God that brought them to their decision? Yet on the other hand, however imperfect, confused, or even erroneous the attitude of such Christians may be, the churches certainly have no right to join in their condemnation. For while these men apply a Christian principle in an inadequate way, their adversaries fight them on non-Christian principles. If the church joins in this kind of anti-pacifism it destroys its own foundations. We have to bear with these brothers, however troublesome they may be at the time.

There are other men who for religious reasons abhor every form of violence. For them it would be a bad thing to be compelled to serve in the army. The churches should use their influence upon the governments so as to procure for these people an alternative to military service. But such men should not believe that they are less responsible for the outbreak of a war, or that working in an office during the war is not warfare. In modern days, when war has come to involve the whole nation, every man at home works as much for his country's triumph as do the soldiers on the battlefield. An absolute refusal to do public service during a war would be in the majority of cases an unchristian attitude. It may be questioned whether the government has a right to compel their subjects to kill other people. But because every man and woman who lives within a body politic enjoys at least the protection of its legal order, the

state cannot be denied the right to claim the services, the goods, and the lives of its citizens.

(d) *Church and Peace.* Experience has shown that friendly contacts between the individuals of different nations have but very slight effects upon the political relations of their respective bodies politic and do not form an effective obstacle at all to the outbreak of a war. For wars are conflicts of collective organization, not of individuals, and we know that the individual within his collectivity acts and reacts in a way quite different from his personal sympathies and antipathies. Hence it becomes manifest how important it is for Christian peacemaking that it should be done within the Church. While the state pays but little attention to the private activities of its citizens, it cannot neglect the work of the church which is a public organism quite apart from its legal recognition.

What can the churches do for peace beyond what is done by their members? First of all, they should be conscious of their dignity as the body of Christ on earth, and they should offer daily prayers of thanksgiving and praise for the fact that God himself is at work in history, and that he has created the churches as a place of freedom within a world of necessity. When the churches are not aware of their dignity and their privileges no effective work for peace can be done.

As in individual Christian life, the main contribution of the church to the peace of the world consists in what the church does as a church, quite apart from political considerations. Christ himself creates unity among the members of his church and overcomes their dissensions and enmities. The very existence of Christian congregations is a bulwark of peace in this world.

How important is, for example, the respect and understanding which the church shows to all its members! The

solution of the color problem, the smooth relation between a conquering nation and the native people, will be prepared for by the kind and loving intercourse within Christian congregations. Have you already fully realized what it means internationally that the German churches in recent years have refused so gallantly to dissociate themselves from their non-Aryan members? No other church can now approve of them without taking more seriously the problems of race and nationality within its own boundaries. Although such steps have no political bearing in themselves, they will transform the political outlook of the members of the respective churches.

The church differs from other organizations by the fact that the fellowship of its members has a supernatural basis. This creates quite a specific type of fellowship. We are, of course, aware of its imperfections, and we deplore them. Yet notwithstanding our failures and our frequent lack of real love, we are sustained in our fellowship by the message, the sacramental gifts, and the discipline of the church. These means of grace create a spirit of charity, sympathy, mutual care and understanding, forgiveness and sacrifice, which does much to assuage existing tensions and antagonisms between its members. Such sentiments are not felt only towards the members of one's own church. Organizations such as the Save The Children Fund, the Church Entr'aide, or the Gustav-Adolph-Verein have largely helped Christians to overcome a narrow conception of nationalism.

The development of the spirit of fellowship is fostered by the church's continual call to repentance. This is a very important corrective to unfriendly feelings, and of a kind such as no other type of organization possesses.

The fellowship of the church is a fact, not merely an ideal or a postulate. On the other hand it is far from being perfect. Christians should realize more than they usually do

what it means for the pacific mission of the church to set an example of how enmity and will for dominion can be overcome, and they should be intensely troubled by the fact that lack of fellowship within the congregation is not merely sin, but also a real harm done to a mankind which is so desirous to receive constructive assistance in its passionate longing for peace.

There is still another aspect of church life which makes for peace in the political sphere without being political itself, viz., its missionary activity, and connected with it, the ecumenical movements. The universal tendency of Christian missions points to the unity of mankind, and it has done much to overcome hate and prejudices. Missionary work implies the recognition that the pagan is called to become our brother, and to enjoy equal status in the church. The smoothing effect of the missionaries' work has not always been recognized. But the fact is that e.g., the unity of Europe in the Middle Ages, and the peaceful conditions in modern Africa, are due to the spread of the gospel. The effects of the economic and political expansion of the Western nations would have been far more detrimental than they are but for the fact that the church has followed them and worked for reconciliation and mutual recognition. Interest in missionary work will influence the international outlook of a congregation, and lack of interest will paralyze the belief in the unity to which mankind is called by Christ.

Historically, and in their ultimate aim, the ecumenical movements are closely connected with Christian missions. They are meant to manifest the unity of the disciples of Christ in the relations which the churches have with one another. They owe their origin to the recognition that indifference or rivalry between the churches is incompatible with the fact that the fountain of their existence and the

agent of their activities is Jesus Christ himself. For however legitimate may have been the cause which has led to the formation of different churches, it is realized now that their differences must not be regarded as so fundamental as to make impossible mutual relations and recognition. The ecumenical movement implies the belief that unity of the church does not mean uniformity, and that it is the great miracle of the love of Christ that the variety of religious life, far from being a source of antagonism and misunderstandings, now becomes a manifestation of the richness of his life. It is surprising to see how much churches have already learnt from one another during the short period of intense ecumenical activity.

The significance which ecumenism has for world peace can hardly be overrated. It gives to mankind a most important lesson about the nature of unity and peace. War is due, as we have seen, to the fact that nations or political groups regard their existence as metaphysically self-sufficient. The ecumenical movements reveal the fallacy of such a view. They recognize the empirical differences in mankind as an undeniable fact, but also the unity which mankind is called to become and which Christ is bringing about.

Ecumenism is a movement for spiritual unity of the church. Mr. Menn has rightly stressed the distinction between ecumenical and international activities. Yet since most of the churches associated with "Faith and Order" and "Life and Work" are organized on a national basis, their ecumenical relations will have its repercussions in the political field.

The ecumenical movements are the test of the Christian message of peace. How can we expect the world to believe in unity and the possibility of understanding and coopera-

tion in spite of far-reaching divergences in outlook and practice, when the churches themselves are not willing or seem to be unable to give it visible expression?

Apart from the general activity of the church for Christian peace, fellowship, and mutual understanding among her members, there arise occasions in history where the church is called upon to overcome actual hate and enmity. This is particularly the case in wartime. The troubles and enmities of the world should remind the churches above all of their divine resources and of their obligation to make fullest use of them. Then even evils can become a source of blessing to the church. But the success depends entirely on the purity of the church's spiritual outlook, to which political considerations have strictly to be subordinated.

Events during the last two decades have shown how much the churches have to learn in this respect. Mankind did not need churches and religious ministers to discover, e.g., that the attitude of the Italian government towards Abyssinia was a manifest break of treaties and pact obligations. Christians in such a situation should have examined the attitude of their own countries, and asked themselves whether the principles underlying their own policy were so fundamentally different from those of Italy. Moreover, has the protest which so many pacifists raised in that moment been one of pure love of Christ and not rather mingled with naïve self-righteousness? Did we realize at that moment that there were potential enmities between our own nation and others? How far did we suffer from these tensions? How far did we feel responsible for these virtual causes of a future war? Rather than advocate measures to be taken against those who disturb the international order, Christian churches should work for the decrease and disappearance of enmity. How much is there still to be done

in Germany towards Russia, in France towards Germany, in Great Britain towards India, in U.S.A. towards Japan or the Central American States, to give only some instances.

It is true, however, that there is a conception of peace prevailing particularly in France and the Anglo-Saxon countries which is a caricature of Christian peace. The maintenance of the international *status quo* is no Christian ideal; for it would mean the justification of the World War. True peace is more than merely the stoppage of hostilities; it cannot come into existence without the spirit of justice and sacrifice, and, as we have shown, it would be absurd to seek these virtues in political life. It is only by the inspiration of Christ that such mentality can develop. Peace is not, therefore, a state in which one might acquiesce, but rather a continuous and strenuous work to which Christians have to devote themselves.

It is not necessary for the churches to take part in a political action for this purpose. This is a fortunate situation. For political actions on the part of the church, so frequently demanded by pacifists, could be executed only with the consent of all members. The clergy alone, or a majority of laymen, can never commit the whole church in such vital matters. On the other hand, political actions are in almost every case unnecessary, for Christ offers spiritual means to his church which have a profounder and wider-reaching effect.

The churches are always free to offer prayers for the enemies of their nation. Such prayers do not mean that we are indifferent with regard to the interests of our own nation, nor that we dissociate ourselves from it. But saying them in public worship would prevent us from a perversion of Christian belief which was so common in the World War, viz., that Christians in their prayers regarded their nation as the only object worthy of divine care and providence.

It would be unnatural for Christians to pray for their enemies and not for their own country. But we cannot think of Christ without remembering that our Father shows equal love to all his creatures, and thus we ought to be willing not to request goods of God which would harm our neighbors, nor should we wish them to suffer more than we do. Churches must learn to understand that it is our supreme duty to pray for the victory of Christ. Thus the interests of our own country are just in their right place. To pray for the enemies of our country is a very hard and difficult task if it is done honestly. For in such a case we ought to wish that God might show as much mercy and love to them as to our nation. But it would be an enormous progress towards peace if the churches which theoretically affirm their love of peace would manifest such genuine signs of Christian love. Yet such prayers are useless unless they are concrete and unequivocal. Prayers for " the whole of mankind " or " for our enemies " are in almost every case merely verbal. They make no impression, they do not stir up the conscience and help to bear testimony to the peace of Christ, because they imply the refusal to face the actual problems which render Christian love difficult. Yet, should it be impossible, e.g., for the churches of Great Britain to pray, not only for the king, his government and country, but also for Hitler and Mussolini, their governments and countries? Could not similar prayers be offered in Germany for Russia or Czechoslovakia, or in U.S.A. for Japan and Mexico? And if we feel unable to overcome the obstacles which the political authorities raise against such prayers, should we not suffer at least from the fact that we fear to offend the powerful of this world?

All the practices suggested above are practicable immediately. Christian love and Christian peacemaking do not require preliminary conditions in the social and political

field. Their actualization and their result depend exclusively on Christ. Political powers may be reluctant over against, or opposed to, the peace work of the church; the League of Nations and other political endeavors may utterly fail. Nothing can affect the work of Christ which goes on through the ages and will certainly come to its promised end. The application of all these steps need not, therefore, wait " until the whole of public life has been pervaded by the spirit of Christ." Nor do they involve any particular strain for individual Christians or the church. The only things required are the church's readiness to be a church and nothing else, and the individual Christian's recognition that he owes supreme allegiance to Christ. Some fervent pacifists will think that Christian peacemaking, as we have described it, is almost insignificant in comparison with the problem raised before us. But we are not called by Christ to actualize our ambitious ideals by our own efforts, but rather to serve him and to follow his slow but irresistible pace in history, and to accept the opportunities offered to us by himself.

On the other hand, if our peacemaking is the fruit of the " love of Christ that constraineth us " there is no reason why we should be frightened in our impotence by the powers of enmity in this world. For it is Christ who, in and through us, holds his sway over this world.

Surely we know it from Christ's own mouth that there will be wars until his second coming? But we have his promise also that the peacemakers, not the warriors, will be called the sons of God, and that, after all, not the violent and ruthless, but the meek shall inherit the earth.

THE RELIGIOUS BASIS OF PACIFISM

by

CHARLES E. RAVEN

THE RELIGIOUS BASIS OF PACIFISM

THE purpose and scope of this paper, differing widely in character from the other contents of this volume, require a word of explanation. It was prepared as part of the preliminary work for the Oxford Conference in order to stimulate the discussion of the theological issues which underlie the problem of the Christian attitude towards war: it was revised in the light of criticisms received during that discussion: it is now published in order to continue the same process.

The conference was, as has always been recognized, only an incident in a continuous attempt to encourage and assist Christians to clarify their thought as to what Christianity in action involves. We met after a long period of preparation, of local study, and of interchange of documents, in order to discover how far a general basis of agreement existed and what were the chief issues that demanded further and fuller consideration. In some sections of the program it was clear that in spite of underlying differences of doctrinal emphasis there was general agreement as to the main lines of Christian conviction: in these there seemed no serious obstacle to united action. In others where wide divergence in practice was manifest the conference helped to disclose the sources of this divergence, and to fix the points to which further study should be directed. The Report of the Proceedings at Oxford will make it clear that in no part of the field was opinion so deeply divided as on the question of the Christian's conduct as an individual and as a citizen in relation to war. Here, as indeed in all its un-

dertaking, the conference set itself not to make *ex cathedra* pronouncements, but to promote and provide material for further consideration. Probably no single other topic was felt to be at once so important, so complex, and so typical of the whole difficult business of Christian discipleship. Of the gravity of the issues every month supplies further and terrible evidence: of its urgency none of us can be in doubt: of its difficulty both for the thinker and for the man of affairs only those who have not seriously faced it can be unaware. To survey the whole field would demand a volume.

For, as has been increasingly recognized in the course of the past twenty years, the problem raised by war is at once basic and representative. Here in a single concrete issue are focused all the elements which in fact underlie every conflict of loyalties, every attempt to combine dedication to God in Christ with the maintenance of human contacts and obligations. Ultimately a decision involves a range of data as wide as life itself. For its discussion there is need to examine fundamental principles in Christian doctrine and ethics, our conception of the nature and purpose of God as revealed in Christ, our interpretation of sin, and of the means and character of redemption, our concept of the world and of history, our theory of the function of the state, our attitude towards the compromises involved in the attempt to live Christianly in a sinful society. In addition it is necessary to consider a large number of practical and intricate questions regarding the place of force in political life, the proposals and machinery for the promotion of peace, and the experience of recent movements in the sphere of international affairs. To do this thoroughly would be plainly impossible. No one who was present at the conference at Oxford could fail to realize the diversity and the religious worth of the positions there represented. Though the special section entrusted with this subject did

its best to consider and to state briefly and fairly the main differences of conviction, it was evident that only prolonged and united study undertaken not by groups holding a common position, but by Christians of different races and nations, traditions and points of view could do justice to the gravity and difficulty of the theme. It was manifestly impossible in the time and space at our disposal to give a full presentation of the whole matter.

The alternative might seem to be to acknowledge this position, to urge the need for full discussion, and to omit any treatment of the subject in these volumes. Manifestly, this is not possible. To do so would be to suggest that Christians were either unaware of the importance of the issues at stake or afraid to deal with them. It would be to leave the exhortation to study unsupported by any provision of material. After very careful consideration it was decided that the best course would be to publish a paper dealing with the religious aspect of the problem, a paper written from one, and perhaps the simplest, position held by Christians, and to offer this not as in any way expressing the conclusions of the conference but as a concrete means of stimulating discussion and focusing it upon the theological elements which must be the starting-point for any considered decision. Those who study the findings of the conference will recognize that the position here taken was only one of many; that at least three others along with it were carefully examined and briefly stated; and that no suggestion was made that any one of these could be regarded as exclusively Christian or as endorsed by the conference. Indeed the conference, though remarkable for the frankness and friendliness of its discussions, revealed unmistakably the extent and the depth of the existing differences of conviction. It was united in the belief that the church could not acquiesce in the permanent acceptance of these differ-

ences, and in its insistence that they demand the general and sympathetic attention of all Christians.

It is the hope of encouraging such discussion and the belief that it will direct the mind of the church to the basal tenets of its faith that determine the scope of this paper. It is not necessary for such a purpose to examine closely the practical aspect of the church's mission of peacemaking, nor to survey the racial, political, and economic problems which concern the statesmanship of peace, nor to put forward any detailed program for the present critical situation. Our concern is only with the theological and religious convictions which constrain many of us not only to reject all recourse to war as demonstrably an act of apostasy, but to insist that the gospel of Christ inherently and explicitly involves a way of life of which reconciliation is the essential element. Here as elsewhere, it is only by an examination of the fundamentals of our creed that we can reach clear and compelling standards of conduct, and only by obedient discipleship that we can hope to fulfill them: faith determines and grace enables conduct.

It may be well to state as a preliminary that to some of us the issue raised by what is commonly called pacifism seems the crucial problem of our day, and our response to it *articulus stantis aut cadentis ecclesiae*. War in the sense of organized military action affects only one part, but a typical part, of the Christian's task of living out his faith in a largely unconverted world. It may well be that in isolating and concentrating upon it we run the risk of being charged with inconsistency: a similar charge was brought a century ago against the Christians who denounced Negro slavery. But for our generation it is so vivid an experience and, thanks to the increasing interdependence of mankind and the discovery of fresh and irresistible methods of destruction, so obvious a peril as to stand out for us above all other

examples of evil. If in dealing with it we seem to ignore errors in themselves not less damnable, we would reply that in fact progress has always been achieved by concentration upon a particular manifestation of sin, and that, by the effort to overcome it, general principles are disclosed which, if originally applied to one problem, are found to bear also upon the whole range of man's moral life. Thus, for example, the convictions formulated by the opponents of slavery were in the next generation applied to the reform of a far wider number of social and industrial evils. It is our belief that the problem of war illustrates in a manageable compass the central difficulties of the Christian's way of life; that by dealing with it we shall be facing the outstanding issue of our day; and that if we can see our way here we shall discover both the vision and the power for other and cognate tasks.

Why, then, do we claim that pacifism is the inevitable corollary of our theological and religious convictions? Because for us pacifism is involved in (*a*) our concept of God and of his mode of creative activity; (*b*) our understanding of Jesus and the method of his redemptive and atoning work; (*c*) our apprehension of the Holy Spirit and of the *koinonia* established by him. Put less technically these involve (*a*) a belief that in the nature of God and, therefore, in his dealings with man and in man's true way of life, love is always primary and justice derivative; (*b*) that in the teaching and atoning work of Jesus it is plain not only that those who take the sword perish by the sword, but that the sole redemptive activity is the power of the love that gives and suffers, that is of the cross; (*c*) that worship and fellowship, the love of God and the love of men, are inseparably united; that what is wrong for the individual cannot be right for the community; that the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace — a way of living of which modern warfare is a

flagrant denial; and that it is only as this way of life is realized that the ministry of the church can become creative, regenerative, and inspirational.

In summarizing these convictions we have set them out in the order of the creed, the order of the three persons of the Godhead. For more detailed examination it will be well to change the sequence and to begin with the revelation in Jesus Christ. This revelation is for Christians primary in importance, normative in influence, and universal in scope. From it are derived our characteristic concepts of God and man, our standards of faith and conduct, our ministry of reconciliation to the world. We will, therefore, consider the pacifist position in relation to (1) the revelation in Jesus; (2) the nature of God; (3) the experience of the Holy Spirit.

1. THE REVELATION IN JESUS

Three preliminary conditions should first be noted:

(1) The appeal to the authority of Jesus has too often taken the form of the citation of one or two *logia* divorced from their context and treated as finally decisive. This was excusable in days when the literal and infallible inspiration of the written word was generally accepted. Even then too often it was evident that " the letter killeth." It is true that our understanding of the spirit and mind of the Master depends largely, though by no means solely, upon His recorded utterances, but these must be studied with a due sense of proportion and perspective. In the discussion of pacifism far too much attention has been focused upon a few phrases and incidents: " let him sell his cloak and buy a sword," " render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's," the " strong man armed " or the " scourge of small cords." [1]

[1] A full discussion of the New Testament evidence is contained in G. H. C. Macgregor's book, *The New Testament Basis of Pacifism.*

(2) The recent tendency to set the so-called prophetic and apocalyptic interpretations in sharp contrast is dangerously misleading, especially when prophetic is identified with minimizing and humanistic, and apocalyptic with a crude supernaturalism which too often serves not as in the New Testament to emphasize the immediacy and supremacy of the divine activity, but to postpone its effects to a period outside history and to relegate it to a sphere of fantasy and superstition. The antithesis repeats the error of those early Christologies which insisted that Christ was *aut deus aut homo,* thereby denying the reality of a true incarnation, and divided up the Gospel records, ascribing some to the manhood and others to the Godhead, thus representing Christ as an actor playing two alternating parts and destroying the possibility of any true atonement. In regard to pacifism this tendency has led some theologians to exaggerate the transcendental and other-worldly aspect of Christ's teaching and to denounce the faith that God's will can be done on earth as it is in Heaven — indeed to condemn the effort to secure peace and social righteousness as mere humanism: it has similarly led others to sunder faith from practice and to treat the problem of peacemaking as if it could be solved without reference to or dependence upon God.

(3) That there exists a real element of paradox in our apprehension of the person of Christ, or indeed of the relation between God and the world, is manifest. To bring infinite and finite into harmony, to live eternally in a world of change, to accept an unlimited obligation and work out its implications step by step — this is the crux of discipleship. It is best seen in the revelation in Jesus, not in the contrast between his divinity and his humanity, but in the mode in which he combines the insistence upon uncompromising perfection with the tenderest patience in wel-

coming and encouraging the first motions of the awakened conscience. He claims that we love our enemies that we may be the sons of our Father and full-grown; yet He does not say to the centurion: "Resign your commission, otherwise I cannot help you," or to Zacchaeus: "Give up your way of life; then I will come and abide with you." He takes men at the point where they are, shows them a horizon and bids them set out towards it: as they start towards what they see, wider vision is attained. For the pacifist this combination of an absolute goal with a step-by-step progress is of the highest significance. Believing that the rejection of all war is involved in the gospel, he has no desire to condemn past ages in which this element of the Christian way was ignored or rejected. It is enough for him to urge that now, when at last the conscience of the church has become aware of the iniquity of war, we must seize the opportunity which that awareness offers and act upon it. Each age, each generation, would seem to have its own characteristic challenge to meet: it is false to the method of Jesus to refuse the morsel of bread offered to us because we cannot gain the whole loaf at once.

With these preliminaries we turn to the revelation in Jesus as it bears upon our problem — that is to its prime content and to the corollaries that are involved in the matter of pacifism.

(*a*) That revelation is for the Christian literally a *mysterium* — an unveiling of the secret of God in the dramatic form of a historic life, and an initiation of the disciple into the fellowship of the mystery. It is declared in positive, not negative, terms, and through the medium of the revealer's own personality rather than by words or acts, save as these are the means of expressing personal quality. Of this quality love is the only appropriate description, but love stripped of all sensuousness and sentimentality, love which

includes and transcends the so-called eternal values, love august, austere, patient, sensitive, forgiving. Such love Jesus declares to be the sole creative reality: God is not king or judge but Father; and his reign involves for his children the acceptance of no conditions save the eyes that see, and the lives that are transformed. To make men aware of God, Jesus uses no cut-and-dried formula but a variety of resources, poetry and parable, aphorism and appeal, prophecy and apocalyptic, sign and sacrament, such as justify Clement of Alexandria's description of him as the "many-colored Wisdom" of God. His objective is always the same, to win men, not in the mass, but as each a person with special and unique characteristics, not by compulsion, but by a self-acknowledged and freely accepted constraint, to the knowledge of God which is eternal life.[2] "He that hath ears to hear, let him hear": if men are deaf, he will try again — though he knows that the issue at stake is one of life or death. He will not use force to compel belief: his means are always in accordance with his end.

But always beyond his words and deeds it is his own embodiment of the mystery that impresses itself. St. Mark's account opens with the acknowledgment of his "authority" by the people at his first public appearance, and closes with the centurion's confession at his lonely and "accursed" death. Whatever interpretation we put upon his God-consciousness, his claim to messiahship, his agalliasis utterance (Matt. xi. 27, Luke x. 22), his parable of the wicked husbandmen or his reply to the high priest, it is

[2] I am naturally conscious that scholars who think it possible by analysis of the evidence to categorize Jesus will condemn this description as unscientific. To me it seems that the efforts to describe Jesus in terms of prophet or apocalyptist, ascetic or social reformer, preacher or wonder-worker, have demonstrated the many-sidedness not less than the essential simplicity and universality of his revelation. We bury him with a descriptive formula: he rises from the grave on the third day.

manifest that all the varied evidence in the New Testament has in common its insistence upon the unique, revealing and redemptive person of the Master. The story of the man born blind, whether authentic or not (John 9), is wholly typical: " one thing I know, that whereas I was blind now I see " leads up to " Lord, I believe " and to the appropriate worship. It is in the face of Jesus Christ that men most plainly see God.

(*b*) The immediate result of this vision is to shatter all the subterfuges of man's pride. Jesus rejected for himself and for his mission all reliance upon success and prosperity, upon race and privilege, upon power and prestige. Like God he respects not the person, the mask and outward show, of any man. He came as one of the chosen people; he ministered to the lost sheep of the house of Israel. He came to a world of war and statecraft; yet would not strive nor cry. He came to establish a kingdom and a covenant; but rejected all the traditional means to kingship and all the customary conditions of covenant-making. Confronted with him, our vanities and ambitions, our fears and jealousies, look mean and contemptible. Neither race nor sex nor status nor any sort of merit entitles us to bargain for God's love. We are equal — in being unprofitable servants: equal in the dust of our humiliation. Thus humbled we no longer judge one another: the desire to flatter our conceit by disparaging our neighbors, and the need to armor ourselves against them disappear. We are prodigals whose only cry is " Father, I have sinned." And because to him who has lost all all is given, those who thus die to self discover and enter into life. Having nothing, they yet possess all things.[3]

Jesus himself, unlike the theologians, said nothing of the fall of man and very little directly about sin — least of all

[3] 2 Cor. 4:7–10 and 5:4–10 set out the contrasts in fuller terms.

about the sins which it is fashionable to denounce. Forgivingness was, for him, the one condition of forgiveness; and forgivingness was at once the proof and the consequence of repentance. As men caught a glimpse of the vision of God, so inevitably their outlook upon their fellows would be transformed. They would see clearly, but with compassion, not contempt: they would serve, yet neither for reward nor with any sense of condescension: they would love, and their love would be free alike from the wish to exploit the beloved and from the moral laxity which loves him, faults and all. Discovering God, they would discover therewith a right relationship with their fellows; and in that relationship the antithesis between justice and mercy would be done away. Redemption, regeneration, justification, atonement, whatever the metaphor by which theology describes it — and all are partial — this way of life accompanies and depends upon the knowledge of God.

(*c*) There remains the question of the mode by which this transvaluation of all values was to be accomplished. For our purpose some further consideration of this is necessary. Love, the love of God and the love of neighbor, is the end to be attained. The means of attainment must be consistent with that end. God cannot deny himself, and if God is love then love's way is universally applicable, and the use of any method that denies love will lead to damnation and ultimate disaster. We cannot do evil that good may come; for even though God can bring good out of evil, by choosing evil, we not only pass sentence upon ourselves but involve the innocent in unmerited suffering. It is to love's way that the Christian is committed when he accepts the cross as the token of his allegiance.

For though we must deprecate any isolation of the cross from the ministry that preceded it or from the series of experiences — resurrection, ascension, Pentecost — that

followed, it is in the cross that the *mysterium* reaches its culminating moment. Jesus chose the cross. Men wished to make him king: his disciples expected thrones and rewards: he indicated (as in Matt. 26:53) that his choice was not due to impotence or lack of alternatives. He chose the cross, refusing to allow that physical force could speak the last word, refusing either to escape or to resist — chose it as the Father's will and his own foreseen way. It may be that the form of his hopes of deliverance was cast in terms of apocalyptic and that in the cry of dereliction this hope failed him. But at least the result vindicated his choice. It was by the cross that he accomplished the release of his disciples into the new life: it was as the Crucified that they proclaimed him Saviour. It is strange that the church, accepting the cross as its banner and recognizing it as the means of our salvation, has been so slow to realize that to take up the cross is the essential condition of Christian fellowship, an obligation upon all its members, and that the way of the cross is the only road towards newness of life for it and them and the world. Can anyone who reflects upon the Crucified seriously argue that modern warfare, either in its course or in its effects, is or can ever be consistent with cross-bearing, though its victims, the men who struggle, the women who suffer, may find even there a veritable crucifixion?

For the way of the cross clearly involves these axioms: — (*a*) that we must renounce any form of compulsion which treats human beings as less than persons, free to reject: Jesus, yearning over his people, yet submitted himself to their verdict rather than coerce their obedience; (*b*) that we cannot overcome evil by evil: Jesus, bearing the effects of man's sin in his own body, yet forgave and did not cease to love; (*c*) that the only redemptive power in the universe is the power of the love that is ready to give and suffer to the uttermost: Jesus triumphed upon and by Calvary.

That Christ enabled and his disciples attained a way of life such as we have tried to describe is proved not only by the quality and atmosphere of the scriptural records but by the evidence surviving from the early days of the church. When we penetrate behind the books that owe their importance to their value for subsequent dogma and ecclesiology to the remnants that preserve for us the life of the earliest Christian communities — to the *graffiti* of the catacombs, or the testimonies of the martyrs, or to letters like the *Ad Diognetum* — we find proof of a vitality, a sense of freedom and joy and infective fellowship which, for those who share it, has made all things new. The origin and spread of Christianity cannot be explained, nor can its true character be understood, if this is ignored. It owed its power not to its *cultus* or creed or organization; these were simple, experimental, and secondary; but to the quality of personality and of personal relationships which Jesus had revealed and imparted. Running through the centuries of Christendom there is a constant reappearance in individuals and groups of this same quality. The calendar of the canonized — though on the whole the standard of Catholic saintliness attaches exaggerated importance to otherworldliness and often verges towards the hysterical — the early Reformers, the Moravians and Quakers, and many an unacclaimed saint in all the denominations display it. Where it appears, like salt, it seasons and preserves. Its recurrence goes far to show that it is no ephemeral product of the first century; its wholeness, sanity, and creative power refute the suggestion that it is abnormal or morbid: it may fairly claim to represent human nature at its richest and highest level. Integration and adjustment, or as the Christian would call them, reconciliation, are everywhere characteristic of it. In the early church it has explicitly insisted that warfare and military service were inconsistent with it; and even in the ages when " just wars " were sanctioned by the church,

its representatives are men of peace. Indeed, the valuation of human life which war accepts, the mass-hatreds which it fosters, the destruction which it achieves are manifestly incompatible with it. Nowadays, when the last rags of romance have been stripped from the trade of arms, when the shrinkage of the world has made all war civil war, and when terrorism and indiscriminate massacre have become the means to victory, the Christian ought no longer to shelter himself from the stark fact that " all war is contrary to the spirit and teaching of Jesus Christ." [4]

2. THE NATURE OF GOD

It is not enough to describe the revelation in Jesus, or to draw attention to the persistent quality of its effects. The question must be asked: Is this revelation consistent with the nature of God as this is seen in the universe? To claim that love is supreme may seem to ignore the claims of justice; to insist upon peace to deny the part taken by struggle in the creative process; to abjure all war to open the way to the unrestrained triumph of evil. Can we regard our interpretation of Jesus as compatible with (1) the teaching of the Old Testament; (2) the facts of evolution; (3) the witness of human history?

(1) It is well for us as Christians to discuss the special difficulties raised by the Old Testament before the more general problems. For to many, and especially those brought up to believe in the inherent inspiration of the Bible, the Old Testament concept of God is hard to surrender; and for others the belief that Jesus not only reverenced but endorsed it fosters a readiness to set Old and New side by side and even to pronounce that they represent alternative modes of the divine activity.

It is a familiar fact that the church's acceptance of the

[4] C.O.P.E.C. Conference Resolution, *Proceedings*, p. 287, April, 1924.

Old Testament raised difficulties which have perhaps never been fully solved. The contrast between the law and the gospel, strongly felt and boldly dealt with by St. Paul, was not then finally settled. In the next century, Marcion produced his *antitheses,* and rejected the whole of the old Scriptures. In the next, Alexandrian ingenuity found in the allegorical method a means of explaining and explaining away discrepancies. It was not until the commentaries of Theodore of Mopsuestia that the critical and historical approach, with its recognition of the time-factor, the limitations of an author's language and vision, and the consequent development in biblical teaching was first explored. With the condemnation of Theodore and the closing of the Patristic Age the problem was abandoned: Old and New were united in an uneasy partnership and so remained until the scientific method employed in the past two centuries set the Old in its proper subordination. Even now the extent to which the church and Christian thought are influenced by Old Testament concepts, strictly irreconcilable with Christ's religion, is hardly recognized. The significance of the parable of the patch on the new garment (Mark 2:21) is ignored by those who claim the right to gloss and supplement and thereby evade the plain meaning of Christ's teaching by interpolation from that of the old dispensation.

In the matter of war there is little excuse for so doing. Matt. 5:21 ff., 38 ff., 43 ff. deal with the specific issue and leave no doubt that in the much overworked text, " I came not to destroy but to fulfill," Jesus meant not " incorporate " but " bring to perfection." That pre-Christian teachers found it natural to speak of God as Lord of Hosts and as sanctioning warfare, is less surprising than the fact that, in spite of their Master's teaching and example, and the condemnation of war by the greatest leaders of the early

church, Christians after Constantine should have come to terms with it. Marcion's real error was not so much in rejecting the Old Testament, as in regarding it as a rival competitor for allegiance, in ignoring history, and in setting up a false contrast between love and justice. If God is love, then we can recognize that justice has its proper task in purifying, regulating, and stabilizing the relationships which love originates: justice divorced from love, justice which does not spring from and subordinate itself to love is, as St. Paul saw plainly, arbitrary and impotent.

(2) But is belief in love as the source and goal and in reconciliation as the mode of God's action in the universe consistent with what we know of the character and evolution of the natural order? Probably the conviction that the struggle for existence and the consequent survival of the fittest have been the chief if not the sole means of evolutionary development is more than any other argument the basis of the general belief in the scientific and, therefore, ultimately ethical value of warfare. That very many, accepting this concept of struggle and elimination, reject not only the pacifist but the Christian and theistic positions, is plain. If the cosmic process is what most biologists maintain, then are we not compelled to believe either that Jesus is wholly mistaken, or at least that the God of Jesus is not the God of nature, and that in either case warfare is a biological necessity?

In the state of confusion prevalent at present in the region of biological theory, it is profitless to examine the problem in detail. Suffice it to say (*a*) that if it were demonstrated that the operative causes at work in the creative process were irreconcilable with Jesus' revelation of God, this would be for many of us a fatal challenge to our faith; we must hold to our confession that creator and redeemer are ultimately of one essence; (*b*) that while the whole

question of the operative causes is at present in dispute, the process has at least produced mankind and the manhood of Jesus: we cannot know and have no right to suggest that any element in the whole evolutionary record is irrelevant to that end; in any case we cannot explain the whole in categories, physical or organic, too low to explain its highest parts; (*c*) that a capacity in the individual for increased sensitiveness, wider freedom, and larger range of adjustment and for a closer and more conscious cooperation with other individuals, is the quality that possesses survival value; that each stage of development shows an increase in such qualities; and that the goal would, therefore, appear to be a fellowship of full-grown members, freely cooperating for the attainment of their own highest ends; (*d*) that the element of struggle which has played so large a part in progress has itself steadily changed its character, developing from crude physical conflict through stages in which psychological factors play an increasing part: if there can be no end to effort, we may fairly claim that our conflicts today should be on the spiritual level, " warfare against principalities and powers," as St. Paul called it, and that to employ human instruments capable of such conflict as cannon-fodder in physical strife is to prostitute them and to set back the evolutionary process; (*e*) that if we are appalled at the suffering, ruthlessness, and evil inherent in the creative process, we ought to recognize that there is no issue here which is not raised in a more acute form by the crucifixion of Jesus: if we accept the cross as congruous with the love of God, we ought not to be surprised that a similar method is adumbrated at every stage of his activity.[5]

(3) It remains to consider the objections which may be raised from the standpoint of human history. If we are

[5] I have dealt more fully with this aspect of the pacifist position in my book, *Is War Obsolete?*

not justified in condemning pacifism on the authority of the Old Testament, or as inconsistent with the evidence of the evolutionary record, does not the story of humanity and, for the Christian especially, the traditional teaching of the church, prove that war plays an essential part in human affairs and that the Christian cannot refuse to admit that it may be justifiable, as, if not itself a good, at least on occasion the less of two evils? Is there no place in Christianity for the " just war "?

Here again a preliminary observation should be made. Pacifists have sometimes oversimplified the statement of their case by the attempt to draw a sharp line between physical force and other means of constraint and to assert that there is no place for the former in the Christian life. This is inconsistent with the incarnational principle which maintains the sanctity of the body as the symbol and instrument of the spirit, denies that matter is evil, and refuses the dualism of Gnostics and Manichaeans. Force which negates love and does violence to the personality of others is sinful whether it be physical or psychic: if it is used for selfish ends, to exploit and dehumanize, the Christian, condemning the end, will condemn the means: that it can be used to the glory of God and in the service of love is a necessary corollary from belief in the Incarnation.

Yet it remains true that the advocates of brute force have not been the formative or creative influences in history. The Egypt of the Pharaohs survives only in museums: the Israel of Moses lives and has shaped the world. Nebuchadnezzar is a bare name: Jeremiah, despised and rejected in his own day, is a spiritual splendor for all time. Rome and the Caesars might have followed Babylon into nothingness if the Christian church had not inherited and preserved their empire — a *damnosa hereditas* no doubt, but

if we condemn the compromises that accompanied it we must at least recognize the superior survival value of religion over militarism. Those who argue that the future belongs to the big battalions might well reflect upon the verdict of posterity as between Paul and Gallio, or Peter and Nero. It is difficult not to feel that human history enforces the lesson, which evolution indicates, that the pioneers of progress are not the secure and successful, the heavily armed and violently aggressive, but the sensitive and the suffering, who live humbly and dangerously.

Particularly is this the case when we consider the history of the church more closely. In the earliest period, when military service was regarded as incompatible with Christianity, and the Christian accepted martyrdom rather than the supremacy of Caesar, the weak things of the world triumphed over the strong. When loyalty to the *Una Sancta* was undermined by the desire for imperial favor and Christian conviction was accommodated to pagan politics, the spiritual energy of the church declined: personal ambition, local rivalry, and ecclesiastical prestige imperilled both its unity and its sanctity. A period of compromise, if not of subservience to political expediency began, and the church with few and splendid exceptions abandoned its task of converting the world in favor of securing its own position in it. Few students of history will dispute the facts of secularization and of a consequent distortion of doctrine and lowering of ethics. The acceptance and even glorification of war is only one proof among very many.

If it is argued that it was inevitable that the church should accept the "conversion" of the empire and ally itself with the state, no one who believes in the reality of the *Una Sancta* or concedes to it his primary loyalty can view without shame the destruction of Christian brother-

hood by the rivalries of Christian nations, or be content to subordinate his ecumenical faith to the exigencies of politics. That nationality and race play a great part in human affairs and that the church cannot ignore them is manifest; but today, when even in secular affairs the need for world unity is evident, it is surely time for Christians to remember that they are committed to the service of a Master in whom the barriers of nation and race are done away. It may well be doubted whether the church has ever received any spiritual gain by acquiescing in war; it is plain that today, when the desire and possibility of a world-wide and universal Ecclesia have gripped the conscience of Christians, the church should return to the example of Christ and of his early disciples and claim that, for those within the fellowship of the *Una Sancta,* there can be no more compromise with military service.

For it should not be forgotten that even when the church accepted the necessity of war it strove to humanize and regulate it, and was never for long easy in conscience about it. *Justum bellum* never meant a righteous war, but a regular war as opposed to personal feuds or freebooting. The *Summa Theologiae,*[6] if it sanctions *justa bella,* insists that they must fulfil the three conditions that they be waged by command of proper authority, for a just reason (that those against whom it is waged deserve it) and for a right intention to promote good or avoid evil, " not in greed or cruelty, but in zeal for peace." It quotes and endorses Augustine's words: " the desire to injure, cruelty in taking vengeance, an implacable temper, savagery in attack, lust for dominion — these and the like are rightly condemned in war." [7] We may legitimately wonder that on this showing any wars could be justified: certainly modern warfare outrages Augustine's conditions: and if the official church,

[6] II. 2. Q. 40. [7] C. Faustum XXII. 74.

heavily involved in secular affairs, could speak thus, there were constantly both individuals and sects who refused to justify them.

Moreover, if scholastic theology and Elizabethan articles agree in asserting the duty of obedience to the civil power in this respect, it is plain that the position then existing has been radically changed. If there are aspects of modern life which make us hesitate to claim any general moral or spiritual superiority over our forebears, at least it is certain that today as never before the conscience of Christians has become acutely aware of the evil of war, and has, in fact, gone far towards totally repudiating it. Sins done in ignorance stand on a wholly different moral level from those done against the light. When some great cause, the abolition of slavery or of war, challenges a generation, then the opportunity must be seized, or we are guilty of treason against God. We have surely learnt from the records of the past twenty years that war, even if undertaken for the best of motives, does not achieve its high objectives, that it inevitably inflames passion and distorts justice, injuring the victors almost as grievously as the vanquished, and sows a crop of hatreds and fears which, instead of ending war, choke the hope of any lasting peace. If we agree that war is evil and that to say " let us do evil that good may come " is to be justly condemned, then surely our duty as Christians is plain.

Finally, if the general attitude to war has changed, war itself has become vastly different. It might be possible to argue in the old days of restricted conflicts and professional armies that military action was only an extension of police action, or at least that an analogy existed between the enforcing of civil order and the settlement by arms of international strife. That analogy is, indeed, still employed, though the changed character of modern war has destroyed

whatever validity it may have possessed. There was always a fallacy in it; for in civil life both hangman and victim are subject to an authority higher than themselves, while the nation, owning no superior allegiance, is itself both judge and executioner. But today, when warfare means not a duel on the grand scale, but wholesale slaughter by thermite and mustard-rain dropped from aircraft, all semblance to police action has disappeared — unless we are prepared to revert to the days of the whipping-boy, or to the habit of torturing his relatives when you could not punish the criminal. It may be that consideration of the effects of war is irrelevant to the moral question, and in any case the appeal to fear is to be deprecated: but that modern warfare is so monstrous a sin that no sane man could sanction or justify it, would seem plain to any who are familiar with its character.

Indeed, no one can reflect on the development of civilization during the past century without realizing that the opening up of the world, the abolition of the barriers of geography, the spread of an international culture and science, commerce, and finance, the interdependence of every people not only upon it neighbors, but upon the whole human race, have created a situation that calls for a new mentality and a new organization of society. The world must achieve an ordered and cooperative unity. The feudal concept of self-sufficient warring nations, the imperial and racial absolutisms of the past, should be regarded as obsolete and intolerable. The unrestricted right to private ownership, whether by the individual or the state, must give way to the interests of the human commonwealth. The cut-throat competition alike in industry and in armaments means ultimately not merely disaster for others but suicide for itself. The truisms of Christianity, " no man liveth unto himself " and " we are members one of an-

other," must be accepted as truths, and supplemented by that other truism that "man's life does not consist in the multitude of the things that he possesses." In these days no nation can bear its own burden unless it also helps to bear the burdens of all: no community save that of all humanity is large enough to deserve our full obedience: ultimately only the kingdom of God can satisfy and save us. If the church is blind to the opportunity now given to it for the first time of fulfilling its commission to baptize all nations into him in whom is neither Greek nor Jew, bond nor free, it will have been guilty of an inexcusable failure to realize the signs of the times.

3. THE EXPERIENCE OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

It remains for us to examine more closely the resources available in Christ for the conversion of his world, the nature and scope of the communion and community which were the fruit of Pentecost, and in so doing to answer the widespread criticism that pacifism is an unpractical ideal, that the Christian ethic cannot apply to corporate life, and that no such consummation as we seek is guaranteed by or inherent in the gospel. It will be well to take this last point first as preliminary to our enquiry.

We have already noted that the apocalyptic element in the New Testament, to which attention has been rightly drawn in recent years, has in its practical bearing been gravely misrepresented. Apocalyptic is, as all experience shows, the natural ideology of those who are shaken out of their complacent reliance upon material security and made aware of the dynamic energy of God. To what extent the disciples or their Master understood its catastrophic language as to be fulfilled in a series of physical events is an exegetical problem into which we need not enter: that they did believe in a speedy and shattering manifestation of di-

vine action is certain — and some of us will claim that in a deeper sense than they realized they were not disappointed of their hope. At least, they were convinced that the triumph of their Lord was assured, that the vindication of the cause for which he had been crucified would be accomplished, and that his reign would be established — and might be set up at any moment. This assurance that God's new age was at hand is the exact antithesis of the view that it is useless to expect and false to maintain any such change within human history. To say that the gospel contains no warrant for belief that the kingdom will come within history or in this world is to accept a creed not of hope but of despair. There have been exaggerations and lack of proportion among the advocates both of the so-called social gospel and of a purely individualist soteriology; in reality each involves the other, and the church must work for the conversion and edifying of individuals and for the regeneration and reform of society simultaneously.

It is then in the faith that the apocalyptic hope, rightly understood, is no delusion that we turn to the question of the origin and character of that community-feeling (*koinonia*) which Pentecost enabled and which our age so urgently needs.

It is unnecessary to state at length the evidence of psychology or of history as to the integrative power of an ideal plainly visualized and strongly desired. Nor can any student of current affairs doubt that when this ideal finds its embodiment in a living personality it can transform the lives of all who give it their allegiance. The " leader " lifts his followers out of egoism and inward conflict; releases in them for service all the energies, conscious and subconscious, frustrated by self-seeking and inner disharmony; and inspires that service to the attainment of definite and concrete purposes. Moreover, in this escape from self and consecration to a common aim, there is created a fellowship

which ceases to be a mere federating of discrete units and becomes a vital and organic incorporation; and this fellowship becomes richer and more creative in proportion to the quality of the ideal that originates it and the end for which it exists. A leader who fails to appeal to the deepest spiritual aspirations of his followers, a program which fails to satisfy their sense of value, produce a weak and transient community, weak because ultimately men will only give their uttermost for the highest, transient because repressed and unsatisfied aspirations are seeds of disruption. A community held together by loyalty to the incarnate God and dedicated to the service of his universal reign ought to exhibit a strength and permanence beyond all other human associations. That the church is, or should be, such a community is surely the conviction of us all. Of this community the Pentecostal *koinonia* is at once the example and the guarantee, and the Pauline doctrine of the body having many members is its best description.

If, then, we are called to such an incorporation "in Christ," this vocation should determine our attitude towards all other loyalties and associations. No one will wish to deny their worth: family or firm, nation or race — these lesser loyalties serve a real and valuable purpose. Few would wish to dispute that the break up of the medieval church-and-empire concept and the rise of sects and nations marked a step forward in human affairs. In any world order there must be room for devolution of responsibility and variety of contribution: all members have not the same office. But when the nation claims independent and self-sufficient autonomy and acknowledges no higher end than its own well-being, the unity of the body is destroyed by war in its members; and the human units composing the nation are faced with a conflict of loyalties and the complex ethical problems so familiar to us all.

It is urged by some critics of pacifism that this insistence

upon the supernational claim of Christ ignores the teaching of the New Testament and the importance of the state in God's purpose for mankind. The belief that the civil power has a right to receive obedience and that its ministers are exercising a divinely bestowed vocation is based principally upon the difficult *logion* in Mark 12:17 and parallels, upon Rom. 13:1–10, 1 Pet. 2:13–17, and Titus 3:1. It is to be noted that of the two longer passages that in Romans concludes with an exhortation to love, since " love is the fulfilling of the law," and that in 1 Peter advocates submission in order that by well-doing you may refute those who criticize you as wrong-doers: these passages may justly be taken as forbidding recourse to civil strife, they cannot be quoted as endorsing a blind subservience in matters recognized as evil. It may further be noted that this attitude is not shared by all the books of the New Testament, and may, perhaps, be argued that in any case the instructions given to the tiny communities of the apostolic church cannot be regarded as literally applicable to the changed circumstances of today.

But the pacifist accepting a ministry of reconciliation will plainly feel it his duty to accept every obligation of citizenship unless this clearly contravenes his loyalty to Christ. He will recognize the religious value of the state, will accept its officers as possessed (in some sense) of a sacred ministry, and will welcome the responsibility of working out his discipleship within the structure and fellowship of its body politic. If he cannot without apostasy accept loyalty to " my nation, right or wrong," and is bound to scrutinize the demands of patriotism in the light of his Christianity, he will realize that the conflict of loyalties when his conscientious conviction and his obligation to his country contradict one another is a crisis that demands the most searching self-criticism. To break the unity of the

nation, to weaken its power to enforce its will, to increase the burden and endanger the lives of his fellows, is to take a course which none may follow lightly or in self-will. He must admit that if he is to share in the corporate life of a particular Christian community, indeed if he is to live at all in a world permeated with evil, he can hardly avoid some compromise and some share in collective guilt. Is he justified in renouncing the duties of citizenship at the point where they involve military service? Has not the state, which has secured for him the benefits of citizenship, the right to claim that he die or kill in war at its command?

No Christian can admit the divine right of the state to order him to abjure Christ — else the martyrs were slain to no purpose. No Christian can believe that to do God's will can be anything less than to serve the highest interests of his country — else God is either not God or not love. We are forbidden to do evil that good may come — and wilfully to do what we are convinced is wrong is to fall into open sin. Our problem comes back to the simple question: Is warfare, modern warfare, an instrument which a Christian can use? If the Bishop of Gloucester is right in stating [8] that a Christian when faced with a moral issue must ask himself what Christ would have done in these circumstances, the answer in this case seems plain: it is to many of us inconceivable that our Lord could have used or sanctioned the bombing-plane or the rain of poison gas.

Moreover, if he holds this conviction as binding upon him as an individual, he is bound to contest the belief that what is wrong for the individual may be right for the state; that the safeguarding of the lives and liberties of its citizens is an end which justifies any means for its achievement; that the ultimate basis of government is the use of physical force; and that a state can acknowledge no law higher than

[8] *What it Means to be a Christian*, p. 152.

that of its own preservation and aggrandizement. It is not enough to argue that the claims of the totalitarian state are incompatible with Christianity; the Christian will criticize the feudal and divisive notions of national and racial prestige which deny the universality of God and obstruct the unifying of mankind. If we are to apply the apostolic injunction we should, at least, remember that it was to the world-wide supremacy of Caesar not to the disintegrating autonomies of modern nations that the apostles bade us be in submission; and that submission did not imply the abrogation of the law of love.

To break the unity of the nation, to repudiate the duties of citizenship, to stand alone against the enthusiasm of mass-emotion and the power of organized propaganda is a duty which the church will only achieve if it takes seriously the stern demands of Jesus, and allows no other consideration whatsoever to usurp his claim to primary and whole-hearted loyalty. That in recent centuries hardly any community of Christians has been able to resist the pull of nationalism or even to denounce the idolatry which identifies the welfare of a nation with the will of God is proof of the difficulty of the problem and of the potency of ingrained habits of mind. It seems to many of us self-evident that considering the character and opportunities of the present international situation, the nature and effects of modern warfare, no sane man can consent to a statesmanship based upon purely national considerations and appealing in the last resort to the verdict of war. For the Christian, commissioned to a supernational loyalty and the supremacy of love, the issue is doubly plain. Common sense and religion are in this at one. Yet the church hesitates: hesitates at a crisis when a clear and united decision by Christendom might arouse the world from its nightmare of terror and impotence: hesitates although her Mas-

ter's teaching is not obscure, and the last twenty years have demonstrated that it is impolitic as well as unchristian to serve Christ by methods appropriate only to Moloch.

As stated at the beginning of this paper, any attempt to consider the scope of a pacifist program has been omitted. It is merely necessary to repeat that pacifism is not to be identified with a negative abstentionist policy, but involves a re-examination of the social, economic, and political orders in the light of Christianity as well as a ministry of reconciliation and of evangelism; that, although the concrete problem of war may rightly be made the subject of concentrated and immediate attention, pacifism is only one aspect of Christianity and involves a way of life affecting all relationships; and that the church, while wholly repudiating war, should press upon its members the duty of constructive peacemaking by giving active support to such movements as seek to remove the causes of strife, or by initiating proposals more drastic than those which non-Christian statesmen think practicable.


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